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It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.
Holmes, J., 1903.1
[W]e would be better advised to adopt as a legal maxim what has
long been the wisdom of mankind: De gustibus non est disputandum.
Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no use litigating




It is axiomatic that the quality of speech-its goodness or badness
from a literary, artistic, or aesthetic perspective, or its effectiveness in
communicating to an audience-should bear no relationship to its
protection under the First Amendment. This was made clear at the
very beginning of modern First Amendment jurisprudence, when the
Court, often speaking through Justice Holmes, extended free speech
protection to "silly little" pamphlets and dangerous ideas unartfully
put.3 As recently as the 1994 Term, the Court extended full First
Amendment protection to an analytically incomplete and
grammatically imperfect anonymous flyer distributed by Margaret
McIntyre, a 47 year-old housewife and mother, at a public meeting on
a school bond referendum in Columbus, Ohio.4 In the fields of
obscenity,5  defamation,6  privacy,7  literature,8  film,9  and the
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,251 (1903).
2. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
also Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
4. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n., 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
5. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973); Pope, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
6. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. In the public disclosure privacy tort, for example, a disclosure's "offensiveness" to
ordinary sensibilities is relevant, but this concerns social norms and tolerance, not the
presence or absence of aesthetic or literary quality. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 856-63 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON]; Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Reviited: Privacy, News,
and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133 (Oct. 1992).
8. See, e.g., 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure' v. Attorney Gen. of
Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
9. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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performing arts, 10 the quality of the writing or performance, and even
its accuracy, bears no relationship, at least as a threshold matter,11 to
the application of the First Amendment's protection.
As with most axioms, the axiom that the quality of speech bears
no rightful relationship to the First Amendment's application or to its
protection knows exceptions. Indeed, First Amendment doctrine, it
turns out, is riddled with them. In the field of obscenity, for example,
qualitative considerations are made relevant to the very application of
the First Amendment. Expression that meets the definition of
obscenity is treated as if it were not speech at all, and thus the First
Amendment is simply inapplicable to restrictions placed upon it.
1 2
Courts employ a similar approach with defamatory speech. 3 More
often, however, the Court passes by the threshold question, treating
the speech as if it were protected by the First Amendment, and then
proceeds to calibrate the rules for the extent of its protection based, in
whole or in material part, on qualitative considerations. Defamation is
an example of this approach, as well, when the issues of accuracy and
intent are brought into play,' 4 but the methodology is more explicit in
the areas of privacy, where newsworthiness is considered, 5 and
commercial speech, where questions of deceptiveness and truthfulness
are made an explicit part of the constitutional standard.' 6 As we will
see, however, qualitative considerations run much deeper than even
these examples suggest.
10. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (concerning the
rock musical "Hair").
11. As discussed at length in this article, considerations that bear a resemblance to
qualitative judgments do often play a role in calibrating the level or extent of First
Amendment protection to be afforded to certain types of speech, but this issue is addressed
after the initial determination that the speech is protected by the First Amendment. I thus
distinguish the application of the First Amendment from the degree of its protection. This
methodology is well established in the areas of defamation (where falsity and intent are
explicitly made relevant) and privacy (where newsworthiness and justification are
considered), but it is implicit in many other fields of First Amendment doctrine as well,
such as obscenity, indecency, copyright, and various applications of time, place, and
manner doctrine.
12. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 34-35.
13. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
14. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
15. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); SIDIS v. F-R Pub. Corp.,
113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Briscoe v. Readers Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (1971).
16. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557 (1980); infra text accompanying notes 399-435.
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Notwithstanding the Court's implicit attention to considerations
that may fairly be described as qualitative in nature, the Court's
opinions have been carefully crafted to avoid any explicit
acknowledgment that the quality of speech is relevant to the First
Amendment. The axiom's rhetoric has thus been consistently
maintained. Recently, however, the Court has had to carve exceptions
even to this rhetorical artifice. The clearest example of this has
occurred in the Court's decisions sustaining government regulation of
indecent and offensive speech. In a line of cases beginning with FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, the Court has explicitly premised free speech
protection on considerations of impact, value, and the need to employ
offensive means to communicate an idea.17 Similarly, the rapidly
expanding technologies of communication have forced the Court to
explicitly broach questions of value and utility of speech as
preliminary considerations going either to the application of the First
Amendment or to the degree of its protection. 18 The campaign finance
cases, too, have tended recently to follow this path.19
It could be claimed that the Court's decisions in the obscenity,
indecency, campaign finance, and broadcasting and communication
technology areas comprise only narrowly carved and carefully
confined exceptions whose presence does not undermine the general
and broadly applicable rule that quality is not relevant to First
Amendment protection. On the surface of the Court's doctrines this
appears to be the case. But once the surface is broken the axiom
quickly dissipates, revealing a surprisingly broad range of criteria
consistently applied by the Court in First Amendment decisions,
criteria that bear the unmistakable imprint of quality.
Quality, of course, is a complex and ambiguous concept which
knows many definitions, ranging from the ideological and political, for
example, to the aesthetic, the stylistic, and the technical. My goal is to
identify the role that quality plays in the Supreme Court's free
expression jurisprudence. I am therefore obliged to explain, at the
outset, precisely what I mean by quality.
17. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 S. Ct. 1043 (1996).
18. The earliest decision employing explicit standards of quality, including value and
utility as well as audience impact, was probably Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969). A more recent example is Turner Broad Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994),
dealing with cable television.
19. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990);
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
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Just as the concept of quality cannot be captured in a single
definition, so also the Supreme Court's treatment of the concept
cannot be reduced to one definition only. Indeed, one of the
interesting and perhaps fruitful aspects of the Court's First
Amendment cases is the variety of qualitative measures that are both
explicitly and implicitly applied. I will therefore structure my analysis
around a series of different concepts of quality which I set out below
in a roughly descending order, from the most general to the most
specific, or from the most ideological to the most technical and,
finally, to the explicitly aesthetic.
The categories, or definitions, that I will employ are: (i) quality as
subject matter (the ideological content, whether political or social, of a
communication, and its value); (ii) quality as meaning (the meaning a
communication has, or conveys, by which its status and protection is
judged); (iii) quality as communication (the effectiveness with which
meaning is communicated, and by whom); (iv) quality as technique
(the extent to which a communication conforms to conventions of
style, presentation, and the like which are characteristic of its genre);
and (v) quality as aesthetics20 (whether the communication embodies
some non-rational transformative dimension).
In the pages that follow I will discuss the five forms of quality in
order. For each I will begin by briefly describing, with examples, what
the form, or category, means and considerations upon which it rests. I
will then turn to a more detailed discussion of the manifestations of
these forms of quality in the Supreme Court's opinions, extracting,
where possible, elements of the Court's approach to such qualitative
forms in order to judge their appropriateness as measures of quality
under the First Amendment.
My purpose is to break through 'the surface appearance of the
Court's First Amendment doctrine across a wide range of fields, from
political speech to obscenity, commercial advertising,
misrepresentation, entertainment, literature and the arts, and humor. I
will assemble along the way the various manifestations of quality that
the Court regularly, although implicitly and perhaps unconsciously,
20. Dictionary definitions of "aesthetic" typically refer to a sensory and non-
intellectualized, or sensuous (tonal or texture or timbre, for example) perception.
THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY VOL. 1 at 147-48 (1961), contains the
following definitions of "aesthetic":
"(1) Of or pertaining to sensuous perception, received by the senses. Obs. (2) Of
or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism of the beautiful. (3) ... Of things: In
accordance with the principles of good taste (or what is conventionally regarded
as such)."
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considers, and the variety of qualitative criteria that the Court
employs. I will argue that any regime of First Amendment doctrine
that falls short of absolute protection for all communication will
inescapably broach questions of quality. The important issue,
therefore, is not whether quality should be relevant to the First
Amendment, but instead when, how, to what extent, in what form, and
with what justification it should be considered. Quality, in short, is
relevant to the First Amendment, but until that fact is acknowledged
the prevailing axiom that quality is irrelevant stands in the way of
developing a systematic and speech-sensitive approach to identifying
exactly when and why it should be considered.
I
Quality as Subject Matter
By quality as subject matter I mean, principally, the value of the
content of a communication from a political, social, or ideological
perspective. The Supreme Court frequently employs this measure of
quality, and almost always explicitly. In its obscenity decisions, for
example, the Supreme Court has held that certain classes of sexually
explicit material are not to be treated as protected speech if they "lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."21 At its core this
rule reflects the judgment that obscene content is "of such slight social
value"22 that it does not warrant constitutional protection under the
First Amendment. It thus reflects a judgment that, from an ideological
perspective, the subject matter of explicit sex for its own sake is not
socially and politically constructive, and is perhaps destructive of
other values (such as democracy, rationality, and the Western ideas of
progress and work and linear truth).
23
A less obvious but still fairly straightforward application of
quality as subject matter is manifest in the Court's defamation
jurisprudence. The Court's statement in Gertz v. Welch, for example,
21. Miller, 413 U.S. at 124. The Miller rule contains within it elements of more than
one form of quality, as I have defined it. See infra notes 62-73, 144-146, 436-474 and
accompanying text.
22. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. See also 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure,'
383 U.S. at 418.
23. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 15; REPORT OF THE ATFORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION
ON PORNOGRAPHY (1984); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT
(1975); Catherine A. McKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-




that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact"24
bristles with ideological content. At one level it embodies an idea of
objective truth, itself a disputed ideological proposition,25 and
concludes that false fact, not being true, lacks value. The reason for
this is strikingly similar to the Court's obscenity reasoning: false fact is
not socially or politically constructive, for the social and political
orders are premised on reason and logic; false fact is often destructive
in its corrupting effect on the Aristotelian search for truth.
26
At another level false statements of fact are deemed destructive
of the preferred social and political order. As Justice Powell put it in
Gertz, "[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless error materially
advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open'
debate on public issues."27 The corrupting influence of false fact,
therefore, threatens not only the commitment to truth through reason,
but also the set of political and social norms (democracy, resolution of
disputes through reasoned discourse, truth-seeking, and consensual
processes) that rest on the larger ideology of Western thought.28
At yet a third level the Court's defamation jurisprudence, and
particularly Gertz, reflects qualitative concerns of social value and
ideology in the sharp distinction it creates between the public and the
private spheres. In Gertz Justice Powell stated that the "interest in
compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires
that a different [and less speech-protective] rule should obtain with
respect to them" 29 than applies to public officials or public figures.
While Justice Powell explained the lower degree of First Amendment
24. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,340 (1974).
25. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TExT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE
SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too (1994).
26. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 323; Richard Delgado, Words that
Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 133 (1982). Surprisingly, the Court's statements about the lack of value in false
fact are largely a product of the constitutional jurisprudence, not of the underlying
common law defamation tort, for the defamation tort did not rest liability on false fact, but
instead on reputational disparagement caused by publications, whether they are factually
true or not. At common law truth was a defense of justification; truth, alone, would not
necessarily suffice by way of defense. It was not until its constitutional decision in
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), that the Court held that
falsity must be proved as an element of the tort, and Hepps did not apply that requirement
to all defamation actions, but instead only to those against a media defendant involving a
matter of public concern. Id. at 777.
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
28. See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA (1991).
29. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
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protection for defamations of private persons on the grounds that
public figures, in contrast to private individuals, have greater
opportunities for self help and have waived some measure of their
reputational interests by voluntarily entering the public spotlight,30 the
true ground for the distinction, implicit in Justice Powell's opinion and
made explicit later,31 was the differential constitutional value accorded
to public, as opposed to-private, subject matter.32 It is speech on
"matters of public concern," the Court would later say,
that is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection. .
[Sipeech on matters of purely private concern is of less First
Amendment concern... [as] "[there] is no threat to the free and
robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with
a meaningful dialogue or ideas concerning self-government .... 33
The idea thus expressed-that individuals enjoy autonomy from
the larger social order and are entitled to have that autonomy
reflected in law, even First Amendment law-is of course a deeply
ideological one with roots firmly planted in the soil of individualism.34
A final illustration of the role of quality as subject matter can be
found in the Supreme Court's public forum jurisprudence. Here
subject matter considerations are narrower in focus, usually
situational, and less broadly ideological. Roughly speaking, the Court
has divided the places in which claims of right to engage in speech
occur into three broad categories. The first is the "traditional" public
forum, including public streets, parks, and sidewalks where speech is
presumptively permitted and the government is limited to content-
neutral time, place, and manner rules for its regulation.35 At the other
extreme is privately-owned property, on which virtually all speech can
30. See id. at 344. Both rationales have been roundly criticized as gross
overgeneralizations and, even if largely true, unrelated to the First Amendment's purposes.
See, e.g., LEE BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 25-26 (1994); Steven Shiffrin,
Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV.
915, 952-53 (1978).
31. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-60
(1985); Hepps, 475 U.S. at 778.
32. See supra note 31.
33. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759-60 (citations omitted).
34. See Robert C. Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic
Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654 (1993).
35. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY LAW REV. 189 (1983); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); International Soc'y For Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
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be prohibited by the owner, for any reason, with the assistance of the
law.
36
Between the extremes of traditional public forums and private
property lie limited public forums, a range of public places and
facilities in which speech may occur as of right, but only as to subject
matters that the government is entitled, if it chooses, to assign to that
place or facility. 37 Thus public concert halls, for example, may be
restricted to concerts;38 a school's internal mail system may be
restricted to school and education-related communications;39 bus
advertisements can be restricted to commercial, rather than political,
messages;40 and airport terminals can be made free of solicitation.
4 1
While such restrictions are expressly based on the subject matter of
speech, and more specifically the subject matter's compatibility with
the use to which the public property has lawfully been dedicated, the
subject matter distinctions are different from those applied in the
obscenity or defamation cases.42 In those cases the subject matter
standards were broadly ideological, based on general social and
political norms. In the limited public forum setting, however, the
subject matter distinctions are situational and descriptive, resting not
on broad ideological grounds but on grounds reflecting more practical
and instrumental value, such as preserving the seating and
architectural quality of a theater, preserving limited space or resources
for its intended use, and the like.
In such cases, the Court's qualitative determinations are largely
interpretive and definitional: does a given speech activity in fact fall
within or without an assigned subject matter field, and what are the
appropriate boundaries of that assigned subject matter? Beneath
these interpretive and definitional criteria, however, are more
normative and often ideological considerations. Is rap music as
legitimate a genre as classical music?43 Is unionization activity by
36. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
37. See Stone, supra note 35; Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management:
The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987).
38. Cf Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). See also David
Day, The Hybridization of the Content-Neutral Standards for the Free Speech Clause, 19
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195 (1987).
39. See Perry, 460 U.S. 37.
40. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
41. See Lee, 505 U.S. 672.
42. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. See also Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
43. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (involving Two Live
Crew's parody of Roy Orbison's "Pretty Woman"). See also discussion infra Part IV.D.2.
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public school teachers education-related? 44 The ideology, or the
qualitative judgments about value, in other words, often lie at the
definitional fringes of the challenged regulation. The Court's opinions,
therefore, are necessarily focused on identifying those definitional
fringes as a matter of first amendment principle. 45 But while the public
forum decisions are one step removed from the Court's more explicit
definitional analysis in the obscenity and defamation settings, similar
qualitative judgments resting on social, political, or ideological value
are inextricably embedded in the Court's public forum analysis.
In light of these illustrations, a few general observations should
be made about quality as subject matter and its roots in considerations
of ideology and value. First, this form of quality should be seen as
functioning independently of the other forms of quality discussed in
this article. That is to say, its role in the Court's decisions must be
separated from the often interrelated questions of meaning,
effectiveness, technique, and aesthetic quality. Quality as subject
matter, or value, assumes a communication's meaning (whether rightly
or wrongly, as I will discuss later) and rests on considerations that are
independent of such questions as the effectiveness of the
communication employed, the technical attributes of the
communication, or its aesthetic dimension. Instead, judgments based
on the quality of the subject matter of a communication look only to
whether the communication's content or message conforms to
identified ideological preferences, political, social, or otherwise, either
as a general matter or in a specific instance.
The second observation is that judgments based on the quality of
the subject matter of communication, or on its consistency with
identified ideological premises, are not necessarily to be condemned
in all instances. My purpose here has simply been to identify what is
meant by this form of quality, and to illustrate its functioning through
selected examples. The Constitution and the laws of the political
system, however, rest upon various ideological premises, such as
"democracy," "equality," "freedom," "private property," and
"progress." In view of this, it may be perfectly appropriate to rest
qualitative, subject matter-based judgments about speech on a
communication's conformity to, or at least capacity for coexistence
with, such constitutionally-based values. This is precisely what the
44. See Perry, 460 U.S. 37.
45. See Stone, supra note 35; David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78
IOWA L. REv. 143 (1992); Post, supra note 34 at 654; Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech,
106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
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Court has done in both obscenity and public defamation cases, when it
resorts to history and to the fundamental premises of the
Constitution's structure.4 6  Whether and when this might be
appropriate, of course, depends on one's view of the importance of
other (non-First Amendment) constitutional values, and also on what
one takes the First Amendment guarantee of free speech to mean.
These are topics that we will turn to in later sections.
II
Quality as Meaning
Quality as meaning refers to the meaning or meanings of a
message, or the content actually given the message by the speaker, the
text, or the audience. Judging a communication's meaning is a subtle
task involving various interpretative methodologies, for the
message(s) intended by a speaker often vary from the text or the
audience's perception. At common law, for example, a speaker was
responsible for a statement that was understood to imply marital
infidelity even though the speaker had no such implication in mind
and the text conveyed no such assertion.47 In such cases the common
law placed a message's meaning in the hands of the audience, as
interpreted by the jury.48 The Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment is not violated by such a rule of interpretation.
49
Liability frequently rests upon the meaning of a communication.
Thus, as a matter of First Amendment law the assignment of meaning
is a central question in free speech cases, and the Supreme Court is
inexorably drawn into deciding how meaning is to be ascertained and
46. See Roth, 354 U.S. 476; Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. See also Bickel,
supra note 23.
47. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 112, at 796; William L. Prosser, Libel Per
Quod, 48 VA. L. REV. 839 (1960). The common law rule was effectively abolished in public
defamation cases by the requirement that actual malice-knowledge of falsity or serious
doubts actually entertained about truth-on the part of the publisher be proved. See St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). It may have been undermined to an uncertain
degree in the private libel cases covered by Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, where a lower standard of
negligence is permitted, at least "where... the substance of the defamatory statement
'makes substantial danger to reputation apparent."' Id. at 348. Thus, where the defamation
is purely inadvertent, as in Prosser's "classic" case of Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., 4 Fr., Sess.
Cas., 645, 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (1902), where a newspaper published a story that the
plaintiff, who some readers knew had been married but a month, had given birth to twins,
Gertz implies that there can be no fault.
48. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 112, at 796.
49. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
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what the precise meaning(s) of a disputed communication actually is. 50
The Court cannot escape becoming engaged in a complex interpretive
enterprise that goes to the heart of quality, for beneath all
determinations of quality lie interpretations of meaning based on
intent, textual analysis, and audience understanding and reaction.
The quality of a Monet, for example, cannot be judged without
engaging in all of these interpretive methodologies. Even after doing
so, of course, the resulting qualitative judgment may remain deeply
personal and idiosyncratic to the interpreter. So it is, also, with speech.
But judgments about the meaning of speech in the legal system,
where criminal or civil consequences ensue for the speaker, must by
necessity reject any universal rule that all meaning is idiosyncratic.
Such a rule would disable the legal system from regulating conduct
that occurs through the act of speaking, whether that conduct be
extortion, perjury, defamation, fraud, or harassment. The Supreme
Court does not have the art critic's luxury of offering a judgment
without consequence, with at least tacit acknowledgment that it
expresses the view of only one (experienced) interpreter and need
not-perhaps should not-be generalized. The Court must instead
draw a series of lines: the first between those communications that
should be treated as idiosyncratic (and thus subject to no general legal
consequences) and those that should not; the second between those
communications in the latter group whose meaning can be assigned
(in whole or part) through application of general rules of
interpretation (the speaker's intent prevails, for example, or the words
or images in the text itself, or the audience's perception), and those
whose meaning is judged on a case by case basis. Finally, the Court
must decide among categories ,of speech to which one or another
general interpretive rule applies. A few examples will illustrate the
varying approaches the Court has taken to the assignment of meaning
to communications.
A. Idiosyncratic Meaning
In the field of the creative arts, literature, and creative writing,
the Court has often adopted the rule that meaning is not a question
for courts, but is instead an idiosyncratic matter best left to individual
interpretation. While this seems to be the Court's approach, it has
50. See Randall P. Bezanson & Kathryn L. Ingle, Plato's Cave Revisited: The
Epistemology of Perception in Contemporary Defamation Law, 90 DICK. L. REV. 585
(1986).
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been accomplished largely by judicial silence and abnegation rather
than through explicit holdings in the Court's opinions.51 Thus the
meaning conveyed by a poem or a song is a question greeted by
judicial silence: it is not taken as a given, or assumed, but rather
treated as legally irrelevant. 52
But this approach is not universally applied even to all cases
involving the fine arts and literature, and its implications must be
clarified and circumscribed. The Court, for example, has carved fairly
broad swaths out of the rule for a number of subject matters. If the
meaning might be obscene or indecent, the fact that the
communication is claimed to be art or literature does not foreclose
interpretive steps geared toward determining whether those meanings
are present. 53 We will turn to the Court's obscenity or indecency
jurisprudence shortly.54 Similarly, if the subject matter of the speech is
claimed to be commercial, even if that meaning arises out of the
creative process of advertising, the Court will interpret the
communication's meaning to determine if that is so.55 Finally, if it is
alleged that a communication is defamatory, even if it is artistic or
literary, the Court will apply the rules of interpretation to judge its
meaning.
56
Sufficiently important public interests, it appears, serve to limit
the application of any presumptive rule of idiosyncratic meaning even
as applied to speech which is aesthetic or artistic or literary in
character. We can view this approach as either setting a definitional
limitation on the "aesthetic," or as carving a set of exceptions from an
otherwise generally applied background rule of declining to judge
meaning for artistic or creative material. The Court's silence makes it
impossible to ascertain which, if either, alternative accounts for the
Court's decisions; and that silence likewise makes it impossible to
51. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903); Pope
v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. See Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 50, at 586. It is not irrelevant, of course, if a
poem's meaning, for example, is determinative of the legal claim. In such cases courts will
focus on questions of meaning; often, however, concluding that no single meaning is
ascertainable and therefore there can be no liability. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
7, § 111 at 773-77, 780-82, § 112 at 796.
53. See, e.g., 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure,' 383 U.S. 413; Miller,
413 U.S. 15; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
54. See discussion infra Part IV.F.
55. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626 (1985).
56. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 111, at 773-77, 780-82.
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know precisely what qualities (visual, emotional, genre-based, etc.)
might contribute to a distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic
expression.
5 7
The limited nature of the Court's abnegation of assigning
meaning to aesthetic communication should also be noted here,
though it will be addressed in considerable detail in parts V and VI of
this article. The only qualitative question with which we are now
concerned is the assignment of meaning to a communication. This is a
distinct question from judging the quality of that meaning, as the
Court does in many speech settings including, for example, in the
obscenity cases discussed above.58 More importantly, judging meaning
is a distinct undertaking from judging the quality of the process by
which a meaning is communicated or, more significantly, its technical
or aesthetic character. As we will see in later sections, even with
aesthetic communication the Court often permits judgments to be
made about technique, and in limited circumstances even engages in
aesthetic evaluations.5 9 For present purposes, however, it is important
only to understand that judgments about a communication's meaning
are analytically distinct from (though clearly interwoven with)
judgments about subject matter, value, technique, and aesthetics.
B. Rules Governing Meaning
The second broad category of cases in which meaning is assigned
consists of those instances in which the Court, usually explicitly,
applies general rules that govern the way meaning is ascertained. The
rules vary, sometimes resting meaning on the audience's
interpretation; at other times basing it on the speaker's intent; and in
yet other settings resting meaning on the literal text (or descriptive
image) of a communication.
57. For further discussion of possible grounds for such a distinction, see discussion
infra Part V.
58. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
59. This is particularly the case in the patent, copyright, unfair competition,
commercial advertising, and journalism (libel and privacy) settings. See, e.g., Campbell, 510
U.S. 569; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491
U.S. 657 (1989). These and other cases are discussed at length infra at text accompanying
notes 237-245, 343-391.
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1. Received Meaning
60
Perhaps the clearest example of the first rule, where audience
interpretation dictates meaning, is obscenity.61 In Miller v. California
62
the Court held that a communication is obscene if the trier of fact
determines that, to "'the average person applying contemporary
community standards'... the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interests;" that "the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law, and. :. [that] the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
63
The Miller test establishes an explicit and unambiguous rule
governing the interpretation of meaning. The rule has two largely
complementary parts. First, the determination of meaning in
accordance with the substantive criteria is to be made by the trier of
60. Other settings in which audience interpretation dominates the question of
meaning include trademark infringement (see discussion infra Part IV.D.3); the public
disclosure privacy and emotional distress torts where outrageousness is a determinative
standard of liability (see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652 (1989); Hustler, 485
U.S. 46); and religious expression alleged to violate the Establishment Clause. The
dominance of audience interpretation in the Establishment Clause setting is of fairly recent
origin. The earlier inquiry into the principal purpose and effect of government action
favoring religion, including expressive action, established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971), has been replaced by an inquiry focused on whether the government's action,
such as the display of a creche, constitutes an "endorsement" of religion. See, e.g.,
Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Whether the relevant Establishment
Clause standard is Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard, Justice Kennedy's coercion
standard, or variants on them, each share in common a determination of whether the
government's communicative action (speech, symbol, etc.) will be understood to represent
a government endorsement of a religious sect, belief, or of religion itself, based on the
audience's perception of the communication judged in terms of a reasonable observer's
subjective perception. Under this approach the Court has, for example, distinguished the
meaning of a menorah (no endorsement) from that of a creche (endorsement) in the same
display, based on the prominence and location of the creche as well, one suspects, as the
interpretive experience the average person would bring to the "endorsement meaning" of
a creche (representing a symbol of a dominant religion and a politically active group) as
opposed to a menorah. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573 (1989).
61. The constitutionally troubled field of indecency applies the same approach,
though without the protection accorded by the rule that otherwise obscene material does
not include material that possesses serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Because of the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the Court's new indecency
jurisprudence, my discussion will focus on the more certain ground of obscenity law. See
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997); Denver
Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374; Turner Broad., 512 U.S. 622.
62. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
63. Id. at 24.
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fact.64 This means that the interpretation of meaning is made a
question of fact. Moreover, the fact determination is to be made by
the trier of fact, usually a jury, on the record of the proceeding.
65
Inasmuch as the questions of fact (whether the allegedly obscene
material appeals to the prurient interest, depicts or describes sexual
conduct, is patently offensive, and lacks serious value) focus on the
content of the communication as interpreted by the jury (or
community), not on the speaker or the text alone, the interpretation of
meaning exclusively rests on the perception of an audience-the
jurors.66 Indeed, the jury is entitled to rest its entire judgment on a
viewing of the challenged material (film, book, pictures, for example),
unaccompanied by any further evidence.
67
The second aspect of Miller's interpretive regime is that, at least
with respect to the communication's appeal to prurient interest, the
meaning is to be judged by "contemporary community standards."
68
In other words, the perception of an audience consisting of the local
community is to determine the meaning to be ascribed to the
communication.69 The jury's role is to interpret the material through
the lens of its community, based on the jurors' individual and
collective judgments about the norms and values of the community.
70
In the end, however, this undertaking most likely results in the second,
community-based, interpretation collapsing into the first, with the jury
engaging in its own collective interpretation which, for all practical
purposes, serves as an approximation of the community's
interpretation.
The important point, however, is that in obscenity cases, as in
indecency cases, a communication's meaning-from which significant
legal consequences flow-is governed by the interpretation given it by
the audience. Communication is a complex phenomenon, but it can
roughly be described as a process involving a speaker, a text, and a
receiver, or audience. A communication's meaning is a product of all
three stages; indeed it usually involves the interaction and re-
interaction of each stage, as well as the influence of persons and
groups external to the communication. As content is conveyed,
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 26.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 30-31; Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
68. 413 U.S. at 24.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id.
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meaning is ascribed by an audience, meaning is reshaped by the
speaker and the text, influenced by forces governing the perception of
the audience, and finally modified or perhaps radically transformed by
the medium in which it is transmitted. Hearing George Carlin speak
the famous seven words is certain to yield different meanings to a
person witnessing the act in a theatre as opposed to someone seeing it
on television as opposed to someone hearing it on the radio as
opposed to someone reading from a text.71 It would likewise have a
different meaning to a Baptist than to an atheist; or to an American
than to a Saudi. These interpretive differences serve to explain, in
part, why the meaning of all communication is, to some degree,
idiosyncratic, and why communications scholars ordinarily describe
communication as a process of negotiated meaning.
72
In Miller the Supreme Court, perhaps for good and certainly for
practical reasons, abruptly short-circuited the interpretive process,
permitting all elements but the audience and the community and
cultural forces working on it to be cut out of the assignment of
meaning. Perhaps the subject of sex is sufficiently universal and one-
dimensional in the meaning it conveys to warrant application of such a
blunt instrument. Perhaps considerations of subject matter and
content, based on cultural and social ideology, justify such an
approach even if it is acknowledged to yield gross error. Whatever the
justification, constitutional or not, the Court in the obscenity cases has
determined that meaning will be ascribed and that the process of
ascribing it will be based on a clear, though oversimplified, rule of
decision: the jury as the audience controls a communication's
meaning.
73
71. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,(1978).
72. See, e.g., UMBERTO Eco, THE ROLE OF THE READER 3-43, 47-89, 125-72, 175-99
(1979); STEPHEN R. SHIFFER, MEANING (1972); ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 173-276 (1966); JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS
(1962); A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC (1936); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 1958); Tony Bennett, Texts, Readers, Reading
Formations, 16 BULLETIN OF THE MIDWEST MOD. LANG. Ass'N 3-17 (1983); Ulric
Neisser, The Process of Vision, 219 SCi. AM., Sept. 1968, at 204-14; Christian Metz, Aural
Objects, 60 YALE FRENCH STUD. 24 (1980).
73. Obscenity is not the only First Amendment setting in which audience
interpretation is the governing approach to meaning. In Hustler, First Amendment
protection was accorded a Hustler Magazine parody of Reverend Falwell because it was
political satire, a conclusion that rested on the jury's finding that the publication "could not
'reasonably be understood as describing actual facts ... or actual events ... ' 485 U.S. at
57.
Other settings include religious speech, where the question is whether a governmental
use of a religious symbol constitutes an endorsement; trademark infringement; and the
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:275
2. Intended Meaning
Obscenity is not the only field in which the Court has adopted a
rule governing the interpretation of a communication's meaning. But
the rules that have been adopted are not always the same. In
defamation, for example, the common law's traditional reliance on the
jury as the trier of fact, and thus the principal interpreter of a
statement's meaning, has been limited in public libel cases by a set of
constitutional rules that operate to shift the interpretive authority to
the speaker. Thus a speaker can not be held liable for defaming a
public official or public figure unless she published a defamatory
statement with actual malice.74 Actual malice, in turn, requires that
the defamed party prove that the publisher knew, at the time of
publication, that the statement was false, or actually entertained
serious doubts as to its truth.
75
The actual malice requirement thus functions as an interpretive
trump card, requiring that the defamatory meaning contained in the
text or understood by the audience be overridden by the intention of
the speaker. A statement implying to its audience that a public official
is corrupt, or even containing the specific allegation, is not legally
defamatory unless the author was aware of the implication, thus
intending it, and knew it to be false when published or actually
entertained serious doubts about its truth.76
The actual malice test, of course, operates not as a rule of
liability, but as a privilege, protecting statements that would otherwise
be tortious, and thus it does not go to meaning, as such, but instead
legal responsibility for meaning. But the rule, privilege or not, governs
the legal consequences of meaning and thus governs the law's
interpretive process, just as the rule of audience as interpreter of
meaning functions in the obscenity cases. In neither instance would
the Court claim that the meaning thus given for legal purposes is the
"true" meaning of a communication; it is instead its legal meaning as
determined in both cases by legal rules, governed by the First
public disclosure privacy tort, where outrageousness is the generally applied standard. See
supra note 60 for a discussion of some of the relevant settings and cases.
74. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; St. Amant, 390 U.S. 727; Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991). See also
Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. 657.
75. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
76. See Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1; C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel,
Defamatory Meanings, and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times v. Sullivan, 78
IOWA L. REV. 237 (1992).
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Amendment, for the ascription of meaning. Both approaches,
obscenity and defamation, moreover, are blunt-edged and crude
instruments with which to judge the infinitely more complex process
of interpreting a communication's meaning.
3. Textual Meaning
A final example of the Court applying a fixed rule of
interpretation of meaning is found in the clear and present danger
test. Unlike the audience-based approach of obscenity or the speaker
based approach of the actual malice test,77 a central and dispositive
element of the clear and present danger test looks only to the text of a
communication, relieving the speaker of liability if the text does not
contain words that are "directed to" inciting an audience to violence.78
Thus in Brandenburg v. Ohio79 the Court held that speech advocating
illegal violence could only be proscribed when "such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action."80
The "directed to" language requires that the words used by a
speaker-the text read literally-contain language specifically and
literally calling on people to engage in immediate illegal activity. Thus
language containing no express words but conveying a meaning of
direct incitement to an audience, as with the parent of a raped child
reading the Bible's "eye for eye" language to a mob gathered before a
jail in which the alleged rapist is incarcerated, would not constitute
prohibited, or more accurately, unprotected incitement to violence.81
In such a case the communication's meaning would be governed by its
text, not by the speaker's intention or the audience's understanding.
This result is justified in First Amendment terms as a necessary
limit on the idiosyncratic meanings that communications can have,
and thus as a rule of prudence designed to prevent persons from
remaining silent for fear of the consequences that might flow from
77. It should be noted that the clear and present danger incitement test also contains
elements based strictly on the specific intent of the speaker, thus making the speaker's
communicative intention determinative of meaning for legal purposes even though the
audience understood the communication to contain a different meaning. See Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
78. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of
Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719
(1975).
79. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
80. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
81. See id.
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unanticipated audience interpretations.82 The rule functions, like libel,
as if it were a privilege, limiting possible meanings but not denying
their validity. Yet, unlike libel, the incitement test's rule that the text
often governs meaning 3 is embodied in the definition of the speech
itself. This difference is not important, however, for the point is not
how the rule of interpretation is manifested, but rather that it is
applied.
These different rules of interpretation of meaning-speaker
intent, text, and audience/community-are reminiscent of the Court's
historic and unending struggle over approaches to interpreting the
meaning of the Constitution. In present day terms, the dispute on the
Court is defined in terms of textualism, by which the words are given
determinative weight; intentionalism, by which the intentions of the
authors of the Constitution receive paramount attention; and
interpretivism, by which the text's words and the values they reflect
are given meaning by reference to history (context) and widely
adopted cultural and social values (audience).84 The connection is not
surprising, of course, as the two interpretive problems are really the
same: how is meaning to be given a communication? What is
surprising, however, is that in the First Amendment setting, unlike the
Constitution-interpreting setting, such dramatically different
approaches coexist and are all applied, seemingly without thought of
inconsistency, by every Supreme Court Justice.
C. Complex Meaning
The third and final approach to interpretation of meaning the
Court applies is case and situation specific: that is, it applies in varying
measure all of the elements that contribute to a communication's
meaning-speaker intent, text, audience, and their dynamic
interaction-in an effort to ascertain the best meaning for a given
statement or image at a given place and in a given time. This approach
to interpreting meaning is thus not governed by a rule, but instead by
a process of fact-based judgment. Because that process ordinarily
82. See Gunther, supra note 78; Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.
1917) (L. Hand, J.).
83. The rule operates only one way. Thus, a communication containing direct words
will not therefore create liability. Other requirements must be met, and more importantly,
in such instances the speaker is entitled to prove that notwithstanding the text's containing
words of direct incitement, the audience did not so understand (or interpret) it. See
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
84. See Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177 (1987).
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embraces all of the elements that contribute to meaning-because it
acknowledges the frequent indeterminacy of meaning and the
complex and often idiosyncratic quality of the interpretive process-
the situational approach to meaning tends, as a general matter, to
yield speech-protective results. But its ad hoc, openly judgmental
nature also makes the approach susceptible to abuse and difficult to
control at the appellate level.
Perhaps the clearest, though certainly not the most famous,
example can be found in the field of trade libel, and more specifically
in the little-noticed Supreme Court decision in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union.8 5 The Bose case involved a technologically
innovative new Bose speaker, the sound from which was reported in a
Consumer's Union review to "wander about the room."86 Bose
considered the description to be very damaging to its reputation and
to the reputation (and sales) of the speaker and, therefore, brought a
suit against Consumers' Union for trade libel, or product libel.8 7 When
it reached the Supreme Court, it was clear that the case turned almost
entirely on a question of interpretation: what did the phrase
"wandering about the room" mean? It was not clear what meaning the
phrase was intended to convey by the author of the review, and it was
likewise unclear what those persons who read the review took it to
mean.88 Only if it were interpreted to convey a damaging meaning
would an action for product libel be sustainable. Thus the Court's
consideration of the question of meaning was precedent to any issues
of constitutional privilege, such as actual malice.
The Court's opinion is hardly a model of clarity or of interpretive
sophistication, and the Court made frequent references, as if it simply
could not help itself, to questions of privilege, negligence, and
malice.89 But in the end the case was resolved by a fact-based process
of judgment that looked to what the author of the review intended, to
the literal ambiguity of the text of the review, to the interpretation
given it by consumers who testified at trial, to the evidence of meaning
85. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
86. Id. at 488.
87. Id. Trade libel or product libel, more generally known as injurious falsehood, is a
distinct tort from the defamation tort, protecting a product or service, not an individual or
entity, and resting firmly at common law on a requirement that the plaintiff prove falsity
and actual economic harm, rather than on defamation's defense of truth and liberal
damage rules, but the torts are also highly similar. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, §
128, at 963-78; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1989).
88. 466 U.S. at 488.
89. Id.
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and impact supplied by sales figures, and (perhaps most importantly)
to the fact that the phrase represented an attempt to describe with
words an aural and fundamentally aesthetic feeling and perception.
90
All of these factors, considered carefully in an effort to fathom how
the communication process worked in fact, and assisted in significant
measure by a thorough analysis by the trial judge based on a complete
record, led the Court to conclude that the meaning yielded in the
communication process was not sufficiently ascertainable and
generalizable. 91 There was, in short, no single or predominant
meaning that could be identified, and therefore no way to justify
visiting the law's sanction on the review.
92
A second example of situational meaning is Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell,93 where the Court held that liability for intentional
infliction of emotional harm through parody was violative of the First
Amendment, largely, though implicitly, because parody's meaning is
too situational and indeterminate. 94 The parody was a play on a
Campari ad, with a cartoon depicting a young Reverend Falwell
leaving an outhouse following a tryst with his mother, which Falwell is
"quoted" as reporting as his "first time."95 Only if the challenged
parody were "believable" and if the publisher were aware of that
meaning (i.e. its believability), the Court said, could the publisher be
held accountable for liability based on that meaning.96 Believability, in
short, was a necessary check on the indeterminacy of a message's
meaning when it occurred in a genre and medium in which meaning is,
characteristically, indeterminate or situational.
I will say little more about what I term the situational approach to
interpretation, other than to observe that the approach finds its most
frequent application in selected corners of First Amendment law, such
as copyright and trademark cases,97 defamation cases in which a
statement's falsity is the principal issue,98 the privacy tort,99 and
90. Id. at 511-14.
91. Id. at 513.
92. Interestingly, much of this was accomplished under the guise of the actual malice
inquiry, but that fact does not detract from the substance of the Court's analysis. See
Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 50, at 585.
93. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
94. See id. at 55.
95. Id. at 48.
96. Id. at 56.
97. See infra Part IV.D.
98. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Tavoulareas v.
Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). See also infra Part IV.B.1.
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Lanham Act-type claims such as trade libel and product
disparagement." ° Much of my discussion in the sections that
immediately follow will focus in greater detail on how the Supreme
Court and lower courts apply the situational analysis of meaning, and
how that analysis is made part and parcel of the distinct but
interwoven judgments about the effectiveness of the communication
process and the technical quality of a communicative act. These are
questions that go more directly to the conventional sense in which we
use the word quality-to the goodness or badness of a communication,
or the effectiveness with which it actually achieves what it purports to
be. But the Court's approach to them reflects also its varied
approaches to the assignment of meaning to a communication.
D. The Meaning of Speech and the Meaning of Meaning
The Supreme Court's failure to develop a coherent approach to
assigning meaning is a reflection of deeper ambiguity about the
freedom of speech. The Court's opinions reflect genuine uncertainty
about what the First Amendment protects: does it protect "speech"
itself, as a thing to be privileged independently of its origin or its use;
or does it protect the act of speaking, an exercise of the individual's
liberty? Does the Constitution privilege speech, an artifact of
communication, or instead its production and use by individuals?
If it is the speech itself that is protected, questions of meaning
quickly become intractable. Whether something (a dog's bark, a bird's
song, a poster on which is written "God is Dead" and no more) is
speech, much less what its meaning(s) may be, are indeterminate. The
answers depend on timing, context, and the idiosyncrasies of those
who witness the potentially communicative thing. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to construct an approach to meaning on such uncertain
and shifting ground. It is even more difficult, for obvious reasons, to
build upon that ground judgments about the social value of the
speech, as the Supreme Court has often done.
If, instead, the First Amendment's business is privileging the act
of speaking--expressing oneself to one or more other persons-
meaning becomes a more tractable enterprise. If it is the liberty of the
speaker that is principally at stake, questions about the precise
meaning of what is communicated become secondary, for the
Constitution's protection is centered on protecting the liberty of the
99. See infra Part V.A.3.
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 623A (1989); infra Part IV.B.2.
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individual speaker to speak, whatever meaning(s) results. What is
important, in short, is not the message, but the messenger's liberty to
deliver it. And the liberty interest is not dependent on the value, social
or political, of. the message. Such questions become relevant, if at all,
only after deciding whether liberty is at stake (a question that
concerns the speaker's intent and little else), and they are relevant
only in determining whether the speaker's liberty produces substantial
harm to others, thus warranting regulation to limit the harm. The
question of harm is independent of, and subordinate to, the question
of liberty; it does, unlike liberty, often depend on meaning; but an
approach so structured limits the uses to which meaning is put and
effectively shifts the burden of proof on meaning, making it relevant
only to the extent that government can prove that a harm-producing
meaning has occurred in sufficient measure to warrant regulation of
the speaker's liberty to speak.
Finally, if the First Amendment privileges the use to which
speech is put-by the reader or listener, for example-questions of
meaning assume paramount importance but in a very different way
than in an approach based on privileging the speech itself. The
question will be whether the recipient put speech-indeed, any
communicative stimuli-to productive expressive use. One need not
assign meaning to the "speech" to make such a determination. The
question of meaning, instead, goes only to the meaning given by each
individual user, and whether that meaning was put to substantial
expressive use by that individual. Meaning, in other words, is tractable
because it is restricted to each particular recipient; its proof, however,
may be intractable, as may be the question whether the use was
expressive. More fundamentally, a use approach cannot be limited to
use of stimuli that we would ordinarily think of as speech, but instead
would privilege the use of any stimuli, whatever its nature or origin, so
long as it were used in an expressive way. This is why, as a general
matter, the Court has limited the First Amendment to privileging the
act of speaking and speech, but not the right to receive and use
speech.
These are three radically different approaches to the First
Amendment: Freedom of speech (focusing meaning on text and
audience); freedom to speak (focusing meaning on intent); freedom to
receive speech (focusing meaning on the audience). Each implies very
different uses of, and therefore approaches to, assigned meaning.
Until the Court determines the underlying theory of freedom
contained in the First Amendment speech guarantee, it can not begin
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Much has already been said in the preceding pages about the
complexities of the communication process and the negotiated
character of meaning. At the most basic level, a communication might
be described as consisting of three elements: a speaker, who originates
and formulates a communication; a text or, more broadly, a content
for the communication, Whether it be words or images in written, oral,
aural, or tactile form; and an audience.1 °1 But the process of
communication is infinitely more complex. The relationship among
speaker, text, and audience is not linear, but is instead repetitively
circular as each interacts many times with the other, shaping the
nature of the communication in the process.10 2 And other forces
outside the speaker-text-audience trilogy exert influence. Social,
commercial and political forces shape the way in which messages are
conceived and formulated, and the way in which audiences perceive
them. 103 And the medium itself, be it print, sound, film, video, real
time, or interactive, itself contributes force and also new meaning to
the messages communicated.1 4
In the previous section, we explored the way in which quality as
meaning is manifested in the Supreme Court's First Amendment
decisions. As meaning is the product of the communication process,
that process served as a benchmark against which to compare the
Court's approaches to identifying a communication's meaning in order
to define its legal character and the consequences that flow from it.
In this section we will look at the communication process from
another perspective, not as a means of extracting meaning, but instead
as an instrumental process that is employed to transmit meaning. The
question we will explore is whether and how the Court's decisions rest
on the effectiveness, from a largely technical standpoint, with which
101. See JAMES ANDERSON, COMMUNICATIONS THEORY, EPISTEMOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS (1996); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA (1964);
MICHAEL O'NEILL, THE ROAR OF THE CROWD (1993); Neisser, The Process of Vision,
supra note 72, at 204-14; Christian Metz, Aural Objects, 60 YALE FRENCH STUD. 24-32
(1980).




the communication process has been employed. In short, we will look
at the quality of the communication.
An example based on the famous case of Cohen v. California
10 5
may serve to illustrate the distinction between meaning and
communication. On a spring morning in April of 1968, Paul Cohen
walked down the long and crowded corridors of the Los Angeles
County Courthouse wearing a jacket with the slogan "Fuck the Draft"
painted on its back. He was arrested for disturbing the peace. Let us
assume that Paul Cohen grabbed the jacket in a rush from his
apartment, mistaking his roommate's jacket for his own, and that he
donned it unaware of the lettering painted on the back. We might
assume, also, that Paul Cohen agreed with the Vietnam War and that
as he walked down the courthouse corridor he had no intention to
communicate any message to the men, women, and children gathered
there, and certainly no intention to voice opposition to the war.
The Cohen case, as I have posited it, raises two quite distinct
issues related to the communication process. The first is the issue of
meaning. What was the message communicated by Paul Cohen's act of
walking down the corridors with the jacket on? Is the message
determined, for legal purposes, by Cohen's intention, by the text, by
the audience's perceptions when confronted, at that time and in that
place, by the lettering? Inasmuch as there was no dispute in the actual
case about Cohen's awareness of the lettering on the jacket, the
question of the meaning communicated was the issue upon which the
Supreme Court focused its attention.
But if we assume that Paul Cohen was oblivious to the lettering
on the jacket, a quite distinct issue going also to the communication
process is raised. Because the message conveyed (anti-war) differed
radically from that intended (no speech), the relationship between the
speaker and the communication process was, effectively, short-
circuited. Paul Cohen's communicative iritentions were subverted for
reasons that we might describe, in this crude example, as technical.
When this happens, should Cohen's actions be treated as speech
protected by the First Amendment? Communication clearly took
place, but in a real sense it emerged from the circumstantial ether of
coincidence and mistake, hardly different, we might say, from a bird's
song or lightning's thunderclap, both of which communicate. Or might
we say that the communication actually received by the people in the
courthouse corridors should not be deemed creditable speech under
105. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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the First Amendment because it was not, as a technical matter, the
intended product of a communication process?
The Court has suggested the latter answer, at least in the
expressive conduct setting.' °6 "[I]n deciding whether particular
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play," the Court has said, "we have asked whether
'[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and
(whether) the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."' 107 The Cohen case thus raises two
distinct questions (as I have modified its facts): first, what did Paul
Cohen's action mean to those who saw it; and second, did his action
qualify as communication for purposes of the First Amendment?
The second question is the one on which we will focus here.
When, and how, does the Court consider the effectiveness of the
communication process relevant to the First Amendment issues raised
in a case? Few cases, of course, raise the issue as starkly as the
example I have drawn from the Cohen case.108 But in a surprising
number of instances less dramatic breakdowns in the communication
process have drawn the Court's attention. The cases tend to gather
into three groups.
The first group consists of cases involving false fact, where the
question raised is whether the false fact communicated to an audience
was the product of inadvertence or mistake. This group also includes
copyright, trademark, and unfair or deceptive practices claims, usually
in the commercial speech or regulatory settings, where the question is
the legal consequences that flow from dissonance between the
intended message and the message actually received, especially where
the dissonance results from the impact of the medium or from
unanticipated interpretations by the audience.
106. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15; Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). While the Court has not said so explicitly, the
requirements it imposes in expressive conduct cases seem clearly geared to requiring that
such forms of speech possess the same elements that characterize direct speech. Were this
not the case, the logic of the Court's expressive conduct decisions would be questionable.
107. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11
(1974) (emphasis added)).
108. Interestingly enough, however, such cases do arise. A recent example (that did not
reach the Supreme Court) involved free speech claims made on behalf of beggars, on the
ground that their solicitation of funds also carried a message of social breakdown to those
who passed them on the sidewalk. The speech claims were rejected in the lower courts. See
Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993); City of Seattle v.
Webster, 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990).
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The second group consists of cases in which the speaker's
communicative intention is frustrated, often by the intervention of a
third party, so that the text and/or message received by an audience
bears no close relationship to the intended speech. The campaign
finance cases are the most recent and unambiguous example of such
situations.
The final group consists of medium-related claims, where the
Court appears to place higher demands of effectiveness of
communication on certain "mediums" of speech, such as multisensory
mediums like television or cable or, perhaps, the Internet, and on
certain types of speech, such as commercial speech.
A. Inadvertent Falsehood
In the first group of false fact cases, the Court's decisions seem
inconsistent with the communicative process the Court demands for
expressive conduct. 10 9 In the public libel setting, for example, the
inadvertent error is not made subject to liability, 110 though one might
expect the opposite result, since mistake in communication ought to
deprive the communication of First Amendment status, thus
subjecting it to liability as if it were conduct, or at least non-speech.
But such a result would clearly misconceive the communication
process. A fact communicated is an intended message that the
audience clearly understands as such. The purported fact's falsity is an
entirely separate question from its effective communication from
speaker to audience; it reflects the speaker's erroneous or mistaken
judgment about what should (in the interests of truthfulness) be
communicated, but not what is communicated. Similar reasoning
explains the actual malice requirement, by which libels are made
subject to liability if their falsity was (for all practical purposes) known
at the time of the communication.1 The imposition of liability on a
statement published with actual malice rests not on the absence of
effective First Amendment communication, but instead on the harm
the act of speech produces coupled with its relative lack of social
value. 1
12
However, in other settings the Court's libel cases do manifest
concern with breakdowns in the communicative process. In the
109. See Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
110. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
111. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 24-34.
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famous New York Times v. Sullivan case, 113 for example, the Court
focused on the common law form of libel per quod, by which a
statement could libel an individual even though the statement's
relation to that individual had been supplied by the audience, and was
thus not intended by the speaker. 114 The question in Sullivan was
whether the audience could reasonably understand the text to carry a
defamatory meaning toward Sullivan, who was the Montgomery,
Alabama, police commissioner during the civil rights protests when,
according to the advertisement at issue in the case, "truckloads of
police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State
College campus"' 15 and Dr. Martin Luther King "had been assaulted
and arrested seven times."'
116
The Court reviewed the statements and concluded that they were
"incapable of supporting the jury's finding that [they] were made 'of
and concerning"' Sullivan. 17 Thus, the libel did not rest upon the
Times' communication and the Times could not be held liable. 18 This
conclusion, of course, is only implicit in the Sullivan opinion, though it
is explicit in the common law rules of defamation.119 But the Court
was drawn to the issue, even though it was irrelevant to the- disposition
of the case,120 perhaps because it understood at an intuitive level that
communication requires the audience's interpretation of a speaker's
intention and text to be a reasoned one, and that if the communication
113. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
114. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 113, at 805.
115. 376 U.S. at 257.
116. Id. at 258.
117. Id. at 288. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding
that a publication about Reverend Falwell was satire and caricature, and thus could not
reasonably be understood to convey true facts about him), discussed at supra notes 93-96
and accompanying text.
118. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 292. Had the Court reached the opposite conclusion,
however, the common law of libel and, by implication, the Supreme Court, would have
permitted liability to be imposed, subject to other common law and constitutional
privileges, such as malice, which rest on questions of value and policy, not the absence of
protected communication. This is because the communication process, judged by the
Court's standard, would have broken down: the speaker's intention would not have
comported with the text or the message received by the audience, and therefore no
effective communication cognizable by the First Amendment would have occurred.
119. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 113, at 805.
120. The libel per quod issue was irrelevant because the Court had already held that,
assuming Sullivan could reasonably be the subject of the libel, no liability could be imposed
because there was no proof of actual malice on the part of the authors or signators of the
advertisement. 376 U.S. at 286-87.
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received is not a reasonable construction of the text conveyed it would
be inappropriate to rest liability on it as an act of communication.
B. Attempted Expression
What was only implicit in the Sullivan case, however, has been
made quite explicit by the Court in other cases, most notably the
campaign finance cases. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo the Court
struck down limits on campaign-related expenditures because they
unconstitutionally restricted core political speech,' 2' but sustained
restrictions on contributions made by individuals to support campaign
speech. 22 The distinction was grounded on the required elements of a
protected communication, and specifically the requirement that the
text and message received be a product of the person engaged in the
communicative act.123 While an expenditure (to buy space for an
advertisement, for example) is a necessary part of individual's
communication of his or her own message, "[a] contribution," the
Court said, "serves [only] as a general expression of support..., but
does not communicate the underlying basis for the support.'
124
Instead, "the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor.'" 125 This was
"speech by proxy,"'126 as the Court would later describe it in a variety
of settings involving not only individual contributions but speech by
organizations on behalf of their members,127 and speech by employees
as an agent of an employer128 -a form of "speech" that does not
qualify for full First Amendment protection as the contributors' or
members' own speech.
The expenditure/contribution distinction and the speech by proxy
idea upon which it rests reflect the Court's judgment that, for a
contributor, the communication process has broken down; that the
121. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 21.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981)
127. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604
(1996); California Medical Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 182; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). The cases are discussed in greater detail in Randall P.
Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735 (1995) [hereinafter Institutional
Speech].
128. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994);
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 .U.S. 454 (1995).
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contributor's speech intention has been cut off from both text and
audience by the intervention of a third party not acting as a direct
agent for the contributor. As a result, the contributor's act of giving
money, which can be described as attempted communication,129 or as
attempted speech, does not qualify as a communicative act protected
by the First Amendment because the trilogy of speaker, intended
message, and reception by an audience does not exist. The
contributor's act, in short, is not speech (though it is so intended), and
therefore can be regulated free of the tight constraints the
Constitution places on government abridgments of speech.'30 The
speech act, if there is one for purposes of the First Amendment,131
involves the communicative act of the candidate who uses the funds,
or the political campaign committee, or the organization of which the
contributor is a member.
Much the same analysis applies in the cases involving speech by
employees, where the challenge is to the public employer's authority
to regulate the employee's speech. While the Court's analysis has not
been as explicit in this setting as it has been in the campaign finance
setting, resolution of the employee Speech claims tends to depend on
whether the employee is speaking in his or her official capacity, in
which case the speech is not considered the employee's speech, but the
employer's, 132 or whether the employee is not speaking in an official
capacity, but instead in a private capacity, in which case the First
Amendment protects the employee's speech if it concerns a public
matter and is not disruptive to important employer interests. 133 In the
former case, when an employee speaks in an official, "scripted"
capacity, the employee is acting as the agent for the employer and
129. The Supreme Court clearly considers the act of contributing to a political
campaign or committee in order to support speech on behalf of a candidate to be intended
speech by the contributor. See supra note 127.
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604
(1996).
131. See Institutional Speech, supra note 127, for a discussion of the criteria that must
be satisfied for the campaign committee or the organization to qualify as a speaker. The
conclusion advanced is that generally an organization that fails to qualify as the direct
agent of the members' speech intentions should not qualify as a speaker for purposes of the
First Amendment's protection, though the speech produced by the organization-the
text-may qualify for some measure of protection under the First Amendment depending
on the function and utility of the message to the audience and the democratic political
process. Id. at 745-55, 777-81.
132. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. 173; Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
133. See supra note 132.
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does not, individually, possess any personal free speech rights with
respect to the speech that is being regulated, or "scripted.,
13 4
C. The Impact of the Medium
The third and final setting in which the Court focuses on the
effectiveness of the communicative process as a definitional element
of First Amendment speech protection consists of cases in which the
impact of a medium of communication is placed at issue. In such cases
the Court's attention to the communicative process is explicit, but the
requirement that that process satisfy the trilogy of speaker intention,
message, and audience perception is latent. Concern about the
breakdown of the trilogy, however, seems to animate the Court's
decisions, even if only at an intuitive level.
Concern about the unknowable, and therefore uncontrollable,
power of mediums of communication has existed since the beginning
of communication itself. Writing with wry humor in the late 19th
Century, Collet Dobson Collet, the chronicler of the struggle against
taxes on knowledge in England,' recounts this fictitious tale: "When
the King of the Tonga Isles, in the Pacific Ocean, was initiated by Mr.
Mariner, the missionary, into the mysteries of the art of writing, he
was alarmed at the idea of his subjects learning to read: 'I should,' he
said, 'be surrounded with plots." ' 1
35
The idea is the same as the one later made famous by Marshall
McLuhan, who coined the aphoristic phrase "the medium is the
message." '136 Both convey the idea that the medium through which a
communication is conveyed itself contributes new meaning to a
message, sometimes lending it force, sometimes modifying or shading
its content, sometimes transforming it into something entirely new,
and sometimes producing profound changes in the social and cultural
order.
The Supreme Court's concern with the power of mediums in
modern First Amendment jurisprudence began in 1969 with its
decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC.137 In Red Lion
the Court was faced with a First Amendment challenge to the FCC's
fairness doctrine, by which the relatively new medium of television
had been partly tamed through obligations of balance and public
134. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 173; Institutional Speech, supra note 127, at 766-81.
135. COLLET DOBSON COLLET, HISTORY OF THE TAXES ON KNOWLEDGE: THEIR
ORIGIN AND REPEAL I (fasc. repr. 1971) (1933).
136. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING THE MEDIA (1964).
137. 395 U.S. 369 (1969).
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interest programming. 13  The Court's decision sustaining the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine rested on the thin reed of
scarcity of frequencies, 139 but the power and impact of the new
medium was never far from the surface of the Courts' consciousness
or its opinion. "Differences in the characteristics of news media,"
Justice White wrote for a unanimous Court, "justify differences in the
First Amendment standards applied to them."'14 This was an
altogether different statement than one which applied the same First
Amendment standards but determined that scarcity justifications
satisfied that higher standard.
141
Concerns about the power and impact of mediums did not come
fully to the surface, however, until later cases. It was not until 1990 in
FCC v. Metro Broadcasting42 that the Court openly avowed the
legitimacy of the government's interest in assuring diversity in
ownership of television and radio stations because of the pervasive
influence of those media. Even then the scarcity rationale, a wounded
remnant of an earlier time, served as a partial, if unconvincing,
justification.143 But the Court's true colors had emerged earlier, in
1978, with the decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,144 where the
Court sustained the FCC's authority to impose sanctions on indecent
programming to which children might be exposed. "[I]ndecency,' the
Court said, "is largely a function of context ... ".,,1 45 "We have long
recognized," the Court continued, "that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems.... [T]he broadcast
media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of
all Americans... [B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.' '146
While the Court was not clear about the exact grounds upon
which the broadcast medium's "uniqueness" rests, Pacifica quickly
became the opening salvo in a larger effort to exact controls on
mediums of communication in the service of a variety of public
138. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994); Fairness Report of 1974, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974), recon.
denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
139. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367; LUCAS S. POE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987).
140. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
141. See Lee Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
142. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
143. Id.
144. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
145. Id. at 742.
146. Id. at 748.
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interests. Thus, over less than two decades following the decision, the
Court has concluded that the medium of live performance, more
specifically nude dancing, is entitled to reduced First Amendment
protection;147 that movies, while generally protected under the First
Amendment, can be made subject to zoning and other similar
restrictions to safeguard against their propensity to facilitate crime
and rape;148 that the uniquely resilient and purposeful advocacy
characteristic of commercial speech may be subjected to exacting
requirements of honesty and fairness; 149  and that television
broadcasters can be required to provide (paid) access to candidates
for federal office in order to blunt the potential power broadcasters
might be able to exert.150 In stark contrast, the Court struck down an
indecency-based restriction on dial-a-porn when carried on the "less
intrusive" aural, and by-then-conventional, medium of voice
communication over the telephone.
151
But it was not until the arrival of cases involving the "newest" of
new mediums that the Court became truly concerned about the impact
of mediums on the messages themselves. The first cases arose from
the burgeoning of cable television, and with it the effective
evisceration of the scarcity rationale for government regulation.
Ironically, it was not just the power and influence of cable that caught
the Court's First Amendment attention (cable's power as a
multisensory medium, after all, was really no different than the
broadcast signals it simply retransmitted), but instead the very lack of
scarcity that the medium afforded. The problem, in other words, was
not too little choice and too much concentrated power, but too much
choice and too little concentrated power, with power now being
effectively delegated to the viewer.
This more decentralized and individualistic environment made it
possible for everyone, especially children, to discover unwanted or
unfitting material. Viewers, not broadcasters, could decide with the
vote of a remote control what channels they would see. The indecency
rationale underlying Pacifica, of course, fit neatly into this regime,
152
147. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
148. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
149. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). See also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
150. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
151. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
152. See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See also Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996).
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as did the obligation (exacted largely by local governments under the
guise of conferring licensing monopolies) to carry local programming,
public access channels, and public programming. 53 But the Court
went further, imposing greatly relaxed First Amendment scrutiny on
the FCC's requirement that local commercial channels be carried on
cable systems in their area;154 a response by the FCC, one must
imagine, not so much to the economic power of cable operators, but to
the consequences of viewer preferences.
The most recent step, however, is the most remarkable. In its
1996 decision in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,155 a deeply fractured Court declared
unconstitutional a federal statute authorizing, but not requiring, cable
operators to restrict or block indecent program material. 5 6 The
statute applied to leased access channels, which federal law requires
cable systems to reserve for lease by unaffiliated parties, and public
access channels, which include educational, governmental, or local
public access channels that federal law requires cable operators to
carry.157 The cable operators claimed that the statute was fully
consistent with the First Amendment, for it left judgments about
material to be carried on the channels to either the editorial discretion
of the operator, a private party, or to the individual viewers.
1 58
The Court concluded, however, that the power to restrict
programming should be placed in neither set of private hands, but
instead in the government's, to be exercised principally by "local
authorit[ies] overseeing the local public, governmental, or educational
channels."'159 These authorities, the Court almost gleefully explained,
exact content control through "complex supervisory systems of
various sorts, often with both public and private standards...
requiring indemnification by programmers, certification of compliance
with local standards, time segregation, adult content advisories, or
153. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996);
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). See also City of Los Angeles v.
Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622 (1994).
154. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 622.
155. 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
156. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1486, §§ 10(a-c) (1992); 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 5320) (1984).
157. 47 U.S.C. §§ 531,532(b) (1984).
158. See Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2382.
159. Id. at 2390.
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even prescreening [of] individual programs." 16° This is quite an
extraordinary statement leading to an equally extraordinary
conclusion, for it reflects a First Amendment preference for
governmental rather than private control of content, and does so with
respect to specific program content and not, as with the Red Lion case,
on a broader categorical basis.
61
With the scarcity rationale no longer available, and with the
shelter of Pacifica unavailing because the scope of discretion
conferred extended beyond the obscene and beyond material
considered indecent for children,162 the Court rested its decision
explicitly on the cable medium and its influence. "Cable television
systems, including access channels, have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.... [M]aterial from
these stations can confron[t] the citizen in the privacy of the
home,...with little or no prior warning."' 63 While the precise
qualities of uniqueness remained obscure in the Court's opinion--one
could say the same things about books or magazines, and certainly
about telephones where dial-a-porn is constitutionally protected' 14-
the logic of the Court's attitude toward cable compels the conclusion
that pervasiveness and intrusiveness also mask concerns about the
power of the medium in shaping personal and cultural values, the
persuasiveness of its multisensory and real-time character, and the
added dimensions of force and immediacy that unrestricted access to
multisensory stimuli provide. As Michael O'Neill expressed in his
book, The Roar of the Crowd:
What sets television apart from all other forms of communication
ever invented is its ability to transmit human experiences in real
time over great distances with a visual power and motion that
mimics life itself-that, indeed, can so intensify experience through
the manipulation and repetition of images that the real world often
suffers by comparison.... The printing press... promoted the
standardization, preservation, and proliferation of knowledge....
Television uniquely sweeps knowledge across the barriers of literacy,
transforming all of life into moving images and sensory stimuli. It
creates impressions instead of ideas and emotions instead of
thought....
[With print] time and distance intervene; the event must be re-
created.., and your reactions reconstructed out of remembered
160. Id. at 2394-95.
161. Compare Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996), with Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367.
162. Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2386.
163. Id. (citations omitted).
164. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 115.
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associations and emotions. Inevitably, the effect is attenuated by an
element of detachment.... The separation of language from senses
is more congenial to deliberative thought and the reasoning process.
[Language, the stuff of words,] is linear.
'There is nothing linear or sequential about the total field of
awareness that exists in any moment of consciousness,' McLuhan
observed. 'Consciousness is not a verbal process.' The actual sensory
world, in other words, is more closely approximated by TV images
than by writing.
165
O'Neill's description not only captures the underlying source of
uneasiness about television, especially in the environment of limitless
and unregulatable choice afforded by the medium of cable
transmission, but also reflects the concerns felt even more tellingly
with the emergence of the Internet, a global, completely ungovernable
medium containing a limitless variety of material in virtually any
medium, accessible at the click of a mouse to anyone virtually for free.
Like the King of the Tonga Isles, we might imagine a 20th Century
Mr. Mariner introducing a government bureaucrat to the mysteries of
the Internet: "I should," he might say, "be surrounded with plots"-
or, more likely today, with disintegration of the social and cultural
fabric.
The Court's approach to the challenges presented by new or
different mediums of communication under the First Amendment is
murky and blunt-edged, at best. The Court has yet fully to explain
what it is, exactly, that is being responded to: is it the cultural and
social consequences of technologies such as television, cable, and the
Internet; the added dimensions of meaning, persuasiveness, and force
that such mediums can provide; or simply the agonizing realization,
felt long ago by the Tonga Isle King, that once loosed such mediums
are effectively beyond government control? The Court's terms,
"pervasive influence" and "intrusiveness," capture all of these
meanings, but only dimly.
But while the specifics of the Court's approach are uncertain, the
general thrust is not. When confronted with a medium whose power
gives pause, the Court simply lowers the level of First Amendment
protection, thus allowing greater sway for government regulation. The
effect of this is to impose a more exacting standard on the effective
operation of the communication process for such media-to require
proof of a clear and direct link between the speaker, the intended
message, and the audience's perception of it.
165. MICHAEL O'NEILL, THE ROAR OF THE CROWD 33-36 (1993).
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To the extent that the medium itself becomes a source of
dissonance in this causal chain, government is empowered to bring it
to heel. Thus, the live medium of nude dancing must provide proof if
it is to claim the pretension of art, an effort that has generally proved
futile if the dancing.occurs in a bar. 66 But due to experience, the
Court is more comfortable with dial-a-porn, a medium which is single-
sensory, verbal, linear, and dispassionate.167 There the dissonance is
perhaps less pronounced, or at least it is a familiar phenomenon for
which coping mechanisms have long been developed.
Television, cable, and now the Internet present the kinds of
concerns which focus on the specific operation of the communication
process and more. The communication process concerns are more
complex than with nude dancing, although they are similar in
character. Video conveys multisensory stimuli; it does so not just by
the rational and domesticated medium of spoken or printed words,
but by images that lend meaning and force to those words, by more
direct appeal to emotional or non-reasoned ways of perceiving, and it
does so without the constraints of distance and time. With video, a
viewer can participate, rather than merely "view," and can be called to
action by the combined force of reason and emotion. Video, therefore,
presents problems more akin to the mob or the inciter than to the
reader or the book.
But it is the social and cultural consequences of the new mediums
of video and the Internet that seem to concern the Court-and
certainly the FCC and Congress168-the most. With the Internet
especially, the fear is a loss of social control and an undermining of the
value-shaping influences of family and education. Just as with the
Court's determination in the Denver Consortium case, where
government oversight was deemed preferable to private editorial or
individual judgment,169 the fear is that education, broadly conceived,
will be lodged in the ungovernable hands of the individual, whether
child or adult. If this were to happen, then changes would be wrought,
so the argument goes, in the common social and cultural values society
166. In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991), the Court, quoting Doran
v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975), observed that "the customary 'barroom' type
of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression ......
167. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. 115; Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374.
168. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 106
Stat. 1486, §§ 10(a-c) (1992), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 5320) (1992); Telecommunications Act
of 1996, 47 U.S.C. H8 230, 560, 561 (Communications Decency Act of 1996) (repealed
1997).
169. 116 S. Ct. at 2390. See also supra text accompanying notes 153-163.
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relies upon for peaceful coexistence. More basically, changes would be
wrought in society's habits and institutions. Perhaps this is what
Marshall McLuhan was referring to when he predicted that the
electronic mediums would retribalize us.
170
D. Conclusion
Determining the quality of speech depends on an understanding
of the speech being judged. Quality is thus a function of the
communication at issue, which in turn is a product of a process by
which ideas and feelings and images are transmitted from one person
to others. Speech cannot be judged, then, without an eye to the
process that produced it.
In judging' First Amendment claims the Court cannot escape
focusing on the communication process. The Court's opinions bear
this out. But what use has the Court made of this analytical tool? The
Court has not operated, it appears, with the sophistication of a
communications expert, but with considerable, if often blunt-edged,
common sense. The Court has grabbed hold of the speech trilogy of
speaker, message, and audience, applying it at times more woodenly
than is warranted and often assuming that it operates more as a linear
than a circular process. But it has also applied it sparingly and
cautiously, perhaps in recognition of the complexities.
Where a sharp break is found between the speaker's intent and
the message actually received, the Court has rightly refused to assign
communicative responsibility to the speaker, shifting it instead to the
source of the break (which may or may not be a speaker). This, it
seems, is the evolving moral of the campaign finance cases, and
particularly of the Court's rough-hewn distinction between
contributions and expenditures. 17
1
There is no speech at all for purposes of the First Amendment
where there is no speaker and only speech, as with the beggar holding
out the tin cup and unknowingly conveying to others a message of
social despair or failure, or where what is heard departs radically from
what was said, not because of an intervening agent but because of the
audience's unanticipated and unreasonable perception. This is the
moral imbedded in the libel tort and in the Court's dictum in
Sullivan.
172
170. MCLUHAN, supra note 136, at 3-5.
171. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); supra text accompanying notes 121-134.
172. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); supra text
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Finally, where a break in the communicative chain results from
the medium in which a message is conveyed, a form of invisible and
ethereal speaker, the Court understandably exercises caution. It does
so by conditioning the First Amendment claim of freedom to speak on
clearer and more direct evidence that the communication trilogy has
in fact functioned and that the message of the medium did not intrude
to a point that the communication was effectively transformed. When
this cannot be established with reasonable certainty-that is, when
there is reason to believe based on common experience with the
medium that the message is partly attributable to it-the level of First
Amendment protection for the speech is lowered. Doing so reflects, in
effect, a recognition that there are two agents of communication at
work, the speaker who attempted to communicate a message, and the
medium that reshaped or transformed it. As to the latter, the Court
seems reluctant, judging specifically by its recent cable decisions,173 to




So far we have considered forms of qualitative judgment that are
abstracted from the "text" of the speech whose First Amendment
protection is being judged. Thus, considerations of "value" go not to
the specific message but rather to the social or political or ideological
value of the subject matter to which the message is related. Similarly,
the closely interrelated questions of the meaning of speech and the
way it is communicated depend heavily on the influence of extrinsic
factors such as culture, audience, intention, and medium. However,
once speech passes through these filters, its value having been
recognized, its meaning assigned, and the link between its author and
its audience established, additional forms of qualitative assessment
focused on a particular act of speaking and a particular "text" remain.
I have divided the speech-specific forms of qualitative judgment
into two categories: quality as technique, or technical quality; and
quality as aesthetics, or aesthetic quality. As we will see, these
categories are much more complex than the terms "technique" and
"aesthetics" imply, but they serve usefully to define a general
accompanying notes 110-120.
173. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. 622; Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374.
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distinction from which more complex patterns of qualitative judgment
can be drawn. We will turn first to questions of technique, reserving
the discussion of aesthetic quality to parts V and VI.
Quality as technique refers to the performance, skill and technical
effectiveness of a communication. If the communication is by text,
considerations of technique would focus, for example, on grammar,
style, clarity and exactness for the purpose intended. If a work of art,
technique would focus on the effectiveness with which a medium was
employed: color, accuracy, brush strokes, and the like. Each medium
of communication encompasses both technical and aesthetic or
judgmental qualities. Technical skill does not guarantee aesthetic
quality. For instance, in law we might be heard to say, by analogy, that
a lawyer is technically skilled but given to poor judgment, the latter
being the more creative application of the medium's skills to a specific
purpose.
The distinction I am drawing is not a readily apparent one, nor is
the boundary between technique, or technical skill, and aesthetics, or
the application of communicative judgment, a clear one. This is partly
because aesthetic success lies partially, if not substantially, in the mind
of the beholder, the audience. Thus, the most technically proficient
communication may fail in its aesthetic objectives, be they persuasion
or the moving of passion and feeling. Likewise a technically flawed
communication may nevertheless possess, in the mind of the author or
the beholder or both, an aesthetic quality that moves the audience at a
level that transcends technique. While the distinction is undoubtedly a
difficult one, it is one that is made with regularity, and therefore we
shall attempt to negotiate it, mindful of the pitfalls and vague
boundaries.
1. Technique as Proficiency
The focus of quality as technique, as I have said, is on the
performance itself. It is not on its message, its value, its meaning, or
the effectiveness with which the assigned message is communicated.
For purposes of inquiry into technique, the value of a communication
is irrelevant, the message and its communicative meaning are known
or assumed and thus not placed at issue. It is likewise taken for
granted that the intended message was received with sufficient clarity
so that the required correspondence of speaker intent, message, and
audience reception has been satisfied. The focus instead is on the
communicative act in isolation and, more specifically, on the technical
effectiveness with which the speaker's intent was transformed into a
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performance, whether it was through text, pictures,. dance, video,
sound, or movement, in a defined genre, 174 such as news reporting,
entertainment, advertising, a fine or performing art, mime, and so on.
It is from the genre used that the elements of technique are drawn.
As a general matter the Supreme Court disavows any inquiry into
technique in the vast bulk of First Amendment cases; considerations
of technique, if considered at all, are explored only in relation to
determining a communication's meaning or the effectiveness with
which it comported to the speaker's intent or to the text conveyed. 75
Technique, in other words, is assigned a narrow and specific role in
judging a separate and distinct question raised by a communication,
and therefore technique, as such, is not made the subject of judgment.
Questions of technique such as the careless use of ambiguous words in
a text, for example, might be relevant to understanding why a given
communication was not understood as the speaker intended, and
consequently be employed in identifying the meaning to be assigned
the speech, or whether and how the communication process broke
down. But the Court will not render any judgment on the
consequences of the poor technique itself, for the purposes of First
Amendment protection.
176
Thus, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,177 which
involved an unartfully crafted and grammatically flawed anonymous
leaflet opposing a school bond referendum, the Court did not so much
174. The term "genre" means "kind, sort, style." 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
114 (1961). It is used to describe a commonly recognized category of expression, including
the general (such as painting) and the specific (such as landscape painting). Genre is thus
distinct from the term "medium," which is "[ain intermediate agency, means, instrument or
channel," and which is used here to describe the form in which expression is produced and
distributed. Id. at 299.
175. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (emphasizing
the relationship between a political endorsement and views of members of endorsing
organization); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (assuming the speaker's intention
and a perceived relationship between words and message); Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 792-93 (1989) (holding that the city's control of sound amplification and
mixing equipment was restricted in its impact on technical quality of sound and unrelated
to aesthetic quality of music and its reproduction). In Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995), technique considerations were employed
to determine whether, and when, parades were expressive for purposes of the First
Amendment, and when selection judgments about parade participants also constituted
expressive choices protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 2345.
176. See Ward, 491 U.S. 781 (clarifying that loudness of amplified music is unrelated to
its status as speech protected under the First Amendment, but instead is relevant only to
the government's speech-unrelated, neutral time, place, and manner restriction intended to
protect neighboring areas from undue noise and interference).
177. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
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as pause to note the technical flaws in the text.'78 There was simply no
reason to comment on the flawed performance, since the intended
message was clear and unmistakable to anyone who read it, and the
.technical flaws had nothing to do with the existence or degree of First
Amendment protection to which the leaflet was entitled.'79 This rule
has been faithfully applied at the heart of the Court's First
Amendment doctrine as early as 1919, with Justice Holmes' dissent in
Abrams v. United States.'80 There he described the ineffective and
brutishly overstated flyer as "a silly leaflet [published] by an unknown
man," but left no doubt that it nevertheless qualified as speech
entitled to the fullest protection of the First Amendment.' 8' Holmes'
view has been consistently followed to the present in a virtually
unbroken line of cases.1
82
2. Technique as Genre
But the picture is not so clear once one leaves the heart of the
First Amendment. Here we find many instances in which a
communication's technical quality appears to have a direct bearing on
its protection under the First Amendment. In some cases, "technique"
considerations play a definitional role, either marking the boundaries
of a relevant category of expression under the First Amendment, such
as "news"183 or commercial speech, 84 or defining a genre or type of
expression according to which first amendment protection, such as a
178. Id. at 1514.
179. The issue in McIntyre was the effect that the leaflet's anonymity had on the First
Amendment's protection of it. Id at 1516. The Court held that anonymity made no
difference, concluded that the leaflet was entitled to full First Amendment protection,
reversed the Election Commission's fine and declared the statute unconstitutional, as there
was no other justification for the State's prosecution of Mrs. McIntyre for her leaflet. Id. at
1524.
180. 250 U.S. 616,624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 628.
182. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 84 (1973); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S.
485 (1984); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
183. See, e.g., Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Bradley, 462 N.E.2d 1321 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (finding that privilege claim of journalist or political activist arose out of
political activities, not journalist activities, and therefore did not qualify for claim of
privilege); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
184. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d
Cir. 1977). See also infra Part IV.E.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:275
claim of privilege,' 85 is being asserted. The evolving concept of
editorial judgment, a standard by which the act of selection of speech
can itself claim speech status, is a particularly important instance in
which technique plays a critical definitional role.
18 6
In other cases, distinctions among genre, as opposed to within
them, are determinative of constitutional protection for speech.18 7 In
the time, place, and manner setting, for example, restrictions that fall
along lines of genres of speech, such as rock concerts as opposed to
classical music in public theatres,188 or commercial advertising as
opposed to political advertising in municipal buses, 189 are permissible
even though similar distinctions within a genre are not.190 Likewise, in
the taxation context, differential incidence or rates of taxation among
genre, such as magazines versus newspapers, 191 or satellite television
versus cable, 192 are permitted, while distinctions within the genre, such
as religious magazines versus news magazines,193 are not.
185. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984), where the court
stated that scholars might be accorded a privilege against disclosure of confidential
information if the scholar's claim of privilege applied to "serious academic inquiry ...
undertaken pursuant to a considered research plan in which the need for confidentiality is
tangibly related to the accuracy or completeness of the study." Id. at 225.
186. See cases discussed in infra Part IV.C.
187. Genre-based distinctions, such as those discussed immediately below and
illustrated by the cases cited in supra notes 182-185, should be distinguished from
distinctions based on the identity of the speaker or the subject of the speech, both of which
may also provide constitutional grounds for regulation, but which rest on very different
justifications. Compare cases cited in supra notes 182-185, with Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Madison
Joint v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1.67 (1976).
188. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that
forum can be limited but only if the limitation is content neutral, including genre-based,
and applied evenhandedly). See generally International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (sustaining prohibition of solicitation, a genre, in airport
terminal); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (sustaining prohibition of political
solicitation, genre, within 100 feet of polling places).
189. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
190. Other examples would include expressive parades and the First Amendment
protection to be accorded decisions to include or exclude participants for expressive
purposes. See Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2345.
191. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
192. Id.
193. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); RANDALL P.
BEZANSON, TAXES ON KNOWLEDGE IN AMERICA: EXACTIONS ON THE PRESS FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1994).
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Many of the cases arise in the areas of "reduced" First
Amendment protection for speech. For example, the lesser protection
afforded due to the speech's "lesser value" invites a more intrusive
inquiry into the quality of the particular communicative act at issue.
The indecency cases, such as FCC v. Pacifica Foundation194 and
Barnes v. Glen Theatre,195 are illustrative. But inquiry into technique is
also quite explicit in the commercial speech cases, such as Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar 96 and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. ,197 and in
the application of the Supreme Court's actual malice and negligence
standards in defamation law.
Other cases are found in a fairly discrete set of interrelated fields
of law that, singularly and in combination, protect proprietary
interests in a communication, whether such communication is a text, a
visual image, or a product with a communicative meaning. Thus,
exploration of technique is deeply imbedded in cases involving the
appropriation tort, copyright and trademark infringement, product
disparagement and unfair competition, and false and misleading
advertising. In these fields, questions of style and technique often lie
at the center of the definitional superstructures the law requires the
Court to identify. Considerations of technique and genre thus surface
as the Court considers whether or not an expression is a "fair use,"
198
an infringement, 19 9 whether it is copyrightable, 2°° whether an
advertisement is misleading,20 1  and whether a use is an
appropriation.20 2 For many years these fields were effectively exiled
from the First Amendment, with judges operating in each little corner
as if the First Amendment did not exist.203 More recently, the Court
194. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
195. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
196. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
197. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
198. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
199. See, e.g., Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
201. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
202. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). See also
infra Part IV.D.1.
203. Copyright and, to a lesser extent, trademark law have been sheltered by the
Constitution's copyright clause, which has been read as carving out a specific exception
from the First Amendment's requirements. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is still the
case, but the First Amendment has cropped up with increasing persistence when courts
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has begun to confront the obvious fact that the element common to
each is the regulation of speech.
The list of cases and doctrines in which technique is judged is
long. By necessity we will only be able to address illustrative cases,
and in fields such as copyright, only certain applications or doctrines.
My purpose, however, is not to catalogue all of the instances in which
quality as technique is addressed in the Court's jurisprudence, but
rather to illustrate when and how it occurs in order to judge whether
and when such an undertaking should be deemed consistent with the
First Amendment. The cases will be allied in subject matter groupings,
beginning with the defamation and product disparagement cases.
B. The Defamation and Product Disparagement Cases
1. Defamation
The Court's increasing attention to matters of technique in
judging First Amendment protection and the path that has led to that
result are perhaps most obvious in the defamation cases. Prior to 1964,
the defamation tort, which includes libel and slander and related
causes of action, was a common law civil tort not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny.2" The tort provided a cause of action for
statements published about an individual which caused that individual
reputational harm in his or her community.2 5 A statement's falsity, as
a general matter, did not have to be proved, nor was truth an absolute
defense. Instead, truth could serve as a justification for the
defamation, not a negation of the tort. Thus, the burden of proving
truth and establishing why it justified the damaging statement fell
squarely upon the defendant publisher." Many other defenses of
justification, denominated as privileges,20 7 were also contained in the
address questions of copyrightability or questions that raise statutory issues that are
governed by standards analogous to those applied under the First Amendment, such as fair
use and exceptions for news reporting. See infra Part IV.D.2.
204. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 111.
205. Id.
206. See id. § 116; ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER AND
RELATED PROBLEMS, at 171-81 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter SACK & BARON].
207. The privileges were distinct from the defense of truth in a number of respects,
most notably for present purposes in the shifting burden of proof. The defense of truth
rested firmly on the defendant. With a privilege, the defendant had to establish that the
occasion of publication was privileged, at which point the burden shifted to the plaintiff to
either negate that claim or prove that the privilege, if not absolute, was abused because
exercised unreasonably or with malice (ill-will) toward the plaintiff. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 7, §§ 114, 115.
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complex body of common law defamation. These included the public
record defense, which justified republication of official public records
and statements made in official public meetings, °8 and the fair
comment privilege, which protected evaluative statements about, inter
alia, matters of public interest as long as defamatory facts were not
implied or malice was not proven.209 In many respects, therefore, the
common law of defamation reflected concerns analogous to those that
might arise under the First Amendment.210
In the 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan,2 ' the Supreme
Court constitutionalized much of defamation law, making it subject to
the explicit demands of the First Amendment. The
constitutionalization was accomplished by superimposing on the then-
existing body of common law a set of distinct First Amendment
privileges which overlapped with many of the common law privileges.
In Sullivan, for example, the Court held that liability for defamation
of a public official, at least with respect to his or her public
responsibilities, could lie only upon proof by the plaintiff that the
statement had been published with actual malice.212
Actual malice, it turned out, was quite different from the showing
of malice required at common law. Common law malice required
proof of ill will toward the plaintiff.213 Actual malice, in contrast,
required proof that the publisher knew the statement was false at the
time of publication, or that the publisher entertained serious doubts
about the statement's truth or falsity and published it in reckless
disregard of those doubts.214 Sullivan's constitutional privilege, in
other words, focused on state of mind with respect to falsity and the
resulting recklessness of the publication decision, not on state of mind
toward the plaintiff, a much more limited inquiry.215 This was a
somewhat peculiar result, partly because Sullivan did not disturb the
common law elements of the tort, which did not require proof of
falsity, or the defense of truth, which the defendant bore and which
served not as an absolute defense, but instead as a justification not
208. See id. § 115, at 836-37.
209. See id. at 831-32.
210. See id. §§ 113-15; David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984); David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1991).
211. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
212. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
213. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 115, at 834.
214. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
215. Id. See also SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at 30-35, 282.
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always applicable.2 16 Thus, actual malice, which required proof of
falsity, stood in an uneasy tension with the common law, which lacked
that requirement. This tension, as we will see, required that the First
Amendment inquiry focus directly on falsity and the reasonableness of
editorial and publication judgments. Those considerations, generally,
were not relevant to proof of the common law action217 or, for that
matter, to the common law privileges.
218
The application of Sullivan's actual malice privilege and the
falsity-based inquiry into the reasonableness of the publication
decision was extended in later cases to virtually all statements made
about public officials,219 to statements made about public figures,
220
and then to statements made about private persons who found
themselves in the public spotlight, voluntarily or not.221 But these
extensions merely broadened the range of the actual malice inquiry to
a larger group of cases; they did not extend or modify it. The latter
task was left to the Court in Gertz v. Welch, a case in which Elmer
Gertz, a well-respected lawyer in private practice who dabbled in
liberal causes, was defamed by a right wing publication connected with
the John Birch Society. 222 The Court said Elmer Gertz was neither a
public official nor a public figure, but simply a private lawyer who
represented a client in a controversial case against a police officer;
223
and thus, he would not have to prove actual malice to succeed in his
defamation action.
It was the common law's dampening effect on expression,
combined with its authorization of damages without proof of actual
216. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 116, at 839-42.
217. The elements of the common law tort were: (i) publication; (ii) of a statement
about an individual; (iii) that damaged his or her reputation; and (iv) in the relevant
community. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 111, at 771-85. Neither falsity nor
unreasonableness were relevant. Indeed, the traditional adage about falsity was "the
greater the truth the greater the libel." SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at 174 (citing
Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1098 n.27 (8th Cir. 1973)).
218. The privileges generally focused on whether the statement published was a public
record or an expression of opinion on a matter of public interest, and the publisher's
feelings toward the plaintiff, such as the publisher harboring ill will or spite toward the
plaintiff. The interstices of the editorial or publication decision and its reasonableness were
not scrutinized as closely. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 113.
219. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. 727; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
220. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
221. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976).
222. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323.
223. Id. at 351-52.
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pecuniary loss, that led the Court to conclude that liability should not
be imposed without proof of fault on the part of the publisher, at least
in actions involving matters of public concern.2' The Court
accordingly required that, in most defamation actions by private
persons,225 the plaintiff would be required to prove negligence, a
standard which came to mean, by analogy to the actual malice test
from which it evolved, unreasonable publication in light of a
statement's falsity, or unreasonable failure to discover the statement's
falsity.22 6 The awkwardness of this test in light of the continued failure
of the common law to require that the plaintiff prove falsity as an
element of the cause of action was finally cured in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,227 where the Court held that the First
Amendment requires that the plaintiff prove the defamatory
statement's falsity in all cases to which a Constitutional privilege
applies-that is, all public and private defamation cases.228
The Gertz Court also held that private plaintiffs who wished to
recover presumed, general, or punitive damages, for which specific
proof was not required at common law,229 would have to prove actual
malice, not negligence. 230 Given the difficulty of proving actual
224. Id. at 347 n.10; See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749 (1985). The "public concern" criterion was not made explicit in Gertz, but was later
added by Justice Powell, the author of Gertz, as an additional limitation on the application
of constitutional privileges in Dun & Bradstreet, which involved an allegedly defamatory
and false credit report. 472 U.S. at 758-61.
225. At one extreme, the "private" cases exclude those brought by private persons who
have been involuntarily swept into the vortex of a public controversy, to whom actual
malice applies. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977); Foretich v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994). At the other extreme, are cases involving a
communication that is limited in nature, serving only the private interests of the parties to
the transaction, to which strict liability seems to apply. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749
(concerning credit report sent to subscribers); Snead v. Redland Aggregates, Ltd., 998 F.2d
1325 (5th Cir. 1993) (concerning press release about failed negotiations issued by one party
to private litigation).
226. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 580B, comment
(h); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 247 (1985).
227. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
228. Id. at 776. See also Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760-61; supra note 202.
229.' In the case of presumed or general damages, juries were permitted to award such
damages without proof of injury or fault at common law (absent privilege). Punitive
damages likewise required no proof of injury to the plaintiff, but did typically require proof
of common law malice, ordinarily defined as publication with ill will toward the plaintiff.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 116A, at 843; SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at
486-511.
230. 418 U.S. at 323.
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economic harm in defamation cases,231 coupled with the need to
obtain much greater damage awards to induce contingent fee lawyers
to take defamation cases,232 the Gertz Court's damage limitation
would effectively require proof of actual malice in most private
defamation cases, thus significantly undermining the lower negligence
standard of Gertz.233 But the important point for our purposes is that
even in the smaller universe of cases in which negligence applied, that
standard required the Court, under the auspices of the First
Amendment, to probe deeply into the actions of the publisher with
respect to truth, the reasonableness of efforts made in the
investigative process to ascertain the truth, the ways in which facts
were couched, and the basis for the decision to publish at the time the
publication occurred (rather than, for example, later). 34
Thus by the time the Court's revolution in defamation law was
complete, the First Amendment had been made to refocus attention in
the defamation action from the publication itself and its meaning to
the audience, to the state of mind of the author, editor, and publisher
on the question of falsity, and the negligence or recklessness of the
investigative, editorial, and publication decisions in light of what was,
or should have been, known about the statement's falsity at the time
of publication. The focus had been changed, in short, from the content
of the speech and the communication process through which it was
conveyed, to the conduct of the speaker. And with this change in focus
the defamation tort understandably, and inevitably, turned its
attention to questions of technique and style, with judgments about
those questions determining the legal fate of the publisher.
The details of how this new regime of inquiry into technique
functions are what will concern us here, for the defamation cases
present a broad range of illustrations of qualitative judgments based
on technique. The cases also illustrate how courts are attempting to
231. The greatest harm from a libel is social and emotional, not pecuniary. See
RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 170-82
(1987); SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at 489.
232. BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 231, at 61-77.
233. Only with proof of actual malice could presumed, general, and punitive damages
be recovered. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50; SACK & BARON, supra note 206; BRUCE W.
SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 432-39 (2d ed. 1991).
234. See BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 8.4 (Supp. 1993); RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 3.17-3.23 (1992); Brian C. Murchison et al., Sullivan's
Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial Standards of Journalism, 73 N.C. L. REV. 7 (1992)
[hereinafter Sullivan's Paradox]; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media
Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247, 259-335 (1985).
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limit the inquiry to judgments about technique governed by relatively
objective standards and to avoid making judgments about the more
aesthetic, or compositional, aspects of a publication.235 Our discussion,
therefore, will serve also as a precursor to the later discussion of
judgments about aesthetic quality.
236
Investigative techniques and judgments are perhaps most easily
reducible to purely objective, technical standards, and seem safely
removed from the more creative, compositional process of writing a
story, It is not surprising, therefore, that judgments about technical
quality are often found when the research process is placed in issue.
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton23 7 is an instructive
example. The case involved an allegation in a news story that
Connaughton, a judicial candidate, had used "dirty tricks" in his
campaign, including paying a woman (who proved to be the source of
the story) for her help in discrediting his opponent's ally.
238
Connaughton sued for libel and challenged the credibility of the
source and the sloppy investigation by the reporter as proof of actual
malice.
239
Parsing the investigative process used by the reporter, the Court
concluded that there had been a "purposeful avoidance of the truth,"
and therefore sufficient evidence to support a finding of actual
malice.240 The reporter should have recognized, the Court said, the
source's personal motives for lying, which were reinforced by "the
hesitant, inaudible, and sometimes unresponsive and improbable
tone" of her answers to the reporter's questions. 241 The source's sister,
moreover, was by. the source's account a "key witness" to the
inducement (jobs and a free trip to Florida) Connaughton was alleged
to have offered, yet the reporter "failed to make any effort to
interview her."242 Finally, the editor and reporter failed to listen to an
allegedly exonerating tape provided to the paper by Connaughton.243
235. The term compositional was coined by Professor Brian Murchison, who was one of
the principal authors of a study in which the author also participated, and upon which the
succeeding analysis will heavily rely. See Sullivan's Paradox, supra note 234.
236. See infra Parts V, V1.
237. 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
238. Id. at 660 (noting that the allegation was contained in a quote from the woman).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 692-93.
241. Id. at 691.
242. Id. at 692.
243. Id.
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Actual malice thus rested in Connaughton on a detailed
examination of the quality of the technical judgments and steps that
led, ultimately, to publication of the defamatory story. In a similar
vein, lower courts have considered themselves authorized, if not
obliged, by the process-oriented, state-of-mind focus of the actual
malice test to probe deeply into questions concerning the credibility of
sources, the adequacy of investigations, reliance on confidential
sources, the exclusion of exculpatory information, and the motives of
the publisher.
244
Inquiry into technical quality, however, is not limited to the
process of research and the construction of the events to be reported.
It is often found in cases that turn on the compositional and stylistic
features of the writing itself. But here the Court seems more sensitive
to the line between the purely technical rules of composition, as
contrasted with the elements of style, order, and emphasis that might
be said to constitute the aesthetics of the writing. In Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal,245 for example, the Court attempted to draw such a
line in a case involving a claimed statement of opinion.246 The case
involved Milkovich, a wrestling coach at Maple Heights High School
in Ohio, whose team had been involved in a brawl at an earlier
wrestling meet.247 During a judicial hearing regarding the incident, the
coach and the superintendent both denied an allegation that the coach
had incited the brawl by his own behavior.248 The judge apparently
accepted their account and lifted the team's probation.
249
A sports columnist for the Lorain Journal, who did not attend the
judicial proceedings, wrote a column titled "Maple Beat the Law with
the 'Big Lie'," the theme of which was that the coach and
superintendent had misrepresented the coach's role in the brawl.250
"Anyone who attended the meet," the story said, "knows in his heart
that Milkovich and [superintendent] Scott lied at the hearing .... But
they got away with it." '251 The newspaper claimed that the column was
protected by the First Amendment because it constituted a statement
244. For a detailed discussion of these and other areas of judicial inquiry in defamation
cases, see Sullivan's Paradox, supra note 234.
245. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id. at 4.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 4-5.
251. Id. at 5.
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of opinion which could not, because of the importance of opinion to
the goals of the free speech and free press guarantees, be subjected to
liability.
252
The Court agreed with this general principle but rejected its
application to the sports column at issue in the case.253 The Court held
that the allegation of perjury, while not put in so many words, was
both obvious and factual, not merely stylistic.254 This had been equally
obvious, in the Court's judgment, to the columnist who wrote the
article. The fact that the column could be characterized as opinion,
therefore, meant nothing more from a communication perspective
than that the author had reached the reported conclusion. 255 The
error, therefore, lay not in the rhetorical flourish of the words or the
style or the composition of the story, but in the factual assertion upon
which it rested. Imposing liability on the fact as distinct from the
manner of its presentation would violate no injunction that aesthetic
style, rather than objective technique, must be specially protected
from judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.
The difficulty of drawing such a clear line between technique and
aesthetics in the heart of the compositional process, however, quickly
became clear the next year in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine.256 The
case involved a New Yorker article about the Freud archives, written
by Janet Malcolm. 257 The article centered on Jeffrey Masson, a
controversial psychologist with a long and often troubled relationship
with Freudian psychology, the Freud family, and the Freud archives.258
Much of the story was told through the eyes and experiences of Jeffrey
Masson, who was quoted extensively throughout. Some of the quotes
were especially damaging to Masson, because the damaging or
embarrassing statements were in his own words.259 More importantly,
some of the quotes were wrong, for they reflected Malcolm's editing
of Masson's words either to clean up the grammar or, more
252. Id. at 7.
253. The Court refused to establish a free-standing opinion privilege, being of the view
that existing doctrines of common law and constitutional privilege, including actual malice
and the requirement that factual falsity be proved by the plaintiff, adequately protected
against the imposition of liability on opinion. Id. at 21.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
257. Id. at 501.
258. Id. at 499-500.
259. Id. at 500-01.
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troublingly, to clarify Masson's meaning by providing "a rational
interpretation of the speaker's words.
'" 260
The Court concluded that some of the misquotations could be
subjected to liability, while others could not.261 In so deciding, the
Court attempted to draw a difficult and subtle line between technique
and aesthetics. Where the alteration represented a successful effort to
convey Masson's actual meaning, even though the words he used did
not clearly convey that meaning, the misquotation, while perhaps
undesirable and even unreasonable in terms of the conventions of
journalism and nonfiction writing, could not be subjected to
liability.262 It was the truth of the meaning that was important; the
devices by which it is conveyed, by which it is given style and literary
force, are beyond judicial competence under the First Amendment.
263
Where the misquotation added meaning not reasonably
attributable to Masson, and specifically (for purposes of libel) where
the added meaning was factual and damaging to Masson's reputation,
the added meaning could be made subject to liability and would not be
saved that fate by the fact that it contributed to the aesthetic quality
and content of the article. 264 Its known falsity and the addition of new,
false meaning, deprived the quotation of the quality of journalism--of
the genre upon which its constitutional protections rested.
265
The distinction drawn in Masson between "new meaning" and
"rational interpretation" places a heavy burden on the definition of a
"fact., 2 66 The Lorain Journal opinion, which rested on the very same
distinction, was much easier to justify because the statement
published-that the coach and superintendent lied to a judge-was
obviously factual and clearly distinguishable from aesthetic or stylistic
claims-claims which may have seemed, in the context of the article
and in the more general setting of journalism, less tenable and
substantive. The Malcolm article in The New Yorker was writing of a
higher literary order. Masson and his (sometimes pitiful) self-
deprecation were the literary devices through which the story was told
and through which the story achieved narrative flow and literary force.
The stylism of misquotation, in short, lay at the heart of the story's
260. Id. at 520.
261. Id. at 522-25.
262. Id. at 517.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See id. at 511.
266. Id. at 511-13.
19981
aesthetic quality. In such a case, it seems more difficult, indeed more
artificial, to parse style for fact which, once discovered, is extracted
and judged independently of style in terms of its truth, the process of
its discovery by the author, and the author's reportorial' technique as
reflected in his state of mind about a fact's truth when committing it to
writing.
The Masson Court, however, would have none of this distinction
between "high" and "low" style. Even if the failure to distinguish the
literary quality of The New Yorker from the Lorain Journal exacts a
cost in the Masson case, the alternative may well present a more
troubling First Amendment problem, for drawing such a distinction
would license courts (and juries) to make aesthetic distinctions within
and among genres of communication. It would enable courts to draw
categorical lines on grounds of general aesthetic quality between
magazines and newspapers, literature and non-literature, classical and
rock music, photography and painting, and on and on. This is, as we
shall see later, 67 a venture the Court is loathe to undertake in any
form. The First Amendment bases for such a fixed prohibition,
however, are hardly clear from the Court's opinions, as are the
justifications for the distinctions the Court already makes between, for
example, obscenity and art.26
8
Our principal concern at this point, however, is with the line the
Court draws in both cases between what I have described as
"technique," on the one hand, and "aesthetics," on the other. The
Court saw Janet Malcolm's use of added facts in Masson as being
separable from, and indeed unnecessary to, the stylistic and literary
qualities of the Freud article. While this line is difficult to draw, even
though it rests on a seeming objective basis of "fact," there is a certain
common sense to it. While the added fact of Jeffrey Masson's self-
described sexual dalliances may have contributed a certain spark or
interest to the narrative, that contribution was substantive and not
simply stylistic. It added to the story, and not just to the story's force
or readability. To reach any other conclusion would mean, for
example, that making a work of history more compelling by adding a
267. See infra Part V.
268. Part of the obscenity definition, it will be recalled, turns on whether the
challenged material "lacks serious.., artistic... value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
25 (1973). See also supra text accompanying notes 21-22. Whether this formulation focuses
on whether the material is "serious art" or not (implying an aesthetic judgment) or
whether, even though serious art, it lacks social value, is ambiguous, but the Court's
obscenity decisions seem clearly to imply that the "serious art" issue is central to the
obscenity determination. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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few new facts should be seen as an aesthetic or stylistic or literary act,
and not as a failure of technique. But in the genre of historical writing
(which was, after all, Janet Malcolm's genre) this would be
unacceptable, if not silly.
This leads us to the final point to be drawn from the defamation
cases. Each genre of writing must be judged differently, yet treated
equally from an aesthetic perspective. This is the difficult balance in
which the distinction between technique and aesthetics exists. But
recognizing the twin demands of judging yet suspending judgment
clarifies the basic nature and importance of the technique and
aesthetics distinction. Each genre has its technical rules, rules which
go to the basic or elementary demands of the genre, leaving ample
room once they are satisfied to execute them with aesthetic qualities
that add force, emotion, or even meaning to a work. Heeding the line
between technique and aesthetics demands that the Court engage in
the often subtle and dangerous job of identifying a work's genre,
ascertaining its technical rules, and applying them with great care.
Perhaps the difficulty of such a task when applied, for example, to rap
music, which we will discuss below,269 is enough to warrant a rule that
places technique out of judicial bounds. The First Amendment, after
all, is filled with just such slippery slope arguments.
270
But this is not the rule the Court has adopted in the defamation
cases or, for that matter, in many other areas. Instead, the Court has
undertaken to ply the slippery path that separates technique from
aesthetics. In so doing, the Court has also reached an important First
Amendment conclusion. While different genres of expression should
generally be treated equally, the First Amendment does not foreclose
the judicial recognition of different genres and the characteristics that
allow them to be so defined.
2. Product Libel
Brief mention should be made of the closely related product
disparagement or trade libel cases, which involve defamation of a
269. See infra Part IV.D.2.
270. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (overbreadth of the actual malice rule in protecting
false statements of fact is necessary to prevent self-censorship by publishers that fear
unwarranted liability under a more exact test); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(requirement that incitement be proved will allow some speech that provokes violence to
go unpunished, but it is necessary in view of the difficulty of defining exactly when speech
will produce violence).
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commercial product rather than an individual or entity.271 As a
general rule these cases closely mirror the defamation cases.272 Unlike
the defamation tort, the First Amendment privileges are only now
being extended to them.273 More importantly, the genre requirements
are generally more clear cut, for the cases usually involve commercial
advertising, a genre resting heavily on factual truth and accuracy,
274
and the range of settings in which overriding aesthetic claims can be
made is deemed to be more circumscribed.
In other words, aesthetic claims are more readily distinguished
from, and subordinated to, demands of factual accuracy.275 As the
Court has expressed it, this is partly, if not largely, attributable to the
greater "resilience" of commercial expression.276 The profit motive, it
seems, makes commercial expression less cowed by a heavier hand of
government regulation or judicial oversight; the aesthetics lost by
prohibiting one form of an advertisement will predictably resurface in
its replacement. Beneath all of this rationalization is another
explanation: commercial expression lacks the social and cultural value
that justifies the fullest measure of First Amendment protection.
277
271. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A. The actions for
product libel, or trade libel, and related tort actions arising out of falsity and
misrepresentation, fall under the general heading of injurious falsehood. The "corporate"
defamation cases, as they have been called, are not separately covered here, for while they
raise some distinct and important First Amendment problems, they are generally
indistinguishable from the defamation cases discussed above in terms of the issues
addressed in this article. Id. §§ 561, 562.
272. In some respects the product libel cases are more coherent, since the torts have
always required proof of falsity by the plaintiff, and the requirements that a statement's
meaning be fixed with the audience (e.g., consumers) and that pecuniary damage be
proved (e.g., reduced sales) are both firmly embedded in the tort. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A, 626, 629, 632, 633. Thus, the cases tend to focus more
cleanly on questions of intent and technique than the defamation cases. Id. § 623A.
273. See SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at 662, 637-63; U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue
Cross of Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.). This is attributable, in part, to the different
and more exacting requirements of proof of falsity and economic harm. See supra note 272.
274. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
275. See U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.) holding that advertising is commercial
speech and is therefore entitled to less constitutional protection than that afforded in
defamation actions); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988) (broadly prohibiting false
and misleading factual statements in connection with advertising of goods and services in
interstate commerce); Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 276 n.8 (2d
Cir. 1981). For a useful discussion of the trade libel, Lanham Act, and unfair trade
practices causes of action, see SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at 637-75.
276. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
277. See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557; Institutional
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Whatever the combinations of reasons for courts' more intrusive
examination of product libel and related claims, the fact remains that
the approach is at base no different than that employed in the
defamation cases, although it is clearer and more obvious. Factual
accuracy in the message conveyed about a product, particularly when
conveyed by a competitor, is treated as a question of technique
required by the dictates of the genre and the generally accepted norms
of the advertising industry.278 "Fact" is thus regularly extracted from
the content of a message, judged both by its text279 and its
interpretation by an audience,280 and submitted to scrutiny for
accuracy and truth. Indeed, in the product libel cases, and even more
so in the false and misleading advertising setting discussed below,
281
the technical standard is often truth; not, as in the defamation cases,
falsity. Truth, of course, is a more exacting and difficult standard than
falsity, or non-falsity.
282
Even in what courts treat as the more aesthetically circumscribed
genre of advertising and product libel, aesthetic claims can arise,
requiring courts to draw the line between technique and aesthetics.
The case of Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union,283 discussed
earlier, is perhaps the best example in the Supreme Court's decisions.
The case, it will be recalled, involved a review of a new Bose speaker,
the sound from which was described as "wandering about the
room." 284 This was not, of course, a description of sound quality that
pleased Bose Corporation. The Court, based on a complete record of
evidence at trial, had little difficulty separating the fact of sound
wandering about the room from the text of the review and defining
the question in the case as whether this fact was true (in the writer's
Speech, supra note 127; Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Daniel A.
Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372 (1979);
D. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech. A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1976); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
278. See U.S. Healthcare, 898 F.2d 914; SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at 637-75
(1994); ALTMAN & CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
(4th ed. 1992).
279. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 623A, & comments.
280. Id.
281. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
282. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 116; SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at
191-97 (1994).
283. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). See also supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
284. Id. at 488.
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perception, as a general descriptive matter, and in the perception of
the audience).285
At this point, however, the Court stopped short. The "fact" of
sound wandering about the room was not only a reflection of a
listener's impression (though couched as a generally perceivable
phenomenon), but it was more basically a description of an aesthetic
phenomenon, an act of purely aesthetic perception. Words, the Court
said, can only imperfectly substitute for descriptions of aesthetic
phenomena.286 Indeed, in using words to describe such phenomena,
the words must, by necessity, be employed aesthetically to describe
that which can not be reduced to objective description.287 Thus, the
person who listened to the speakers and wrote the review could not
have believed the "wandering about the room" statement to be false.
Absent evidence of spite or a conspiracy, the author was using words
aesthetically to replicate his actual aesthetic experience.288 In other
words, the review's description was protected because it was both
technically acceptable and aesthetically valuable.
Just as misquotations could be used aesthetically in the Masson
case to convey a real meaning, words can also be used to capture an
aesthetic meaning even though, when parsed literally, the precise
words are clearly inadequate to the task. This is perhaps the best
description of what aesthetic use of language is and the function it
serves. And this is the reason that reviews of musical performances or
theatre have traditionally been protected from liability at common
law.289 To explain such cases by resort to such terms as "opinion" falls
miserably short of the mark. It is ironic, in this respect, that the
common law of defamation and product libel resolved such cases in
terms of a time-tested distinction between aesthetics and technique,
seeking express or implied fact that could be extracted and tested,
and, failing this, privileging the damaging statement as "public
285. The differences in meaning of the fact have been discussed earlier. See supra Part
II.C.
286. 466 U.S. at 503, 513-14.
287. Id. at 513. See also Bezanson & Ingle, supra note 50.
288. 466 U.S. at 510-514.
289. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 115, at 831-32; SACK & BARON, supra
note 206, at 202, 233-44 (1944); Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment,
76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205 (1976); Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 86 N.W. 323 (Iowa 1901).
The predominant application of the fair comment privilege to evaluative statements about
aesthetic quality in relation, for example, to theatre, art, literature, public performances,
and the contributions of public institutions is consistent with the idea that descriptions of
aesthetic phenomena, as long as factually accurate and reasonably presented, are incapable
of proof or disproof.
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comment." It is only under the auspices of the First Amendment that
efforts have been made successfully290 to attach the term opinion to
such claims-efforts which, it should be said, the Supreme Court not
only unanimously, but rightly, rejected in the Lorain Journal case.
291
The defamation and product libel cases will serve as a prism
through which we will consider the other groups of cases where
technique is assessed and in which questions of technique are
cordoned off, with varying degrees of success, from questions of
aesthetic quality.29 2 The central features of the Court's approach to
this task, by way of summary, are to define the genre, then identify the
technical requirements that relate to the legal claim presented, and
finally to extract the technical elements from the expression in order
to judge whether they have been or, in the case of descriptions of
aesthetic phenomena, could be satisfied.
C. Selection Judgments: Editorial Judgment
Technique considerations arising out of the definitional elements
of a genre have begun to take on increasing importance in relation to
the variety of claims of First Amendment protection based on
"editorial judgment." The essence of these claims is that the selection
of material to be published is itself an exercise of freedom of
speech.293 In recent cases, the Court has tended to group all such
claims under the heading of "editorial judgment," but then to treat
different types of judgments differently for purposes of the First
Amendment. A jurisprudence of editorial judgment, resting on the
290. See, e.g., Keller v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 778 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1985); Olman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir.).
291. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). While the Court was divided in
the Lorain Journal case, the Court was unanimous in its holding that there is no "opinion"
privilege mandated by the First Amendment. Id.
292. A case arising in the closely related context of intentional infliction of emotional
harm is Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), involving a "parody" of
Reverend Falwell published in Hustler Magazine. The Court denied Reverend Falwell
recovery for emotional distress on the ground that the parody communicated no fact that
could be proven to have been published with actual malice, the constitutionally required
showing, because the publication "could not 'reasonably be understood as describing actual
facts about [respondent] or actual events in which [he] participated." Id. at 57. The absence
of "believable" fact was a function of audience interpretation, discussed earlier, supra
notes 93-100. It was also an element of the genre of political cartoon or satire based on
caricature which, the Court said, "Webster's defines ... as 'the deliberately distorted
picturing or imitating of a person, literary style, etc. by exaggerating features or
mannerisms or satirical effect." Id. at 53.
293. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374,2382 (1996).
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definitional elements of a genre of decisions about speech, is thus
evolving.
The Court's journey into the genre of editorial judgment began
many years ago in the context of conventional news organizations. In
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee294 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,295 the
Court endorsed a broad and seemingly unequivocal claim that
"editing is what editors are for," 296 thus suggesting that if editing or
editorial-type judgments were genuinely at stake those judgments
would not be second guessed for their quality-whether for their
quality of writing or quality of news, entertainment, or the like.
297
Editorial judgment is the bounding idea protecting against intrusion
into the purely aesthetic within the genre of news.
This position required the Court to define what it meant by
"editorial" judgment. In Sullivan298 the Court disqualified the
calculated lie, a form of self-interested, personally motivated
judgment.299 In Gertz,3° the Court extended greater protection to
private plaintiffs, protecting against negligent falsehoods.301 The
malice and negligence inquiries anticipated some form of scrutiny of
the published statements, largely in terms of knowledge of falsity and
intent with respect to falsity, but all other considerations (whether to
publish, how to write the story, how much emphasis to give its main
themes) were safely within the protective ambit of editorial judgment,
and therefore beyond examination.
30 2
In other cases the Court has suggested that decisions that are
governed strictly by personal interest, not general audience interest,
are not editorial judgments. 30 3 More recently, the Court has examined
the concept of editorial judgment in settings other than conventional
294. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
295. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
296. Columbia Broad., 412 U.S. at 124.
297. Id.
298. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
299. Id. at 280. See also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 728 (1968).
300. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
301. Id. at 346-348.
302. See Sullivan's Paradox, supra note 234; Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in
Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REV. 247 (1985).
303. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); Dun & Bradstreet Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); SEC v. Wall Street Publ'g Institute Inc., 851 F.2d 365
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91
(2d Cir. 1977).
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print news, such as cable, and has implied that editorial judgment must
be reasoned, other-directed, and made at the specific, or retail, rather
than the general, or wholesale, level.3 4 In order for an editorial
decision to fall within the news genre, those technical attributes must
be present.
While considerations of genre and technique seem clearly to
underlie the Court's approach to editorial judgment claims, the Court
is deeply divided on the precise meaning and scope of the concept
when it is called into play, for example, with respect to entertainment
or other non-news selections,30 5 or when it arises in new technological
settings, such as a cable television operator's channel selections or the
configuration and function of a web site on the Internet.
3°6
The divisions emerged clearly in Denver Area Education
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,30 7 decided in 1996. One of
the provisions at issue in the Denver Consortium case granted cable
television operators editorial discretion over "indecent" material
broadcast over the public access channels on the operator's cable
system.38 Before 1992, when the statutory provision was enacted,
cable operators had exercised no editorial discretion, having usually
given up their control over public channels in the franchising
process. 30 9 The statute thus conferred editorial power where it had not
existed.
Congress' recognition of a cable television operator's editorial
judgment under the First Amendment was hardly surprising, as the
Supreme Court in its 1994 Turner Broadcasting310 decision had
expressly recognized that "cable operators engage in and transmit
speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press
provisions of the First Amendment. 3 11 However, the extent of First
304. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. 622; Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374.
305. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. 622; Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct.
2374; Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.
306. See supra note 275. A Web site is a menu through which a person on the Internet
can pass to reach other programs or materials. It is much like a channel switch operated by
a cable television operator. The First Amendment status of the switch is at the center of
the Internet case recently decided, in which portions of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996, Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, were declared unconstitutional.
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,857 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd., 117 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
307. Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374.
308. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 106 Stat.
1486, § 10(c), 47 U.S.C. §§ 532(h), 5320); 47 C.F.R. § 76.702 (1995).
309. Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2381.
310. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. 622.
311. Id. at 636.
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Amendment protection was limited in Turner Broadcasting,
permitting government regulation of television cable operators'
editorial judgments under an intermediate standard of scrutiny.
312
One reason for this qualified protection is that a cable television
operator's channel selections are abstracted from the specific material
being broadcast.313 Such wholesale judgments are not entitled to the
same degree of First Amendment respect as the particularized, retail-
level judgments at the specific program level, which are much closer to
the model of editorial judgment the Court applies to newspapers
editors' editorial judgments about news.
314
The Court's recognition of a cable operator's First Amendment
freedom to make channel judgments, however, made the Court's
invalidation of the statute conferring such authority in Denver
Consortium quite surprising. But the result reflected the deep
divisions on the Court about the application of a technical genre
analysis, and even about the genre to be judged. Thus, the plurality in
Denver Consortium, led by Justice Breyer, appeared to recognize no
rightful claim of editorial freedom in the cable television operator's
authority (whether statutory in origin or not) to judge material under
a decency regime.315 Justice Breyer stopped short of the Turner
Broadcasting decision, which had recognized only a qualified freedom
of editorial judgment in cable operator decisions.
316
Justice Kennedy, in contrast, took the view that the public access
channels had been sold to the municipalities at the time of franchising,
and thus had become public property to be treated as a public forum.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy expressly invoked the street and park
analogy.317 The idea that the public access channels were public fora,
of course, cut the cable operator out of any claim of editorial
judgment under the First Amendment with respect to the material
broadcast, as control of the forum would be strictly limited under the
312. Id. at 662.
313. Id. at 644.
314. See id. at 655-56; compare Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) and Columbia Broad., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), with Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at
2374.
315. Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2374.
316. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 636. The reasons for this conclusion were not made
clear, and could rest as much on waiver (the cable operator had given up any right to make
a claim of editorial authority at the time of the original franchise agreement) as on a
rejection of the Turner Broad. language. See Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2374.
317. Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. at 2409.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 20:275
First Amendment and would thus be a governmental responsibility,
not a private editorial one.
318
Justice Thomas, joined in a dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, took a position at the other extreme.3 19 A cable
operator's judgments about material to be broadcast and channels to
be carried, he concluded, were as fully protected by the First
Amendment as the decisions of a newspaper editor about the
selection or contents of a news story.320 Indeed, under this view the
speech claims of a program producer seeking access to a cable system
or resisting editorial supervision of what is published are clearly
subordinate to the constitutionally secured authority of the cable
operator; such claims, in fact, are not First Amendment claims at
all.32
1
The Turner Broadcasting and Denver Consortium cases thus
disclose the full range of views about whether editorial judgment as a
genre of speech activity has any bearing on a cable operator's program
and channel selection decisions, and if so whether it is entitled to full
or only qualified First Amendment protection. The differences so
reflected are, generally speaking, differences in judgment about the
definition of editorial judgment as a genre or species, and the
importance of certain elements to its constitutional protection. In the
Turner Broadcasting and Denver Consortium cases the critical
elements were two: the degree of particularity with which the selection
choice was made; and the basis upon which the selection judgments
rested-whether they were based on audience desire and operator
profit, on the one hand, or public need, on the other.
Two other cases, neither decided by the Supreme Court, identify
additional elements of editorial judgment as a genre of speech act. In
SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Institute, Inc.,322 the SEC sought to
enjoin Stock Market Magazine, a trade newspaper, from publishing
stories that featured selected companies without disclosing the fact
that the companies had paid the publisher.3 23 The articles focused on
specific companies (usually in glowing terms), and were allegedly
solicited by the companies, which paid for the expenses incurred in
visiting the company and "writing" the articles. Indeed the articles
318. Id. at 2410.
319. Id. at 2419,
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
323. Id. at 367.
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were largely written by company employees and, with few if any
changes, simply republished in the news magazine as the magazine's
own.
324
In holding that an injunction could 325 constitutionally issue
against the feature stories, the court drew a sharp distinction between
republication for hire, a form of advertisement at best, and editorial
judgment based on the publisher's independent selection of material
with a view to the audience's needs, pursuant to a process directed to
such a determination.
326
[S]o long as consideration is defined in accordance with the material
used in the publication, the very definition of consideration will
necessarily constitute the line between the sphere of permitted
regulation-disclosure of the omitted fact [of "for hire"
publication]-and wholly protected speech. The crucial factor that
distinguishes the feature articles from the balance of the magazine-
and which constitutionally justifies regulation-is not the glowing
terms used to describe the companies featured.... Rather,
permissibility of the disclosure requirement must necessarily turn
solely on whether consideration was paid to the magazine for
publication of the article-and not on the content of the publication.
Were the government to show, for example, direct cash payments to
Brown, the Managing Editor, such transactions might well be
distinguishable from writers' fees because the payments might be
tantamount to payments to the publisher to carry the article.
Requiring disclosure of such payments would not interfere with
either editorial judgments concerning the content of the feature
articles or news gathering practices.
[The] term 'bought and paid for' suggests, particularly in light of the
constitutional difficulties we have described, a crisp transaction
sharply distinguished from normal ,journalistic editing or news
gathering practices.
327
Similar distinctions between independent editorial judgments and
''mere use" of material originated by others are reflected in the
copyright field when claims of fair use arise in the news setting. For
example, in Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,328
the Second Circuit declined to treat a Wall Street Journal financial
324. Id.
325. Id. at 376. The issues arose on appeal prior to full trial, and therefore the court did
not decide whether in the particular case an injunction would be enforceable, but rather
that under certain circumstances an injunction could be issued to require disclosure even
against a "newspaper."
326. Id. at 375.
327. Id.
328. 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977).
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column's use of a substantial quotation from a commercial financial
newsletter to be a fair use in news reporting.329 The Journal financial
column consisted almost entirely of the quotation.33 In light of this
fact, the Journal could not be said to have added anything to the
copyrighted passage that would qualify the use as news, a judgment
based implicitly, and necessarily, on the absence of any independent
judgment made about the material to be published in the column
which would transform it from the work of another into the product of
the process of editorial judgment about news. 331 News, in short,
consists of more than quoting another writing; it rests on judgment
and presentation that manifests an independent view of the publisher,
who is deciding what to publish and how to publish it for purposes of
serving the needs of the audience.
332
In these and other cases decided over the past twenty or so years,
the Court has sketched the important elements comprising editorial
judgment: public-regarding decisions about material to be selected;
arrived at independently by a publisher through a process of reason;
accompanied by a dedication to truth; and applied with respect to
current information judged to be of importance to the public or some
segment of it.333 Implicit in these elements, and especially in the first
and the last, is the requirement that the judgment be based on a
particularized decision about the material.
The Turner Broadcasting and Denver Consortium decisions are
not inconsistent with this. They suggest, at the very least, that the less
particularized and more wholesale the level at which choice is made,
the less significance the First Amendment will attach to the decision
as an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press. And the
Wainwright and Wall Street Publishing Institute cases suggest that
where independent judgment is completely lacking, regardless of the
level of particularity, no First Amendment value will be attached to
the publication, for there is no act of selection deserving of protection
as expression. Selection judgments claimed to be exercises of editorial
judgment, but which can not satisfy the elemental, or technical,
329. Id. at 96-97.
330. Id. at 96.
331. Id. at 96-97.
332. See id.; Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
333. For a more thorough discussion of editorial judgment and press freedom, see
Institutional Speech, supra note 127, at 806-15.
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requirements of the genre, will not be afforded First Amendment
protection.
D. The Appropriation, Copyright, and Trademark Cases
The importance of genre to the application of standards of
technique, or technical quality, is most evident in the fields of
appropriation, copyright, and trademark. It is therefore on the role of
genre definitions that we will focus our attention, leaving to occasional
and spotty footnote discussions the other illustrations of judgments
about technique that occur in the larger bodies of case law in these
fields.334 The three areas of appropriation, copyright, and trademark
have one critical feature in common: they all seek to protect a
property-based ownership interest in a communication from
conversion by another.
The appropriation tort is an ill-fitting offshoot of the privacy tort
originally given definition and legal place by William Prosser in his
famous article, Privacy.335 As Prosser observed, while the roots of the
tort in privacy can be traced to the property-based foundation
underlying the original common law concept of privacy, by mid-
century appropriation remained the only "privacy" tort rooted firmly
in property notions.336 The tort protects someone's personality or acts,
including communicative acts, from being used by another for the
other's (largely commercial or pecuniary) benefit. 337 The tort thus
334. As one might imagine, given the kinds of comparative judgments courts regularly
must make in appropriation, copyright, and trademark cases, the examples of judicial
discussion of technical elements of challenged expression are legion. See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 7, § 117, at 851-54; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C;
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661
(1988); THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW, VOL. 3, §§ 22.01-25.21 (2d ed.
1996).
335. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
336. Id.; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 117. The other privacy torts defined by
Prosser were the public disclosure of private facts tort, the tort of intrusion on privacy and
the false light tort. Prosser, supra note 335, at 389. The first turned toward a "pure" form of
personal interest in privacy of information and avoidance of embarrassment and emotional
distress. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 117, at 856-59; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D (1976); Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy,
News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133 (1992). The intrusion tort
retained a foothold in property, but only through the protection of certain spaces and
places in the interest of tranquillity and privacy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652B (1976). The false light tort evolved toward defamation, protecting a privacy interest
in freedom from embarrassing or unwanted public exposure caused by placing a person in
a false light. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 117, at 854-56; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1976).
337. See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and
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serves, in the applications we will be concerned with here, as a rough
substitute for copyright protection.
In contrast, copyright and trademark are creatures of statutes
and, in the case of copyright, the Constitution.338 The Copyright Act
grants monopolies to "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression."33 9 Trademark protection, defined by
the Lanham Act,340 does not extend a monopoly to original works.
Instead it applies to words, names, symbols or devices that have
become well known and valuable, and thus entitled to protection
against misleading or confusing use by others in connection with the
sale of goods or services.3 41 Therefore, copyright and trademark
protect very different interests. But, like the appropriation tort, both
are grounded on a property-like interest conferred on a
communication. Furthermore, both are designed, in effect, to prevent
its conversion to a competing use by another. As a consequence, one
of the most common and difficult issues courts must confront with all
three legal interests is whether an unwanted use by another
constitutes a prohibited conversion or taking.
342
In all three areas, appropriation, copyright, and trademark, the
question of impermissible use (or "conversion" as I will call it)
depends largely on judgments about technique. These judgments, in
turn, rely heavily on definitions of genre and comparisons of the
technical, rather than aesthetic, demands of the competing genre. The
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 670-74 (1991).
338. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause gives Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
339. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996). See Judith B. Prowda, Application of Copyright and
Trademark Law in the Protection of Style in the Visual Arts, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
269, 270 (1995).
340. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (amended §§ 1052 and 1127).
341. Id. § 1051-1127.
342. The terminology and underlying legal concepts are different for each interest. For
an appropriation, the question is whether a name, likeness or performance possessing
demonstrable commercial value, for example, has been appropriated by another's use of
some or all of it for the other's economic benefit and with destructive consequences for the
owner of the original performance. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977). For copyright, the question is whether the original work has been
reproduced, used in a derivative work or distributed for public sale or display by another.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996). If so, the question becomes whether that use is "fair" and thus
unprotected. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996). For trademarks, the question is whether the mark
has been used by another in a confusing or misleading way in connection with the sale of
goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993).
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same distinction between aesthetic quality and technique that
underpins the defamation tort governs the enforcement of
appropriation, copyright, and trademark interests.
1. Appropriation
The Supreme Court's first, and apparently only, experience with
the appropriation (or right of publicity) tort occurred in 1977 in the
case of Zacchini v. Scrips-Howard Broadcasting Co. 343 The case
involved Hugo Zacchini, who performed a human cannonball act at
fairs. 3" During an early performance in a county fair in Ohio, a
television reporter filmed Zacchini's act over Zacchini's objection.
345
The local station ran a 15-second segment of the act that evening.
346
The broadcasted segment pictured the cannon propelling Zacchini
into the air.347 It was the heart of the performance which Zacchini
understandably concluded would dampen the interest of potential
future fair-goers. 348 He accordingly claimed in his subsequent lawsuit
that the television broadcast had appropriated his legally protected
interest in the commercial value of his act.349
The Supreme Court's opinion and dissenting opinions in the
Zacchini case are hardly a model of judicial clarity.350 In the First
Amendment style of claims for an opinion privilege, discussed
earlier,351 the Court focused its attention on whether the segment's
broadcast as news, in and of itself, compelled its immunity from
liability.352 The Court then considered whether broadcast of the
"entire act" (as a practical matter) somehow disqualified it from being
treated as news. 353 The Court stated:
It is evident ... that petitioner's state-law right of publicity would
not serve to prevent [the television station] from reporting the
newsworthy facts about [Zacchini's] act. Wherever the line in
particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are
protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and
343. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
344. Id. at 563.
345. Id. at 563-64.
346. Id. at 563.
347. Id. at 564.
348. Id. at 575.
349. Id. at 564.
350. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
351. See supra notes 245-255 and accompanying text.
352. 433 U.S. at 574-75.
353. Id.
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Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they
broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent.
354
However, beneath the rubble of a newsworthiness privilege and
the definition of news the Court's analysis reflected a common sense,
though unarticulated, inquiry into genre. 355 The question presented in
the case was whether the act's broadcast on television represented a
different genre of communication from its performance at the fair,
and if so, whether its broadcast satisfied the technical requirements
that precondition any claim that a distinct genre was employed. 35 6 If a
distinct genre claim which is substantially distinct from the genre of
Zacchini's performance is made, then the broadcast should be treated
as transformative-as transforming Zacchini's communication into
another. Thus, its degree of First Amendment protection should rest
on the value of that transformation to the aims of the First
Amendment.
The application of this analysis, which bears a striking
resemblance to the reasoning employed under different headings by
the Court,3 57 would look something like this: Zacchini's genre was the
dramatic performance of an act for an audience.358 This definition of
genre is not restricted to a place (such as performance at a fair), time
or, most importantly, live setting (such as a performance before a live
audience). Such a narrow definition would not capture the full
aesthetic content of the act; would not reflect the commercially
feasible settings in which it might, without substantial modification, be
communicated; and would defeat the very policy interests served by
the tort.
The genre claimed by the television station, in contrast, was news.
This is a distinct genre with its own technical requirements, such as
usefulness to an audience, interest, accuracy of representation, and
value to the community as judged editorially.359 The question in
354. Id. at 574-75.
355. Id. at 562.
356. Id.
357. In the copyright field, the boundary between news (as a fair use) and infringement
has often been based on questions of genre, or specifically whether a "use" involves
sufficient "value added" as news to transform the copyrighted work into "news." See, e.g.,
Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977)
(concluding that portions of a commercial newsletter used in a financial column did not
constitute fair use); Roy Export Co., v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982)
(concluding that Charlie Chaplin films used in CBS program on his life did not qualify as
fair use).
358. See Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 91; Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1095.
359. The elemental characteristics of news are both contestable and frequently
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Zacchini is whether the station had transformed the segment of
Zacchini's act into a new and valuable genre.
360
One could pose this question by asking, as the Justices did,
whether the "entire act" had been broadcast and, thus, the station's
news claim should be disbelieved because the act is purely and simply
entertainment. 361 However, it would be better and clearer to approach
the question from the other end by measuring the segment broadcast,
including the pictures and surrounding text, against the elemental
characteristics of news as a genre. First, one would require that the
station identify the broadcast's news content and news function.
Assuming that the function was simply to report the occurrence of a
notable event and not part of a larger story, such as how people do
silly things that risk their life for money, the question would then
become whether depiction of the entire act was necessary to serve that
news function (utility to the audience, value to the community) or
whether that function could be performed as well, if not more
effectively, without broadcasting the effective heart of the
performance. In other words, the issue would be whether the act was
transformed into something new through its use in the news
broadcast-whether the station had added value through its use for
news36 2-- or whether the act's significance remained the same while its
venue simply changed.
By reversing the Ohio Supreme Court's adoption of a broad First
Amendment privilege for news broadcasts,363 the Court required the
Ohio court to apply this method of analysis on remand. The fact that
the broadcast was of "legitimate public interest," as the Ohio Supreme
Court had declared, was not enough to warrant First Amendment
immunity.364 Virtually anything including news, entertainment,
theatre, music, or most genres, can be clothed in such sweeping
garb.365 The Court necessarily implied that news is more than that.366
The approach to quality as technique that the Court made
implicit in the Zacchini case is quite explicitly adopted in a broad
contested. However, the ones I have posited seem adequate to the task in Zacchini and
would, generally, be accepted in the journalism community. See supra notes 295-333 and
accompanying text.
360. 433 U.S. at 566-67.
361. Id. at 562.
362. See, e.g., Wainwright, 558 F.2d at 91; Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1095.
363. Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 454.
364. 433 U.S. at 565.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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range of appropriation cases.367 A revealing example is the case of
Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen,368 where a New Jersey District Court
found actionable appropriation on the basis that there was no genre
difference (and thus no transformative value for purposes of the First
Amendment) between the appropriating use and the original.
369
Russen, one of the legion of Elvis Presley cases, involves an Elvis
impersonator show titled the "Big El Show." 370 In finding a
compensable appropriation, the court defined the genre of the
appropriating use and concluded, without much difficulty, that the
appropriation was "entertainment [that was] merely a copy or
imitation" lacking "its own creative component., 371 It was not history
because it contained nothing biographical.372 It was not social political
commentary as it provided no information relevant to social or
political or cultural questions.373 Finally, it was not designed to be
artistic because it did not encourage expression of creative talent that
contributed to society's cultural enrichment.374
Instead, the "Big El Show" was entertainment that did no more
than copy or imitate Elvis' performances. 375  Thus it lacked
transformative value in the genre of entertainment as it lacked "its
own creative component or significant [and distinct] value as pure
entertainment.376 The court made it clear that the fact that the show
was entertainment did not, in and of itself, deprive it of potential First
Amendment value.377 Instead it was the lack of contribution of its own
that dictated the result.378 As an example of protected entertainment,
the court pointed to satire, which, while often no more than
entertainment, contributes new elements of that genre to the original
act and thus transforms it.379 But the "Big El Show" was apparently
367. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, § 117, at 851-54; Victor A. Kovner et al.,
Recent Developments in Intrusion, Private Facts, False Light and Commercialization
Claims, 3 PLI/Pat 615, 825-82 (1993).
368. 513 F. Supp. 1339 (N.J. 1981).
369. Id. at 1354.
370. Id. at 1348-49.
371. Id. at 1359.
372. Id. at 1360.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 1359.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1365.
378. Id. at 1356.
379. Id. at 1359, n.21.
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scrupulously serious about its purely imitative objectives, and thus no
satire was to be found, except possibly in the minds of some
beholders.
2. Copyright
The concept of transformative use and its foundation in the
concept of genre and technique also emerges in copyright cases. In
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,380 the Supreme Court was faced
with the question of whether rap group 2 Live Crew's parody of the
Roy Orbison song "Pretty Woman" was a violation of copyright or a
fair use.381 The answer, according to Justice Souter's opinion for the
Court, boiled down to whether and to what extent 2 Live Crew's
performance was "transformative of the original work, altering it with
new expression, meaning, or message." 382 In determining whether a
transformation had occurred, the Court looked to the genre of parody,
which it defined as a performance that "mimic[s] an original work in
order to make its [own] point. 38 3 According to the Court, the 2 Live
Crew performance employed the parody genre to make a statement
about race and cultural attitudes.
384
Whether the technique of parody justified 2 Live Crew "tak[ing]
the heart" of the original, its musical score and lyrics, was the very
question the Court had wrestled with in Zacchini. In Campbell, the
Court answered this question in the affirmative, relying, again, on the
technical elements of parody. "Parody," the Court said, "needs to
mimic an original in order to make its point, and so has some claim to
use the creation of its victim's ... imagination .... 385 In other words,
the transformative genre of parody justified taking the heart of the
original. But, "having found [parody]," the Court said, "we will not
take the 'further step of evaluating its quality."38 6 Thus, having
determined that the technical elements of a claimed transformative
380. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 579.
383. Id. at 580-81.
384. Id. In an analogous but distinct setting, the Court discussed the attributes that
distinguish a parade as a form of expression from one which is not. See Hurley v. Irish
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338,2345 (1995).
385. 510 U.S. at 580-81.
386. Id. at 582 (agreeing with Judge Nelson's dissent in the Court of Appeals).
Whether the parody is in good taste or bad, the Court continued, does not matter under the
First Amendment. Id.
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genre had been satisfied, the Court would not venture judgment on its
aesthetic quality.
The technique orientation of the Court's analysis was further
confirmed by the distinction it drew between parody, the claimed
genre of 2 Live Crew, and satire. According to the Court, parody must
"take the heart" of the original to accomplish its purposes, "whereas
satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the
very act of borrowing." 38 7 Satire, which simply ridicules or discredits
the original,388 is a distinct genre with its own set of elements and
conventions; it is these elements, rather than any aesthetic qualities,
that distinguish satire from parody. Satire can lay no claim to
borrowing or copying because doing so would stand at odds with its
very function.38 9 This was a point the Court had already made a few
years before in the Falwell case, discussed earlier.
3 90
The Court's attention in Campbell to the distinction between
parody and satire was intended to clarify the fact that in approaching
copyright claims involving expression, just as in approaching
appropriation claims, qualitative judgments bearing on technique can
and must be made in the interest of the legal right asserted and, more
importantly, in the interests of the First Amendment. But it is equally
important, the Court admonishes, to keep judgments about technical
quality separate from judgments about aesthetic quality; for just as the
First Amendment may require the former, it prohibits the latter.
3 91
387. Id. at 581.
388. See id.
389. In a similar fashion, courts have defined the limits of news as a genre, rejecting
claims to fair use protection where the use of copyrighted materials cannot be said to
contribute to news. For example, in Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,
558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), the court declined to consider a Wall Street Journal financial
column's use of a substantial quotation from a commercial financial newsletter to be a use
for news reporting under the fair use doctrine. The sum and substance of the financial
column was the quotation. d. at 94. The Journal, in light of this, could not be said to have
added anything to the copyrighted passage that would qualify its use as news. Id. at 97.
News, in short, consists of more than quoting another writing; it rests on judgment and
composition that transforms the value or meaning of the raw material reported, whether it
be fact alone, or a quotation from someone else. See also supra notes 328-333 and
accompanying text.
390. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). There the Court saw a
parody of Reverend Falwell as satirical in part because it "could not 'reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts."' Id. at 57. See also supra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text.
391. The quality as technique analysis is also evident in a recent case involving The
New Yorker's satirical use of the Old Farmers Almanac cover on its Christmas cover. See
Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267 (1992). Interestingly,
the genre used in The New Yorker cover was deemed to be satire, not parody, yet the cover
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3. Trademark
Trademark cases present a unique set of issues that set the cases
apart from the appropriation and copyright cases. These include
whether a trademark is distinctive, whether it has acquired a
secondary meaning in the public mind, a mark's functionality, and the
likelihood that an infringing use will cause confusion.392 Because
attention to these questions dominates a court's analysis in virtually all
trademark cases, the technique analysis is rarely straightforward. But
its structure can be detected beneath the surface.
Thus, in Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Corp., 393 which
involved an allegedly confusing battery label, the court defined the
distinctiveness requirement in genre terms. To qualify as a trademark,
a communication must not be "mere" description. It must instead be
suggestive, a genre which, according to the court, relies on the use of
imagination to achieve its meaning.394 This is a question going to the
nature of the communication, not the quality of imagination it evokes
or the aesthetic features which evoke it.
395
In Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha International, Inc.,396 the
court extended trademark protection to fine art reproductions,
protecting them against competing products in the same style or with
the same "overall look" as the protected prints. 397 Under the heading
of functionality, the court's opinion focused not on aesthetic quality
but instead on the technical attributes of the original artist's work, a
"combination of visual features that create[s] a distinctive visual
impression .... 
398
was a mimic of the original, taking, as the Campbell Court put it, "the heart" of the
original. Id. at 279. The district court concluded, consistently with the implication of the
Campbell analysis, that such a use would not be protected, as the elements of the genre of
satire would not justify it. Id. But in the end the court avoided this result by crediting The
New Yorker's claim that the use communicated a separate, ironic message about the falsity
of thrift in the trendy New York of the 1990's. Id. at 280. The Court concluded with the
somewhat limp statement that "the obscurity of [the] joke does not deprive it of First
Amendment support." Id. The Court apparently did not recognize, however, that by this
sleight of hand it had negated its earlier conclusion that the cover was satire, and
transformed it into parody.
392. See supra notes 340-342 and accompanying text.
393. 531 F.2d 366 (1976).
394. Id. at 378.
395. Id.
396. 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). For a discussion of the Romm Art case, see
Prowda, supra note 339.
397. Romm Art, 786 F. Supp. at 1134-35.
398. Id. at 1136.
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The Romm Art case can be criticized for pressing the
technique/aesthetic distinction too far, for extending it beyond the
more general genre considerations common to copyright cases and
applying it at too particular a level. Romm Art effectively treats an
artist's work as a genre with certain technical, as distinguished from
aesthetic, elements. Perhaps the criticism should be well taken and a
line should be drawn at some level of generality to avoid the risk that
technique will too easily invade aesthetics. But such a criticism should
be seen as resting on a slippery slope argument, and not negating the
fact that, in theory and perhaps in practice, elements of technique can
be separated out from the aesthetic even at the level of the individual
artist. This is precisely what is done in the defamation cases, and it is
also what is done in many copyright and appropriation cases where, as
in Romm Art, the claim is that one person is using the voice of
another.
But we shall set this larger normative question aside for the
moment. The purpose of the present discussion is largely to describe,
not to criticize. And the description drawn by the appropriation,
copyright, and trademark cases is clear. In these areas the courts,
including the Supreme Court, purposefully navigate the waters
separating the technical elements of a communication from its
aesthetic features. As a result a growing body of case law has
developed in which a central focus is placed on technical quality, or, as
I have named it, quality as technique.
E. The Commercial Speech and Advertising Cases
"Commercial speech," the Supreme Court tells us, is "expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience." '399 In determining the First Amendment's protection for
speech of this type (we will postpone for the moment the question
whether speech so defined can be legitimately viewed as a genre),4°°
the Court evaluates three requirements. First, the Court determines
whether the speech "concern[s] a lawful activity and [is] not
misleading;" second, whether the "governmental interest [in
regulating it] is substantial;" and third, whether the regulation at issue
"directly advances" and is reasonably tailored to that interest.4 1 If
399. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
400. See infra text accompanying notes 411-435.
401. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Central Hudson formulation of the last
part of the test has been restated and, it appears, relaxed in later cases. I have
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these requirements are met, the government can regulate the speech,
either because the government's interest is sufficient to override the
First Amendment or, as the Court often puts it, because the
expression is not protected (as speech) under the First Amendment.4°2
The ambiguity in this aspect of the. Court's formulation is of
considerable theoretical importance, 4 3 but happily it need not detain
us here.
Whichever way one views the question, the important fact for our
purposes is that the Court has singled out for less stringent protection
a species of speech that possesses three characteristics: it "solely"
concerns "the economic interests of the speaker and its audience;" it
"concern[s] a lawful activity;" and it is "not misleading. ' '4 4 The
present discussion will focus even more narrowly on the economic
interest and misleading factors, for unlike the lawful activity element
which goes to the subject matter or ideational content of the speech,
the economic interest and misleading elements go more clearly to the
generic characteristics of the speech and thus look more like genre
elements. Through these two elements we will be able to determine
whether, and to what extent, the commercial speech cases reflect
approximated the current view with the term reasonably tailored. The Court, however, has
followed a truly shifting course in the past decade, moving from the fairly strict
requirements of Central Hudson to greatly relaxed requirements in Posadas De Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), to an intermediate degree of strictness in
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995), and Board of Trustees of the State
University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), and finally, to a standard similar to
(though perhaps a bit more relaxed than) CentralHudson, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). These wavering standards of review are not relevant to our
inquiry in this article, as we will focus on the definitional aspects of commercial speech,
which while variously and imperfectly formulated have not really changed over time, and
not on the government's regulatory interest or the standard of review.
402. The Court's opinions are far from clear on this question, perhaps because the
Central Hudson test, itself, mixes the two different formulations together, asking, first,
whether the speech is commercial speech because it concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading (thus it is "speech" under the First Amendment), and then (assuming it is
speech) whether the government's interest is sufficient to override the First Amendment.
See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983).
403. Is false and misleading "commercial speech," for example, not commercial speech
at all, thereby falling completely outside the First Amendment, or is it still commercial
speech because it satisfies the sole economic interests definition, but subject to regulation
because of its false and misleading quality without the need to resort to the government
interest parts of the test?
404. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562, 566.
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qualitative judgments about technique in addition to the obvious
social value judgments that have been discussed earlier.
405
The Supreme Court's earliest formulation of the commercial
speech definition was quite different from the one it finally settled on
in Central Hudson. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,4°6 Justice Blackmun posed the question as
"whether speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial
transaction' . . . lacks all protection" under the First Amendment.
407
He described such speech as a communication whose author "does not
wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to make
generalized observations even about commercial matters., 408 "The
'idea' he wishes to communicate," Justice Blackmun continued, "is
simply this: 'I will sell you the X prescription drug at Y price.' 409 This
definition, based on the author's intention, excluded two genres of
speech: news and commentary (or nonfiction commentary), and
settled upon one, the "paid advertisement" for goods or services.
410
In Virginia Pharmacy the genre of commercial speech is defined
as it should be, by the purpose the author intended the speech to
serve.411 As discussed earlier, where the First Amendment protection
is claimed for the author who engaged in a communicative act, the
genre determination must be based on the author's communicative
intention, not simply the text or the audience's perception.412 To be
sure, the text and received message must, the Court tells us, comport
with the author's intention in order for the author's act of speaking to
be constitutionally related to the claim of protection for the resulting
speech. Where that is not the case, as with the beggar holding a cup
who is seen by others as a metaphor for social despair, the protection
accorded the speech bears no sensible relation to the "author," who is
really no longer the author.
The same analysis should apply to genre determinations,
including the definition of commercial speech, and for the same First
Amendment reasons. If a cigarette advertisement is seen by an
audience as a metaphor for greed, the ills of capitalism, imperialism,
405. See discussion supra Part IV.
406. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
407. Id. at 762.
408. Id. at 761.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 762.
412. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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or human stupidity, that transformation by the audience should not
entitle Phillip Morris, for example, to claim that its speech concerned
issues of public policy and social commentary, thus entitling it to the
fullest protection of the First Amendment.
4 13
The analysis is the same for genre questions. If the cigarette
advertisement ("Come to Marlboro Country") is seen in metaphorical
terms as a reflection on corporate greed and avarice, or the cultural
and social importance of rugged individualism, that fact shouldn't
entitle Phillip Morris to claim that its "paid advertisement" for
cigarettes wasn't really an advertisement, but was instead "news" or
nonfiction commentary, or even poetry.414
One might hypothesize a setting in which a cigarette
advertisement from the 1920's is transformed by a republisher into an
artifact of social or cultural significance, or even a work of art, much
as Andy Warhol transformed the "Campbell's Soup" can. But even in
such a case, Phillip Morris should not be considered the relevant
speaker for purposes of First Amendment protection, and the genre of
Phillip Morris" advertisement (as opposed to the genre of the author
of the history in which it was republished or of the printmaker who
reproduced it) should not be considered to have been transformed by
place and time.
415
In short, the determination of genre must necessarily be grounded
in the intent or purpose of the speaker. This is precisely what Justice
Blackmun did in the Virginia Pharmacy case.416 And having defined
413. As a practical matter, this may be the very reason that the Court created the
commercial speech category, for without it the protection to be accorded speech would
depend on the vicissitudes of time, place, and audience as they relate to meaning, with the
practical result that advertising would have to be considered core political speech.
414. The argument to the contrary, that because cigarettes are the subject of public
interest and political controversy cigarette advertisements should be defined as speech on
matters of public interest and thus considered "core" political speech, is hardly facetious. It
is the argument made by the cigarette companies in challenges to advertising restrictions
and smoking restrictions. The argument, rightly from a First Amendment perspective, has
been rejected. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (speech that does no more' than "propose a commercial
transaction," is protected, basing the definition on the text); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (speech "solely related to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience," basing the definitional question on
speaker purpose or motive); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d
Cir. 1993) (concluding that begging is not protected speech).
415. For further discussion of the questions surrounding art and technique, see infra
notes 458-474. For a detailed discussion of an analogous set of issues relating to J.S.G.
Boggs and his counterfeit art, see discussion infra Part VI.B.
416. 425 U.S. at 773.
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genre in this way, he could identify and isolate, for purposes of First
Amendment analysis, the elemental characteristics of the genre. For
his purposes they were that the information contained in the
advertisement be true and not deceptive or misleading.4 17 These
characteristics were then treated as elements of technique-as
standards of technical quality not subject to the demanding scrutiny of
the First Amendment but instead serving as preconditions for the
application of such scrutiny. They serve as requirements, in effect, that
speech must meet in order to qualify for the protection accorded the
genre, which protection was determined by an altogether different
calculus of value, as discussed earlier.418 Questions of aesthetic quality
could thus be cordoned off by limiting qualitative judgments to
questions of technique, which were restricted to the issues of truth and
deceptiveness or misrepresentation (themselves complex questions
often probing aesthetic concerns, which will be discussed in the next
section). Likewise, questions of social value, meaning, and
communication could also be kept analytically distinct.
Justice Blackmun's careful and genre-based formulation of
commercial speech in Virginia Pharmacy, however, was muddled by
Justice Powell's new formulation in Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.419 The first difficulty was
introduced by Justice Powell's reformulation of speaker purpose from
"propos[ing] a commercial transaction" to "the economic interests of
the speaker." 420 These are two very different ideas. Justice
Blackmun's formulation looks to the function the speaker intends the
speech to serve; Justice Powell's looks to the motive and interests of
the speaker, and is at once narrower and, more importantly, vastly
broader in reach than the Virginia Pharmacy language. Genre goes
not to motive, but to functional purpose. Justice Powell's concept of
economic interests of the speaker goes only to motive, and therefore
would embrace, in its literal terms, virtually any form of
communication engaged in strictly for reasons of avarice or profit.
"No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money," Samuel
Johnson is reported to have said, according to Boswell.42
The second problem introduced by the Central Hudson test was
its requirement of audience motive, or interest. Justice Blackmun's
417. Id. at 771.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 403-405.
419. 477 U.S. at 561.
420. Id.
421. SAMUEL JOHNSON, BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON (1776).
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test carefully avoided reference to the audience. The audience's
perception was a question of meaning, not of genre; a question, to
state it differently, of the quality of the communication process, not
one going to the nature of the speaker's act. Justice Powell's
formulation-"expression related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience" 422-brings the audience directly into the
genre definition, and it does so not in terms of the audience's
perception of the speech, but rather in terms of the audience's motive.
But the fact that a person purchasing a Picasso sketch does so out of
an interest in collecting childrens' scribblings, not knowing it is a
Picasso, doesn't dispossess Picasso from the print or transform its
genre from art to childhood scratchings. The audience is an interpreter
of communication, to be sure, but it is not a party to the act of
speaking.
The final confusion introduced by Central Hudson was the
separation of the genre definition-"commercial speech"-from the
question of its false or misleading character, and the inclusion of the
deceptiveness inquiry in the test the Court applied to the
government's regulatory interests. By separating the falsity issue from
the genre definition, the Central Hudson formulation made it difficult
to separate the technical elements of genre (i.e., false, non-misleading,
non-deceptive) from questions of aesthetics or of social value. Instead,
the genre was left to definition by the motives of the speaker and
audience alone. Thus it was left without any valid or useful objective
criteria by which the Court could determine what type of
communication was involved in the case.
By conflating the falsity issue with the questions of social policy
(such as, is the government's interest important, has it been
accomplished well in its legislative form?), falsity, too, was made into
a question of social policy not genre requirement or technique. Thus
the Court was able in Central Hudson to consider truth to be a matter
of social policy by treating as important and constitutionally valid the
state's interest in energy conservation when applied to truthful
information about electrical appliances, where the state only restricted
its ban on truthful information about electrical devices to those which
failed to decrease electrical consumption.
423
Since Central Hudson, the Court's approach to commercial
speech cases cannot be described as resting on considerations of
422. 447 U.S. at 561.
423. See 447 U.S. at 568-69.
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quality as technique. It has instead rested on a flawed definition, at
least from a communication standpoint, and a resultant opened-ended
form of ad hoc balancing. This is quite likely the reason why the
Court's commercial speech decisions, as well as their analytical
foundations, have vacillated so greatly, appearing at times, even, to
crumble.4 24 Under the Central Hudson regime the technical and, as we
will see, aesthetic quality of speech have been made the product of
social and constitutional value determinations grounded in the Court's
view of the importance of the state's policy objectives; 2 5 the shifting
value attached to economically self-interested acts on the part of
speakers and audiences;4 26 the value of the subject of the speech;427
and the constitutional importance of the activity to which the speech
relates.4
28
In the end, however, it is neither the untidiness nor the analytical
confusion, nor even the open-ended balancing on matters of free
speech, that condemns the Central Hudson approach to the
commercial speech cases. It instead is the Court's failure to hew to a
constitutionally important line that Justice Blackmun had drawn
between considerations of technique, on the one hand, and
considerations of quality, on the other. Without such a line the Court
risks intrusion of social policy, political preference, and taste into the
domain of aesthetic quality, which the Virginia Pharmacy definition
potentially protected against. And the seeds of just such an intrusion
lurk near the surface of the Court's decisions, which can be seen as
reflecting a certain disdain for Tupperware parties,4 29 big billboards,430
and even demeaning professional advertisements.
431
The problems associated with the Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence are likely to be felt more broadly, for there is a risk that
they will influence the Court's approach in such areas as the
regulation of false and misleading advertisements;432 the regulation of
424. See supra notes 416-423.
425. See Posadas, 478 U.S. 328; United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434
(1993).
426. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
463 U.S. 60,67-8 (1983).
427. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,474 (1989).
428. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410,416 (1993).
429. See Fox, 492 U.S. 469.
430. See Posadas, 478 U.S. 328.
431. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,450 (1978).
432. See Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as
amended Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
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securities markets, including proxy statements and restrictions on
information communicated by companies and brokers;433 and the
regulation of speech in labor union settings, 434 to name but a few.
Cases involving these issues seem particularly well adapted to an
approach based on genre, with the area of permitted government
regulation being largely restricted to insisting that the definitional
elements of the genre be satisfied. Thus, for example, advertisements
would be judged, as Justice Blackmun suggested in Virginia
Pharmacy, by whether they satisfied the elements of factual truth and
the absence of deception, much as the crime of fraud is subjected to
such scrutiny, but only in those contexts in which the genre of the
speech requires those characteristics. Securities information in the
genre of proxy statements, likewise, can be made to satisfy the
preconditional requisites of truth and full disclosure--cordoning off
questions of aesthetics or opinion or persuasiveness from the
technique issues which are subject to less exacting First Amendment
scrutiny.435 The same approach might be taken in the unique context
of labor union speech, or in the broader context of persuasive speech
related to contested electoral issues.
Some of these applications of an approach based on technique
might suggest that the definition of genre could be reduced to a
situation-specific rather than a generic level, a development that
would allow genre to swallow aesthetics. Containing such a tendency
would be important. But an approach based on genre and technique
also offers the distinct advantage of setting a neutral and enforceable
limit on the Court's ability to rest judgments on aesthetic notions of
quality. For a Court not inclined to see the First Amendment in
absolute terms, and driven to balance First Amendment interests
against competing and often practical necessities at a level of
increasing intricacy, fixing a line short of the purely aesthetic has
become a compelling objective.
(amending §§ 1052 & 1127); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181,209 (1985); U.S. Healthcare Inc. v.
Blue Cross of Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 937 (3d Cir.). See supra text accompanying notes
271-291, 322-332 for a discussion of the securities and unfair competition cases.
433. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cited in
Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (also cited in
Ohralik, supra). See also supra note 383.
434. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969),
435. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1994); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 209;
SEC v. Wall Street Publ'g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1988); cf Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987).
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F. The Indecency Cases
We turn finally, in this discussion of quality as technique, to the
indecency cases, a broad group of cases ranging from the expletive
"Fuck the Draft" worn on Paul Cohen's jacket in a courthouse
corridor,436 to George Carlin's seven dirty words heard over the
radio,437 to the age-old art of nude dancing,438 and finally to the newer
technological art of dial-a-porn. 439 The definitions of indecency are
somewhat different in each instance, ranging from words giving
serious offense, to language which is unsuitable for children, to
socially unacceptable and suggestive exposure of the body, to patently
offensive descriptions of sexual activities or organs. But the common
core of each is speech which gives offense because it violates
entrenched social norms.
One might well expect to see manifestations of an approach based
on quality as technique in these cases, particularly because of the close
proximity of offensiveness determinations to questions of taste and
style and thus to aesthetic judgments. In the defamation,
appropriation, copyright, trademark, and commercial speech and
advertising cases the Court has employed the genre-based technique
approach to restrain itself from entering into the purely aesthetic
domain. If anything, the offensiveness setting cries out even more
compellingly for a similar limiting doctrine.
In view of this, it is hardly surprising that from the very earliest
point the Court, through the pen of Justice Harlan, laid the
groundwork for just such an approach. In Cohen v. California"0 the
Court was faced with the claim that in the late 1960's, a young man
named Paul Cohen was exercising his freedom of speech when he
walked into the Los Angeles Courthouse wearing a jacket with the
words "Fuck the Draft" prominently painted on its back, thus
offending the men, women, and children there assembled. 441 In his
opinion reversing Cohen's conviction, Justice Harlan turned first to
the dialogical goals of the First Amendment, particularly as they
relate to matters of public debate. He then focused on the need to
leave questions of taste and style to the individual lest the government
436. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
437. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
438. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
439. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
440. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
441. Id. at 16.
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enact a regime of tastefulness governing expression. 442 This was not,
however, a fully satisfactory explanation for reversing Paul Cohen's
conviction, for it has always been clear that the government is not
dispossessed by the First Amendment from regulating all matters of
taste and style.
443
Justice Harlan recognized the need for further explanation, and
he provided it. Paul Cohen's speech, he said, was political speech.
More importantly, it was the voicing of an unpopular view on a matter
of considerable public controversy, the Vietnam War. Such political
speech, he said, often needs to shock and surprise. 4 Shock and
surprise are elements of force, dramatizations of the idea being
expressed and, more importantly, are the means by which such ideas
are given emotive quality rather than only reasoned persuasiveness. 445
The emotive value of speech, Justice Harlan said, is protected by
the First Amendment just as is the cognitive content of the speech." 6
At least this was so for the genre of political expression into which
Paul Cohen's "scurrilous epithet" falls. 447 To put the point a bit
differently and in explicitly "technique" terms, "emotive force" is an
accepted (and historically common) element of the genre of political
debate. Accordingly, it is as fully protected by the First Amendment
as the idea it is employed to convey. "Technique," in short, was
employed in Cohen to justify First Amendment protection. Given the
conclusion that the technique employed was an element of the genre,
the Court could probe no further into Cohen's use of the technique
without making judgments about matters of taste or style, which are
aesthetic judgments.
From these beginnings in Cohen v. California, however, the
application of criteria based on technique rather than on aesthetics
has had a sporadic history in indecency cases. In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,448 involving the radio broadcast of George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" sketch, virtually nothing was said about genre or
technique. Perhaps this was because such an analysis would have
required the application of the highest measure of First Amendment
442. Id. at 24-26.
443. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 726; Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374.
444. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23.
445. Id. at 26.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 726.
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scrutiny to the FCC's indecency policy.449 Instead the Court's focus
was on the "unique" characteristics of the broadcast medium and on
the importance, as a matter of value and social policy, of protecting
children from exposure to material deemed unsuitable for them.
450
Such considerations, at least when applied to adult programming,45'
have no bearing on genre, much less on its technical elements.
This has been the approach taken in most other "indecency"
cases recently addressed by the Court. The only differences in these
cases is the shifting degree of emphasis on medium considerations and
value considerations. 452 In Sable Communications v. FCC,453 for
example, the Court invalidated a congressional ban on indecent
interstate commercial telephone communications, including "dial-a-
porn" services. 454 One might well expect that, in upholding the First
Amendment claim of the dial-a-porn provider, the Court would
explain why the particular kind of speech involved in the case
warranted the Court's application of the fullest measure of First
Amendment scrutiny. Instead of providing such an explanation, the
Court's opinion rests on the ground that because dial-a-porn
communications are volitional and thus involve no captive audience or
intrusive medium, the speech is entitled to full First Amendment
protection.455 This conclusion would be understandable if it were
coming from a Court whose doctrine required the same constitutional
test to be applied to all speech, thereby making questions of medium,
genre, and technique irrelevant. But given that the present Court has
crafted an increasingly intricate set of calibrations for the appropriate
level of First Amendment scrutiny, resting expressly on questions of
value, medium and genre,456 and given that the Court has sustained a
number of regulations based on the indecency of speech occurring in
449. This result, it seems, would follow directly and necessarily from Cohen, 403 U.S. at
15.
450. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-50.
451. Different considerations might apply to children's programming, which could be
seen, perhaps, as a distinct genre.
452. See, e.g., Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Ersnoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
453. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
454. Communications Act of 1934, § 223(b), 47 U.S.C. § 223(b), as amended by Pub. L.
100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988).
455. See 492 U.S. at 127-28.
456. See Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189 (1983); William VanAlstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech
Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982).
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various settings,457 the Court's failure to explain itself more fully is
more than disappointing.
The one recent decision in which the Court has more fully
explained itself, and in the process explored issues relating to genre
and technique, is Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.4 58 In Barnes, a deeply
divided Court upheld the constitutionality of an Indiana statute that
prohibited persons from knowingly or intentionally appearing nude in
public places, as applied to nude dancing by females in a bar.459 Five
votes could not be gathered in support of a majority opinion, so the
Court had to make do with an opinion announcing the judgment of
the Court, supported by two concurring opinions based on quite
distinct reasoning.46° The disagreement centered on two issues: 1)
whether public nudity constituted expressive conduct protected by the
First Amendment; and, if so, 2) how the appropriate level of First
Amendment scrutiny should be applied to a general ban on all public
nudity, including but not limited to nude dancing or other forms of
expressive nudity.46' But questions of genre and technique, as well,
perhaps, as aesthetic quality, lay just beneath the surface. The Justices
had to explain how, under any form of First Amendment scrutiny, a
prohibition on nudity in barroom dancing would be distinguished, for
example, from nude dancing in a theatrical performance, such as the
play "Hair." The answer (if a satisfactory one is to be given) must lie
either in considerations of aesthetic quality or in differences grounded
on genre and technique.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion announcing the judgment of
the Court came first. His analysis is straightforward, though barren.
He concluded that barroom dancing is, in fact, expression protected
by the First Amendment, although "only marginally So", 4 6 2 in light of
its proximity to indecency and obscenity. His conclusion seems to rest
on the fact that it is an established, if not universally accepted, genre
of performance, a "'form of entertainment [that] might be entitled to
First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some
457. See, e.g., Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726; Renton, 475 U.S. 41; Kingsley Int'l Pictures
v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Denver Consortium, 116 S. Ct. 2374.
458. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
459. Id. at 565; IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988).
460. 501 U.S. at 563 (Rehnquist joined by O'Connor and Kennedy, delivering the
judgment of the Court); id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring).
461. The statute was an across-the-board ban on public nudity, a fact that was critical
to the Court's analysis. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988). See also 501 U.S. at 566.
462. 501 U.S. at 566.
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circumstances.' 463 The Court announced its conclusion almost
grudgingly and with little elucidation, and having stated it, Chief
Justice Rehnquist moved on with no further explanation.
464
The Chief Justice then bit the bullet that permitted him to avoid
further discussion of the details of the performance from either an
aesthetic or technical point of view. He stated that Indiana's statute
applied to all public nudity, not just barroom dancing or expressive
nudity, that the general prohibition of nudity served sufficiently
important interests to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, and that
because the ban was across-the-board, applicable to all forms of public
nudity, the state had, in fact, acted in a manner narrowly tailored to
accomplishing its interest in a complete prohibition.465 From a
doctrinal perspective Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis is
unexceptionable, although it required that a bitter pill be swallowed,
for it would crumble if even the slightest wavering from a flat ban
might be required by the First Amendment. In short, it required an
agreement between Justice Rehnquist and those who joined him that
the statute would be equally enforceable against "Hair." This they
accepted by logical necessity though not, it should be noted, by
express acknowledgment, much less acclaim.
Justice Scalia's concurrence was to much the same effect as the
Chief Justice's opinion, with but two differences of degree and not of
kind. First, Justice Scalia seemed to have less patience with the
dancers' First Amendment claim, acknowledging it implicitly and
theoretically, but not fully embracing it.46 Even the Chief Justice's
"marginally so" phrase may have been too much for him.
The second difference, however, was more radical in its doctrinal
implications, for Justice Scalia rejected any requirement that the state
prove the "importance" or "compelling" nature of its purpose. It
should be enough, he said, that the law is "a general law not
specifically targeted at expressive conduct. ' 46 7 That being so, the
Indiana law "does not implicate the First Amendment. '' 46 By this
formula Justice Scalia, we might say, not only bit the bullet of "Hair,"
but swallowed it.
463. Id. at 565 (quoting California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972)).
464. See 501 U.S. at 565-66.
465. Id. at 572.
466. Id. at 576-79 (Scalia, J., concurring).
467. Id. at 576.
468. Id.
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It was thus left to Justice Souter to pick up the genre cudgel and
explain that which Justices Rehnquist and Scalia had only implied.
Nude dancing, he said, is a genre of expression protected by the First
Amendment. He explained:
Not all dancing is entitled to First Amendment protection as
expressive activity. This Court has previously categorized ballroom
dancing as beyond the Amendment's protection.... and dancing as
aerobic exercise would likewise be outside the First Amendment's
concern. But dancing as a performance directed to an actual or
hypothetical audience gives expression at least to generalized
emotion or feeling, and where the dancer is nude or nearly so the
feeling expressed, in the absence of some contrary clue, is eroticism,
carrying an endorsement of erotic experience. Such is the expressive
content of the dances described in the record.
Although such performance dancing is inherently expressive, nudity
per se is not. It is a condition, not an activity.
[E]very voluntary act implies some such idea, [but] calling all
voluntary activity expressive would reduce the concept of expression
to the point of the meaningless.
But when nudity is combined with expressive activity, its stimulative
and attractive value certainly can enhance the force of
expression.... 469
Justice Souter, it appears, had not only read but understood and
agreed with Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California. Justice
Souter agreed that an individual's purposeful act of expression
through conduct may be speech protected by the First Amendment. In
addition, the increment of meaning provided by the conduct may
likewise be expression, because it contributes emotion to, and thus
amplifies the force of, the idea expiessed. The emotional force of
expression is expression protected by the First Amendment.
This is a very promising beginning, in which Justice Souter
suggested that ballroom dancing could be distinguished from barroom
dancing. He invited the reader to consider how differences of genre
might be imported into an analysis of First Amendment speech,
perhaps on grounds of custom or the importance of emotion to the
forcefulness of the genre. But then Justice Souter veered off, leaving
all of these possibilities behind.470 The turn he took was the easy one.
He attributed to the Indiana statute the purpose of discouraging
prostitution and crime, which it accomplished only bluntly, if at all. In
469. Id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
470. Id.
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addition, he rejected the State's more historically justifiable purpose
of vindicating the interest in public decency and morality through a
requirement that the body be clothed in public.471 While this provided
an easy escape from any further explanation of what he said at the
beginning of his opinion, Justice Rehnquist probably had the better of
the argument. The escape proved difficult from a doctrinal
perspective, for it required the validation of a statute that achieved its
purpose in a brutally blunt-edged way.
472
Having escaped in this way, however, Justice Souter left the
dissent free to claim, as it did, that it was aesthetic preferences and
taste, and not First Amendment principles, that lay behind each of the
three opinions sustaining the statute. "That the performances in the
Kitty Kat Lounge may not be high art, to say the least, and may not
appeal to the Court," the dissent declared, "is hardly an excuse for
distorting and ignoring settled doctrine. The Court's assessment of the
artistic merits of nude dancing performances should not be the
determining factor in deciding this case." 473 But the five Justices
forming the majority made it seem so. And perhaps so it was, for it is
likely that had Justice Souter continued very far along Justice Harlan's
path he would have found himself in dissent, declaring, as Harlan had,
that the First Amendment must be read to leave matters of taste and
style to the individual, not to the majoritarian political process.474
We thus conclude our discussion of the indecency cases on a sour
note, having discovered much confusion and little coherence in the
Court's approach to the admittedly vexing issues they present. The
possibility of approaching the cases by looking at matters of
technique, judged through the elements of genre, remains one of the
currents in the Court's recent cases. However, it has yet to emerge
clearly from the foundation set in Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen.
On the one hand this is unfortunate, for without such a restraining
rule of decision the Court has become drawn, perhaps unconsciously
and unwillingly, into the realm of the aesthetic, resting decisions on
judgments about aesthetic quality, while at the same time denying that
471. Id. at 583.
472. Id at 582. Mr. Justice Souter put his reasoning in these words: "I nonetheless
write separately to rest my concurrence in the judgment, not on the possible sufficiency of
society's moral views..., but on the State's substantial interest in combating the
secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments of the sort typified by
respondents' establishment." Id But Justice Souter had to admit "that this justification has
not been articulated by Indiana's Legislature or by its courts." Id.
473. Id. at 594 (White, J., dissenting).
474. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
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it may be doing so. On the other hand, however, a process of decision
based honestly on considerations of technique and genre would likely
lead, as it did in Cohen, to the extension of First Amendment
protection to speech that is considered, legally, indecent. For a Court
bent on avoiding that result, that may be too bitter a pill to swallow.
G. Condusion
Questions of technique and genre present difficult and sensitive
issues for courts judging First Amendment claims, but they are also
inescapable issues. If the First Amendment's injunction is to be
anything but absolute, claims of freedom of speech will necessarily
compel the Court to rest judgments on considerations of technique
and genre of the speech-be it humor, drama, poetry, political
commentary or news-whose freedom is at issue. This will be so, at
least, so long as categorical distinctions, or definitional analysis, is part
of the First Amendment equation.
The quality as technique inquiry is unavoidable, and it is crucial.
Genre and technique represent the dividing line between relatively
objective and neutral considerations of technique, interpretation, and
meaning, on the one hand; and subjective judgments about aesthetic
quality, on the other. If we cannot find ways to limit inquiry to matters
of genre and technique, there will be no way to prevent courts from
slipping, consciously or not, into aesthetic judgments. As we have seen
from the indecency cases, the line is not an easy one to draw, much
less to enforce. And as we will see in the next section, once the line is
crossed it is all too easy to slide into the aesthetic realm. In view of




It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the
law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At
one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until
the public had learned the new language in which their author
spoke.
At the other end, [protection] would be denied to pictures which
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public .... it would be bold to say that
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they have not an aesthetic ... value[,] and the test of any public is
not to be treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for the
moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change.
475
[I]t is quite impossible to come to an objective assessment of (at
least) literary or artistic value, there being many accomplished
people who have found literature in Dada, and art in the replication
of a soup can. Since ratiocination has little to do with esthetics, the
fabled "reasonable man" is of little help in the inquiry, and would
have to be replaced with, perhaps, the "man of tolerably good taste"
-a description that betrays the lack of an ascertainable standard. If
evenhanded and accurate decisionmaking is not always impossible
under such a regime, it is at least impossible in the cases that
matter .... [W]e would be better advised to adopt as a legal maxim
what has long been the wisdom of mankind." De gustibus non est
disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no
use litigating about it. For the law courts to decide "What is Beauty"
is a novelty even by today's standards.
476
We now turn to a discussion of aesthetic quality. Aesthetic quality
comprises the residuum of quality, once considerations of social value,
meaning, communication, and technique are removed. This is, of
course, a significant residuum, as aesthetic quality is the most
important and sensitive form of quality. It is also surely the most
difficult form of quality to define.
By aesthetic quality I mean quality that transcends the text or
script of a communication, thereby conveying not only reason but
feeling and emotion, giving the message a new dimension of force or
impact but without necessarily transforming its meaning.477 Aesthetic
quality has to do with the "emotive function" of expression. As Justice
Harlan articulated in Cohen v. California,478  "much linguistic
expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well .... [W]ords are often chosen as much
for their emotive as their cognitive force."
479
Sometimes aesthetic quality yields new meaning, much as an
abstract painting can convey a meaning (emotional or cognitive)
475. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). The
Bleistein case was a copyright case including reproductions for circus advertisements of
three chromolithographs. Id. at 242. The dispute was over whether or not, as Holmes put it,
"ordinary posters are not good enough to be considered within [copyright's] scope"
because they were not prints or illustrations "connected with the fine arts." Id. at 251.
476. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504-505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
477. See supra note 18.
478. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
479. Id. at 26.
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bearing no logical relation to the shapes, lines and colors it contains.
Sometimes it yields additional meanings grounded directly in the
meaning contained in the expression, as a picture of a slave family on
the stoop of their home conjures up new feelings and meanings also.
Sometimes aesthetic quality lends force to a communication, much as
Cormac McCarthy's narrative style lends a mystical quality to both the
plot and characters,480 or as Paul Cohen's jacket attracts attention to
his message.481 Sometimes aesthetic quality contributes cognitive force
to a communication, just as a well-structured and articulated argument
can persuade or induce insight and understanding.
These are hopelessly deficient examples of aesthetic quality, as I
use the term, but such examples may succeed in capturing the
evanescent nature of the aesthetic dimension of expression and the
resultant difficulty of reducing it to any set of rules or definitions. This
probably accounts for the Supreme Court's reluctance to explore the
aesthetics of speech, at least any more than to acknowledge it in order
to cordon it off.482 Justice Harlan suggests another reason.
483
Aesthetic quality is not just one dimension of communication, but is
perhaps its highest quality; it is the marker for the ideal against which
the First Amendment's aspirations for a marketplace of speech and
constructive exchange of ideas leading to truth are measured. It is also
an important way in which communication is individualized, taking on
the unique characteristics of the individual whose liberty is being
exercised.
In view of the important relationship between aesthetic quality
and emotion, and between the emotional dimension of speech and its
constitutional value, it is hardly surprising that the Court almost never
ventures into any form of judgment about aesthetic quality. Indeed,
the court regularly and quite explicitly disavows both the capacity and
power to make such judgments. 484 It is more surprising, however, that
the Court fails to explain in any but the most generalized language the
justifications in First Amendment theory for this inflexible rule of
judicial abnegation.
This is a significant omission, for there are many settings in which
government officials make judgments that are based quite explicitly
480. CORMAC MCCARTHY, ALL THE PRETrY HORSES (1992).
481. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
482. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
483. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15.
484. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994); Cohen, 403 U.S. 15;
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995). See also Ward, 491 U.S. 781.
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on the aesthetic quality of speech-indeed there are some in which
they must 48 -without doing any apparent violence to the First
Amendment. Such settings include arts funding decisions,486 tenure
decisions,487 peer review of scholarly research,488 and public library
acquisition decisions.489 To be sure, these are not examples of judicial
decisions about aesthetic quality, but they represent instances in which
the First Amendment licenses government to make aesthetic
decisions. Thus the distinction between judicial and administrative
authority should be explained.
In the pages that follow we will turn first to selected settings in
which the Court does appear to broach questions of aesthetic quality,
such as invasion of privacy, where the sensory or emotive force of
speech is an essential ingredient of liability. Upon closer examination,
however, such cases appear not to represent judicial efforts to judge
aesthetic quality, but instead reflect attempts to place bounds upon
such an inquiry, cordoning off aesthetics by using factors and tests that
operate similarly to the genre and technique inquiry discussed earlier.
We will turn next to a brief discussion of the instances in which
government officials and agencies (though not courts) judge aesthetic
quality. We will consider why agents of the executive branch can do so
while courts may not, and consider whether the process-based
explanations for this difference in executive and judicial authority are
best seen as resting on genre and technique, not aesthetic,
considerations.
The question of whether aesthetic quality should play a role in
judicial decisions about First Amendment protection will be analyzed
last, in Part VI. There, armed with a fuller understanding of the
treatment of all forms of quality, especially aesthetic quality, we will
confront the dilemma posed by Boggs v. Bowron;490 a case involving
counterfeit currency art,491 where the only ground upon which artistic
work of the highest quality may be kept free is its aesthetic quality.
485. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996).
486. See id.
487. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
488. See Finley, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); cf.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1996).
489. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
490. 842 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 67 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1147 (1996).
491. Boggs' art consisted of facsimiles of United States currency in various sizes. 842 F.
Supp. at 544.
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We will turn, first, to the established doctrine and the ways in
which the Court restrains itself from moving beyond genre and
technique into aesthetic quality. Such limiting doctrines and devices
take the form of substantive boundaries, coupled with process-based
rules of deference.
A. Placing Substantive Bounds on Quality
The role played by substantive boundaries that limit judicial need
to inquire into aesthetic quality is illustrated by the limiting rules
enforced in the settings of religious expression, defamation, and
privacy. These limiting rules function much as the rules of genre and
technique function, though they cannot be explained in terms of an
identifiable genre and its required technical elements.
1. Religious Expression
The Court has had to confront the question of aesthetic quality in
its purest constitutional form under the First Amendment religion
guarantees. The tension that exists between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses has forced the Court to distinguish religious
from nonreligious beliefs and actions as a matter of constitutional law.
In the process the Court has placed boundaries on the definitional
inquiry in which courts may be obliged to engage.492 Whether a belief
is religious or not, and whether an action represents an exercise of
religion, is at base an aesthetic question that cannot be fully resolved
by objective criteria or by standards that look only to the intent of the
claimant.
Thus the conscientious objector claims that confronted the Court
in connection with the Vietnam War could not be determined simply
by asking whether the objector's beliefs corresponded with those of an
established religion, and whether the claimed beliefs were held in
good faith and consistently acted upon by the claimant.493 Religious
belief cannot be confined to a limited set of institutional arrangements
or habits. And whether beliefs and actions are a product of religious
belief is not just a question of intent and good faith; it involves also
the presence of a felt compulsion growing out of an individual's beliefs
492. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2510; United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S.
707 (1981).
493. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh, 398 U.S. at 333.
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and faith in a transcendent power, an emotional and, indeed, aesthetic
transformation of cognition.
494
The question whether a belief is religious and whether an act
stems from it is, therefore, ultimately an aesthetic one. It was this
quality of religious belief and expression that led the Supreme Court
in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia 495 to
prohibit judicial parsing of religious speech in order to judge the
magnitude and quality of its religious content (religious speech versus,
for example, speech about religion) or its force or persuasiveness.
496
Any other view, the Court said, "would require... [government] [in
the name of nonestablishment] to scrutinize the content of ... speech,
lest ... [it] contain too great a religious content. '497 To distinguish
between speech having the quality of evangelism, for example, and
works that instead "express views that a given religion might
approve," the Court said, "raises the spectre of governmental
censorship.... to imperil the very sources of free speech and
expression. "498
2. Actual Malice
The actual malice privilege, applicable largely in public libel
cases, operates to bound aesthetic quality judgments, to place them off
limits to judicial examination. Thus, in reviewing an allegedly libelous
publication, the actual malice privilege forecloses such considerations
as the clarity with which a story is written, its accuracy, its literary
quality or force, and its fairness. The actual malice test instead limits
the inquiry to falsity (understandable given the tort of defamation)
and to the subjective state of mind-the intent-of the author.
As a recent study of malice cases points out, in applying the
actual malice standard courts generally draw a line between
"compositional" judgments, which go to aesthetic qualities, on the one
hand; and more objective standards such as adequacy of research and
conformance to generally applicable editorial procedures, which bear
principally on technique, on the other hand.499 As the authors
expressed it:
494. See Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 579 (1982).
495. 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2524-25 (1995).
496. Id. at 2524.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. See Sullivan's Paradox, supra note 234, at 73, 79-84.
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"[clourts should not consider writing and editing behaviors as
circumstantial evidence of actual malice. These behaviors should
remain protected because they are central to the intellectual process
of expression which must be unregulated in order to thrive. Many
courts today do seem to be deferential in these areas, undoubtedly
sensing the inappropriateness and incompetence of judicial
involvement."
500
Writing style, powerfulness, poetry of phrase, and fairness of
content aside, the actual malice question focuses narrowly on whether,
given what was said in fact or knowingly implied, the author actually
knew of its defamatory falsity, or entertained serious doubts about its
truth at the time of publication.501 If so, no further inquiry can be
made and liability can be found without more. If not, the publication
is privileged and no further inquiry is permitted. In either case,
privilege makes irrelevant such questions as whether the writing and
storytelling is good or bad, powerful or repugnant.
3. Privacy
In the privacy cases, and specifically in the public disclosure tort
setting, the question is not whether a private fact disclosed makes an
article or story "good;" but whether its use, at an abstract level and in
light of the genre of expression involved, can be justified as relevant to
the purposes of the publication or story-to its force, clarity, content,
and so on.502 This is getting dangerously close to aesthetics, for
aesthetic criteria involve such questions as force, clarity,
persuasiveness, and the like. In theory, at least, the Court's approach
in privacy cases and in other newsworthiness settings stops short of the
line by abstracting these considerations at the level of the genre or the
general rule, and not applying them in a searching way to the specific
story.
50 3
In this, however, the courts have only been modestly successful,
for specific consideration of aesthetic quality may be the only
500. Id. at 108.
501. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
502. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Briscoe v. Readers Digest Ass'n., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 249
N.E.2d 610 ( Mass. 1969); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289
(Iowa 1979).
503. See Randall P. Bezanson, Public Disclosures as News: Injunctive Relief and
Newsworthiness in Privacy Actions Involving the Press, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1061 (1979);
Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205
(1976); SACK & BARON, supra note 206, at 588-618; Howard, 283 N.W.2d 289; Virgil v.
Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
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satisfactory explanation for the different results in Melvin v. Reid, 04
on the one hand, and Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.,50 5 on the other.
Melvin involved a former prostitute and alleged murderer who, after
the passage of many years, turned her life around, married, and
became a respectable member of her community, only to find her past
brought to public light in a movie about the murder case in which she
was acquitted. 506 The California Supreme Court, in 1931, concluded
that an action for invasion of privacy could lie despite her former
notoriety.50 7 The Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp. case, in contrast,
involved an article revisiting the life of a child prodigy formerly the
subject of wide attention, who years later when the offending story
was written, lived a life of isolation and determined privacy marked by
peculiar interests and an unchallenging job.508 The Second Circuit
held, in 1940, that no privacy claim would lie. The cases were decided
by different courts in different states in different years. Yet most
notable among the possible grounds for distinguishing the results is
the fact that Sidis involved not a movie of less than classic quality, but
instead a brief but genuinely compelling, masterfully written, and
evocative narrative published in The New Yorker and written by
James Thurber.
50 9
Similarly, aesthetic considerations are implicit and perhaps even
more in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,510 a case involving the
disclosure of the drinking and sexual habits of Luther Haynes, a
Mississippi sharecropper who, around 1950, moved to Chicago,
married Ruby Daniels, and lived a life of poverty, frustration, and
drink.511 In Haynes, the court's analysis, penned by Judge Posner,
explored the aesthetics of the questioned passages in terms of genre
(history) and, more importantly, in terms of the book's purpose and
quality:
Much of social science, including social history, proceeds by
abstraction[s], aggregation, and quantification rather than by case
504. 112 Cal. App. 285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
505. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
506. Melvin, 112 Cal. App. 285.
507. Id.
508. 113 F.2d at 807.
509. Jared L. Manley, Where are They Now? April Fool, NEW YORKER, Aug. 24, 1937,
at 22. Jared L. Manley is a pseudonym under which James Thurber wrote. See also Richard
S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84
GEO. L.J. 2381,2400 n.72 (1996).
510. 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
511. Id. at 1224-26.
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studies.... But it would be absurd to suggest that cliometric or other
aggregative, impersonal methods of doing social history are the only
proper way to go about it and presumptuous to claim even that they
are the best way. Lemann's book has been praised to the skies by
distinguished scholars, among them black scholars covering a large
portion of the ideological spectrum-Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
William Julius Wilson, and Patricia Williams. Lemann's
methodology places the individual case history at center stage.
[To protect identity] Lemann would have had to change some,
perhaps many, of the details. But then he would no longer have been
writing history. He would have been writing fiction.
The Promised Land does not afford the reader a titillating glimpse of
tabooed activities. The tone is decorous and restrained. [T]he public
needs the information conveyed by the book [about Luther Haynes'
drinking and sexual habits] ... in order to evaluate the profound
social and political questions that the book raises.
512
In the hands of a judge less able than Judge Posner, hewing to the
line that separates genre and technique from aesthetics would prove
difficult in the Haynes case, where the question could too easily
become focused on the force and strength of the narrative-its
aesthetic character and quality-when told through the deeply
personal account of the lives of Luther Haynes and his family. Judge
Posner was careful to define the issue in terms of acceptable historical
method, thereby abstracting the legal question to issues of genre, and
of acceptable historical method. The function served by the
recounting of Luther Haynes' own struggle, including his drinking and
sexual habits, was not to add passion and force to the story (though it
surely did), but rather to provide through the "decorous and
restrained" medium of history the contextual detail and the more fine-
grained account that marks the genre of social history. To alter the
facts or disguise the name, Judge Posner observed, would be to alter
its quality as history.
Even in privacy cases, then, where the legal wrong and its
justification rest upon the contribution that a private fact makes to the
force and effectiveness of a publication, abstraction of the issue to the
level of genre and purpose can serve as a boundary between technique
and aesthetics, between objective characteristics of a work, on the one
hand, and its subjective or sensuous qualities, on the other. Standards
of acceptable methodology, upon which the Haynes court relied, may
not be so easily ascertainable outside such fields as history or, even
512. Id. at 1233.
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news. Where such standards are available they can serve a useful and
important, although risky, function; where they are not available, that
fact itself should chasten a court otherwise inclined to venture
judgments. For without such abstracted criteria by which qualitative
judgments are reached there is no escape from the purely aesthetic.
B. Process-based Rules of Deference
If the line between technique and aesthetics is to serve as a
critical First Amendment boundary by which to avoid the "dangerous
undertaking," as Holmes put it, of judges, "persons trained only to the
law... constitut[ing] themselves final judges of [aesthetic value,] ...
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits," 513 how is it that the
First Amendment is not likewise violated when other government
officers pass through the boundary, openly resting decisions on
aesthetic quality? This is a very large subject, 14 and one on which no
pretense of thoroughness will be attempted. But it is an issue that
cannot be ignored in a discussion of judicial limits on aesthetic
judgments. Three examples will prove instructive: arts funding
decisions; museum and library acquisition decisions; and academic
peer review decisions (such as publication decisions or tenure
judgments).
Arts funding decisions are made regularly by a wide range of
public bodies, from the National Endowment for the Arts to state and
local arts organizations. 515 While some of these decisions are made
categorically, such as a decision to support local artists or artists
working in a particular medium (such as oil painting) or genre (such as
landscapes or Native American art),516 many are quite specific to the
artist based on what the artist proposes and on the artistic quality of
513. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,251-52 (1903). For the full
text of the quotation, see text accompanying supra note 475.
514. A pathbreaking and comprehensive treatment of the larger subject is MARK G.
YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION
IN AMERICA (1983).
515. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that it would be unconstitutional to introduce non-aesthetic, in this case decency,
criteria into a purely aesthetic standard of quality governing the awarding of grants to
artists); Advocates for the Arts v. Thompson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.) (upholding denial of
funding for a literary publication on content grounds).
516. See 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1994); Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M.
1978); Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can It Play an Appropriate Role in
Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L. J. 1209 (1993); Marci Hamilton, Art
Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1996).
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what he or she has done in the past.517 The funding decisions, in other
words, are often explicitly based on aesthetic judgments, and indeed
that fact is the basis upon which the decisions are justified.518
Similarly, acquisition decisions are often based expressly on
aesthetic judgments.519 Art museums, for example, typically build
their collections on the aesthetic quality of the art acquired and
displayed. They may restrict their acquisition activities to a particular
theme or genre, 520  but within it aesthetic quality, not
representativeness, is the deciding criterion.521 Library acquisitions,
too, are of similar character, although qualitative judgments may be
even more circumscribed by limitations on public service obligations,
patron demand and interest, and community need and sensitivity. But
beneath these considerations, judgments about the aesthetic quality
of, for example, works of history, or of children's literature, or of
fiction, will be central to the choices made in the acquisition
process.5
22
Finally, peer review decisions are a regular and, indeed, central
part of the academic world at public as well as private colleges and
universities. For example, university presses and journals that publish
work in academic fields are often supported largely, if not exclusively,
by public funds, and are in substance if not in fact state or federal
agencies.5 23 The editorial decisions about which of the manuscripts
submitted to a press or journal should be accepted for publication rest
on avowedly aesthetic judgments, as I have defined the term for
purposes of this article. The question, for example, is not whether an
article in the field of history possess the technical attributes of history
(as opposed to journalism or fiction, for example), but whether it is
517. Id. See also Finley, 100 F.3d at 671; Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d 792.
518. National Endowment for the Arts grant funding is explicitly based on aesthetic
judgments. 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) states that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the
criteria by which applications [for grant funding] are judged..."
519. Two very helpful and insightful articles about the acquisition and deaccession
choices made by museums and similar public institutions, based on thematic considerations
as well as judgments of pure quality, are Thomas H. Boyd, Disputes Regarding the
Possession of Native American Religious Cultural Objects and Human Remains: A
Discussion of the Applicable Law and Proposed Legislation, 55 Mo. L. REV. 883 (1990);
Jennifer L. White, When It's OK to Sell the Monet: A Trustee-Fiduciary-Duty Framework
for Analyzing the Deaccessioning of Art to Meet Museum Operating Expenses, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1041 (1996).
520. See Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978).
521. See supra notes 519-520.
522. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
523. See Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d 792.
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good and important history. As the First Circuit expressed it in
Advocates for the Arts v. Thompson, which concerned funding for a
literary publication:
[T]he very assumption of public funding of the arts is that decisions
will be made according to the literary or artistic worth of competing
applicants. Given this focus on the comparative merit of literary and
artistic works equally entitled to first amendment protection as
"speech," courts have no particular institutional competence
warranting case-by-case participation in the allocation of funds.
If such a program is to fulfill its purpose, the exercise of editorial
judgment by those administering it is inescapable.
524
Likewise, the decision to tenure a faculty member is commonly
based on a retrospective judgment about the quality of his or her
scholarly publications. The central question answered by a faculty in
judging tenure is not a descriptive one-is there enough work; does it
possess the attributes of work fitting the relevant discipline-but an
aesthetic one-does it rise to the level of importance and quality that
the faculty requires for tenure?
5 25
While not exhaustive, these three examples of government-
sponsored aesthetic judgments are sufficiently illustrative to reveal
two common features that are critical to the distinction between such
qualitative judgments and those foreclosed, with rare exception,526 to
courts. The first feature is that funding, acquisition, and peer review
decisions all reside within a specialized professional culture, a culture
that serves to assure expertness and experience with aesthetic
judgments on the part of those enabled to make them, and that
narrows the range of such judgments to the aesthetics relevant to an
assigned set of genres to which the expertness pertains. The deference
due librarians, for example, pertains to acquisition judgments based
on the appropriate set of professional and institutional criteria. A
decision based instead on political expediency, for example, would
earn no deference. 527 A funding decision based on political, not
artistic or literary, quality would be impermissible. 528 Likewise, a
524. Id. at 795-76.
525. See AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS (1995);
Banerjee v. Board of Trustees, 648 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Catholic University,
83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
526. See infra Part VI.B.
527. See Pico, 457 U.S. 853.
528. Finley, 100 F.3d 671; Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d 792; Livingston v. Ewing, 455
F. Supp. 825 (D.N.M. 1978).
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tenure decision based not on the quality of a candidate's scholarship,
for example, but solely on race or gender would deserve no deference,
as race and gender, as such, bear no relationship to the requisite
qualitative criteria.
529
The second common feature is process. In each of the instances
cited a defined and common procedure exists by which the
professional judgment about aesthetic quality is made.530 With tenure
decisions the procedure is collegial, with clear restrictions on those
who are entitled to vote and on the grounds upon which judgment
must be rested. With library acquisitions the process of decision is not
collegial, but it is both professional and constrained by restrictions on
the type of judgment that may be made-the range of factors,
including constituent interests, that can be reflected. Like editorial
judgments,53' the decisions must be other-directed and conform to
professionally-established and enforced criteria. Peer-reviewed
publication decisions are similarly made pursuant to an established set
of procedures based on common conventions of qualitative judgment.
The effect of granting deference under the First Amendment to
aesthetic quality judgments in these contexts is much the same as
recognizing that a newspaper's publication decision is entitled to First
Amendment protection as an exercise of editorial freedom. 532 The
result, of course, is quite different, as the claim of editorial judgment
by a newspaper dispossesses government of authority to supervise the
publication decision,533  while the effect of deference in the
acquisitions, peer review, and tenure settings is to license government
to make such decisions-but only part of government and only
pursuant to fairly circumscribed conventions and procedures. We
might say that the different consequence--enabling rather than
529. See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
530. The process element is most obvious, perhaps, in the academic tenure setting,
where courts are very careful to confine their review of challenged tenure evaluations to
whether the qualitative decision was made (i) by the appropriate people (generally faculty
and academic administrators), (ii) on the right kind of grounds, and (iii) pursuant to the
prescribed process. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980); Banerjee, 648
F.2d 61; EEOC v. Catholic University, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
531. For an analogous discussion of the meaning of editorial judgment, see Institutional
Speech, supra note 127, at 806-15.
532. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
533. See, e.g., Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 241; Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Committee, 419 U.S. 94 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). But
cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (concluding
that local government agencies, rather than cable operators, should be able to make
selection decisions about whether to carry programs on local public access channels).
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disabling government-is a product of necessity in the case of tenure
decisions, museum and library acquisition choices, and public support
for the arts. If government can and must do these things, they must be
undertaken with the creative freedom and pursuant to the qualitative
criteria that would mark choices made by private institutions.
In this sense, the deference given to certain government decision
makers, but not to courts, reflects a distinction that closely parallels
the technique and genre line to which courts must hew. When the
government decision maker rests its judgments on criteria and
pursuant to procedures that guarantee that the range of aesthetic
choice will be confined to the genre for which the decision maker is
experienced, the First Amendment not only prohibits courts from
probing the decisions beyond the elements and procedures applicable
to that genre, but it also simultaneously protects the discretionary,
aesthetic judgments made within the procedural and professional
confines of the genre. The function of courts, then, is to judge
technique and genre only, and thus to assure that the qualitative
choice, be it public or private, is suitably confined.
As it is with most questions of constitutional law, the question of
aesthetic quality boils down to a question of who decides and what
and when and how they shall decide, rather than what the decision
should be. This rule of judicial restraint is ordinarily sufficient in
constitutional law, and in First Amendment settings in particular. It
has permitted the Supreme Court, through doctrines of strict scrutiny,
narrow tailoring, and clear and present danger, and through
categorical distinctions among political speech, obscenity, and
commercial speech, for example, to tightly circumscribe governmental
power and to evolve a system of rules that is surprisingly speech-
protective. But is this rule of decision sufficient in all cases, or are
there occasionally cases that warrant judges, though "trained only to
the law,"534 to look beyond "who should decide" and ask "what should
the decision be?" It is to this question, finally, that we shall now turn.
VI
Judging Quality
Just as it is celebrated but untrue that quality has no bearing on
freedom of speech, it is uncelebrated but true that speech's freedom is
not absolute. And so long as the freedom of speech is qualified it is
534. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (Holmes,
1998] QUALITY OF FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
perfectly logical and, perhaps, inevitable that judgments about the
qualifications will spill over into judgments about quality.
The First Amendment's qualifications are, broadly speaking, of
two varieties: definitional and utilitarian. Definitional qualifications
rest on the boundaries among general categories of expression-
public and private; political and nonpolitical; reasoned and
emotional-and among more tightly contained genres, such as
commercial speech, obscene and offensive speech, expressive conduct,
incitement, false fact, editorial judgment, news, entertainment,
history, fiction, humor, parody and satire, and the subcategories of the
fine and performing arts, to mention only some examples.535 The role
of definitional qualifications is to identify what is speech and what is
not, thus to permit judgments about why and to what degree it should
be protected.
Utilitarian qualifications, on the other hand, take speech as it is,
straight from the definitional assembly line, so to speak, and focus on
the harm the speech produces as balanced against its value on a social
and individual level.536 The calculus focuses not on the speech, but on
the ends and means of the government's regulatory attempt: are the
reasons for regulating speech important, and are the means used
sufficiently sensitive to the speech interests?
Almost without exception, qualitative judgments about speech
surface as part of the definitional inquiry, which focuses exclusively on
the speech and its claim for First Amendment protection. In marked
contrast, quality rarely enters into the utilitarian assessment of
governmental purpose and means, as neither inquiry focuses on the
speech, as such. This is true whether the qualitative issue concerns
subject matter, meaning, communication, technique, or aesthetics.
But there is an important exception-or possible exception-to
this rule: the exception for aesthetic quality. Aesthetic quality plays no
role in the definitional inquiry; it may, however, have a limited, but
important role in the utilitarian inquiry.
Aesthetic considerations rarely surface as part of the Court's
definitional analysis. This is as it should be, for aesthetics has nothing
to do with definitional or categorical judgments about the meaning of
speech, unless, of course, one were to define a broad category of
"good" versus "bad" speech. This is something the First Amendment
535. For a very useful discussion of this subject, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 928-44 (2d ed. 1988).
536. See Institutional Speech, supra note 127, at 816-20.
[VOL. 20:275
plainly prohibits and existing doctrine clearly forecloses, and in any
event it would defeat the very logic of the definitional and categorical
inquiry, which is genre-based but aesthetically neutral just as, in public
forum doctrine, speech restrictions may be subject matter grounded
but content neutral.
537
Aesthetic judgments are equally, indeed more plainly, irrelevant
to the balancing of benefit versus harm that occurs in the utilitarian
stage of the Court's First Amendment analysis. However they may be
relevant as after-the-fact checks on the results of that analysis; checks
that operate in one direction only-protectively toward speech
otherwise deemed subject to regulation. The possibility that aesthetic
judgments might serve such a function is raised by two cases538 in
which it can be argued that even the most speech-protective
definitional analysis and the most stringent utilitarian balancing can,
on occasion, yield undesirable results. These cases thus present two
choices in bold relief: either accept the answer doctrine yields and
prohibit the speech on the ground that such rare instances are the
price that must be paid for a generally protective but not absolute
regime of free expression; or permit courts to trump speech-restrictive
results in extreme cases by permitting narrow exceptions for speech of
extraordinary and obvious aesthetic quality.
In the following pages we will explore the role that qualitative
considerations do and should play in judging First Amendment
speech, breaking the subject into two broad questions. First, what are
the risks associated with incorporating qualitative measures into the
definitional stage of First Amendment analysis, especially when
qualitative judgments rest on considerations of genre and technique?
Second, assuming that judgments about aesthetic quality have no
appropriate place in either the definitional or utilitarian components
of First Amendment doctrine, can aesthetic quality nevertheless serve
an exclusively speech-protective function as a judicial check on
conventional First Amendment analysis; can such a role be effectively
limited or contained; and most importantly, can it be squared with the
purposes served by the First Amendment? The second issue will be
537. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983);
Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189 (1983).
538. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc,, 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Boggs v. Bowron, 842 F.
Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 67 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1417
(1996).
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addressed through a discussion of Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,5 3 9 the
nude dancing case, and Boggs v. Bowron,540 the counterfeit currency
art case.
A. Judging Quality Short of the Aesthetic
In this case, considering the poem's content and its placement amid
a selection of poems in the interior of a newspaper, we believe that it
bears some of the earmarks of an attempt at serious art. While such
earmarks are not inevitably a guarantee against a finding of
obscenity, and while in this case many would conclude that the
author's reach exceeded his grasp, this element must be considered
in assessing whether or not the 'dominant' theme of the material
appeals to the prurient interest.
541
We have seen the Supreme Court address questions of a
qualitative nature across a wide spectrum of First Amendment cases.
The range of qualitative assessments is broad, spanning considerations
of political and social utility and value, on the one hand, to
interpretations of a communication's meaning, the effectiveness of its
dissemination, and, finally, its technical quality, on the other hand.
Only aesthetic quality is cordoned off from judicial attention. What
can be said about these judicial forays into the realm of quality?
The first observation is that, with the exception of quality as
subject matter-that is, the social and cultural value of speech applied
at the definitional level of First Amendment analysis 54 2-the Court's
attention to quality has been unsystematic and, with few exceptions,
543
intuitive. The Court's efforts to assign meaning to ambiguous
communications, to assign a source to content received by an
audience, and to identify objective elements of genre and technique as
part of an effort to give definition and, thus, comprehensibility to
claims of speech freedom, have followed no consistent methodology.
If, as I suggest, considerations of meaning, effectiveness of
communication, and technique are inevitable in any First Amendment
regime that confers less than absolute protection, it is important that
the Court's implicit analytical path become explicit-acknowledged
and identified for what it is. Only then will a measure of consistency
539. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). See also supra notes 458-474 and accompanying text.
540. 842 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 67 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1417 (1996).
541. Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,231-32 (1972) (per curiam).
542. See supra Part I.
543. The most notable exceptions to this statement are the trademark and copyright
cases, where forms of quality are requisite to the field. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
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be brought to qualitative inquiries, and only then can the fruits of the
Court's labors be openly assessed and criticized.
Second, there are many grounds upon which reservations, if not
fundamental concerns, can be expressed about judicial determinations
of the political and social value of speech. But much ink has already
been spilled on this question and I will not spill more, as to do so
would only be to cover ground already well-surveyed. 5" It is
sufficient, perhaps, to say only that since the Constitution is the
fundamental charter of a governmental and political order which
reflects certain textual, historical, philosophical and cultural values
and principles, it should come as no surprise that decisions about the
boundaries of the ambiguous text should be informed by matters of
history and principle as well as cultural and political values.
Third, the Court's decisions concerning the meaning of speech or
the effectiveness of its communication are all quite recent and
therefore represent early efforts to confront problems that, frankly,
cannot be escaped. The Court has followed a wavering path at times,
judging meaning by a number of quite different techniques;545 and it
has given those who seek comfort in predictability little satisfaction in
its approach to communication, especially the impact of the
medium.546 Much is now being written in this fast-emerging field, and
no certain answers are apparent.547 Much would be achieved at this
early stage, however, by a greater measure of judicial openness; a
more explicit recognition that questions of meaning and
communication are a necessary incident of judicial determinations of
the freedom that speech should enjoy.
544. See TRIBE, supra note 535, at 890-943, and authorities cited therein; Catherine
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
545. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (relying on speaker
intent); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (relying on audience
interpretation); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (relying on text); supra Part
II.B.
546. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (concluding that medium of the
American flag is the message); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (concluding
that medium of radio enhances and changes the force of the message); Denver Area Educ.
Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (concluding that medium
differences justify point of view distinctions by government agents and agencies); text
accompanying supra notes 135-170.
547. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995); M. Ethan
Katsch, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1681 (1995); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will
Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995); Institutional Speech, supra note 127.
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Fourth, and finally, what are the costs of courts taking one further
step and inquiring into technique? Apart from the risk of judicial
error or insensitivity which, as we have seen, is substantial but sadly
not unique to the technique inquiry,548 the inquiry into genre and
technique presents two particular problems: controlling the
definitional boundaries of genres, and ossification of genre definitions
and categories.
The boundaries of genre are not apparent or self-limiting, and
thus there is a risk that genre will, as it did in the indecency setting,
549
become so atomized that it is little more than a benign-sounding
surrogate for aesthetics. Genre should not be defined, for example, at
the level of the work of a particular artist, or even at the level of a
"school" of particular artists. 550 Instead, genre must reflect a
measurable and sufficient degree of abstraction from the specific
communication being assessed to permit objective criteria to be
disentangled from subjective, aesthetic criteria, and to allow those
objective criteria to be tested against independently verifiable and
accepted kinds or categories of expression. Without this, technique
and genre will simply collapse into aesthetics.
Genre-based analysis also poses the risk that genre definitions
will become too fixed and, perhaps, too abstract, with the consequence
that the creativity manifested in the emergence of new genres will be
quashed. The values protected by the First Amendment are not
restricted to the particular content of messages, but extend to the
forms in which communication transpires, as well. As Justice Scalia
put it, "it is quite impossible to come to an objective assessment of (at
least) literary or artistic value, there being many accomplished people
who have found literature in Dada, and art in the replication of a soup
can."551 The risk presented by a systematic focus on genre, in short, is
the risk of ossification, the risk that genre categories will become fixed
and inflexible, with a dampening effect on the creative process of
communication.
548. See discussion supra Part IV.
549. See discussion supra Part IV.F.
550. Cf Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y.
1992). Romm Art involved trademark infringement and thus not the same considerations
of genre definition, but in which the court enjoined the production of prints or posters
having the "overall look of (Tarkay's) 'Women in Cafes."' Id. at 1134-35. Tarkay is Itzchak
Tarkay, a well known Isreali artist. For a discussion of Romm Art and related cases, see
Judith B. Prowda, Application of Copyright and Trademark Law in the Protection of Style
in the VisualArts, 19 COL.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269 (1995).
551. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,504-05 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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These are risks that predictably follow from a rule permitting
courts to explore the quality of speech at the level of genre and
technique. The most effective response to them, however, is open
acknowledgment of the inquiry and its risks, not a rule prohibiting
such inquiries. Courts cannot escape genre-based determinations
under the First Amendment, for too much in existing doctrine turns
on categories of expression,552 and too many substantive rules of
liability rely for their application on genre determinations." 3 Indeed,
many of the First Amendment's most speech-protective rules rest
upon genre considerations. 554 Only in the absence of any qualifications
on the First Amendment's freedom would a First Amendment freed
from the influence of genre be possible.
So our attention must be focused not on rooting out genre
considerations in First Amendment doctrine, but on systematizing
them and bringing them to the surface of the Court's analysis so that
genre distinctions can be assessed across the full breadth of First
Amendment claims. Once they are in the open, attention must also be
given to defining the boundary between genre/technique, on the one
hand, and aesthetics, on the other. The two must be kept separate
even though, in some instances, courts might be encouraged, in the
name of the First Amendment, to take the self-conscious step beyond
the boundary and openly explore questions of aesthetic quality.
B. Aesthetic Quality as a Speech-Protective Check: The Perplexing Case of
Boggs v. Bowron
The final question to be addressed is whether there is ever a
justification for judicial inquiry into aesthetic quality, or alternatively,
whether the boundary between genre and technique, on the one hand,
552. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 928-44 (2d ed.
1988); Fred Shauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 31 VAND.
L. REV. 265 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
553. This is the case, for example, with copyright law (expression versus idea; fair use
or infringement); privacy (newsworthiness); false advertising and injurious falsehood
(advertisement; factual accuracy); defamation (public versus private function, truth);
journalism (news, editorial judgment). See discussion supra Part IV.
554. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (holding that news and criticism of public officials
are subject to actual malice privilege); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444 (holding that restriction
of political advocacy and group protest are subject to clear and present danger test);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that political campaign expenditures are
protected by strict scrutiny test); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1974) (holding that advertising is protected by First
Amendment).
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and aesthetics, on the other, is a fixed and immutable one. The
question is presented in stark relief by the case of Boggs v. Bowron
555
where judicial assessment of the aesthetic quality of J.S.G. Boggs' art
was its only hope for First Amendment protection. The case is thus
much like Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,556 where the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of Indiana's public nudity statute on
grounds that would permit its application to "Hair." Our discussion
will focus predominantly on Boggs, but will occasionally refer to the
Barnes decision.
1. Boggs v. Bowron
J.S.G. Boggs is an artist.55 7 He is a Fellow in Art and Ethics at
Carnegie Mellon University.558 His work is widely known and
respected and has been exhibited widely in America and Europe,
recently under the auspices of the Smithsonian Institution.55 9 He does
not sell his art. He barters it, exchanging pieces for other items of
value. Those who engage in barter transactions with Boggs know that
they receive art, not money, in the exchange. This is important,
because the medium Boggs has chosen for much of his art is
currency.
560
Boggs' art is visual and performative. His representations of
currency are often exacting, but they never precisely mimic the
currency portrayed, instead leaving signals that readily distinguish
Boggs Bills and the genuine article. Bartering is Boggs' way of
bringing his art "out of the museum and into the street. 5 61 The
bartering transactions involve open discussion about the currency as
Boggs' own work of art, and never involve deception or fraud.5 62
Boggs' currency paintings represent symbolic expression, a means,
according to Boggs, of "explor[ing] issues of trust, value, aesthetic
beauty and questions about the usefulness and value of art-all in a
dialogue with the viewer" 563 with whom Boggs barters.
555. 842 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1993), affd, 67 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1417 (1996).
556. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). See also supra notes 458-474 and accompanying text.
557. The facts presented here are largely taken from the district court's opinion, 842 F.
Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1993).
558. Id. at 544 n.5.
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As it turns out, the "currency art" in which Bogs engages enjoys
an established heritage as an art form. Its origins are found "in
Renaissance-born European art traditions of money painting and still
lifes." 564 In contrast, its American antecedents grew out of the clashes
about currency that emerged in the political life of the early 19th
Century. These clashes took the form of struggles to establish a
national currency and conflicts between banking and industrial
interests, on the one hand, and Midwestern farmers and populist
interests, on the other.
565
The "school" of currency art developed in the late 19th Century
as an artistic means of expression on the subject of materialism,
commerce, and political culture. Its practitioners include many well-
known artists whose work is displayed at such well-known museums as
the Metropolitan and the Corcoran Gallery of Art, as well as at the
Treasury Department. The genre characteristics of the currency
painting school, in addition to depictions of bills and notes, are subtle
alterations from the genuine note that serve to raise philosophical and
cultural questions about Value and worthlessness. Boggs' practice of
the genre follows this tradition: his paintings and their performative
bartering are intended to provoke reflection on the "interrelationships
among people, art, value, and governmental power through the device
of comic inscriptions and alterations.
5 66
Boggs began to create his currency art in 1984.567 Soon thereafter
the Secret Service took a serious interest in what he was doing.
568
However, it was not until 1992, after a number of failed attempts to
restrain and prosecute Boggs, that the Secret Service and the
Department of Justice took action. In late 1992 the Secret Service
obtained warrants to search Boggs' residence, studio, and office and
seized much of Boggs' work. In early 1993, Boggs received a cease and
desist letter from the United States Attorney for the Western District
of Pennsylvania, informing him that continued production and
distribution of his currency art could subject Boggs to prosecution
under the counterfeit laws of the United States. Boggs unsuccessfully
sought relief within the Treasury Department, then commenced an
564. Brief for Appellant, Boggs at 3, 67 F.3d 972 (No. 95-5100).
565. 842 F. Supp. at 544.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 544 n.9.
568. Id. at 545.
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action challenging the constitutionality of the counterfeiting statutes
as applied to his work. He lost.
569
Boggs' challenge to the constitutionality of the counterfeiting
statutes and regulations, and their application to his work, involved
three principal claims. First, Boggs challenged the federal statutes as
unconstitutional time, place, and manner restrictions under the First
Amendment.57 ° Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Regan v.
Time571 and the amendments thereafter made to conform to the
Court's decision, the district court rejected the First Amendment
challenge to the statute, both on its face and as applied to Boggs.572
Boggs' second claim was that the two provisions applicable to his
work could not be applied to him because both contained an implied
requirement that intent to defraud (acknowledged not to exist) be
proven. And, without such an intent requirement the provisions would
be unconstitutional because they impose criminal liability in the
absence of mens rea. The provisions made it a felony for anyone to:
possess[] any obligation.., made or executed, in whole or in part,
after the similitude of any obligation... issued under the authority
of the United States, with intent to sell or otherwise use the same; or
[to] ... make[] or execute[] any... print, or impression- in the
likeness of any such obligation.., or any part thereof, or sells any
such ... print, or impression.
''573
The district court held, on the authority of Regan, that the
provisions did not require proof of intent to defraud, but instead only
intent to "use" or "sell. ' 574 The absence of criminal intent did not
require the statute's invalidation, as mens rea is not a constitutional
requirement. 575 There was, of course, no serious dispute about Boggs'
intent to use or sell-barter-his work.
Finally, Boggs claimed that his work did not satisfy the "likeness"
or "similitude" requirements of the statute, and thus could not be
569. Id. at 546.
570. Id. at 544. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 474,504 (West Supp. 1993).
571. 468 U.S. 641 (1984). In assessing the application of the counterfeiting statutes and
regulations to Time, Inc.'s use of a currency drawing on the cover of Time magazine, the
Court in Regan interpreted the relevant statutes so as to limit their scope, and made fairly
specific suggestions about needed amendments that should be enacted to assure the
counterfeiting statutes' constitutionality. The amendments were subsequently enacted by
Congress before the Boggs matter arose. See id.; Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 550-51.
572. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 562.
573. 18 U.S.C. § 474(a) (West Supp. 1993).
574. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 560.
575. See id. at 559; Regan, 468 U.S. at 659 (Brennan, J., concurring); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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made subject to confiscation or to criminal sanctions. 576 The similitude
standard requires that a bill "bear[] such a likeness or resemblance to
any of the genuine obligations.., of the United States as is calculated
to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary
observation and care dealing with a person supposed to be upright and
honest. 5 77 The district court applied this test after viewing seized
samples of Boggs' work, and concluded as follows:
The court, having viewed the[] items and found that they have the
general pattern of general currency, including portraits in the
middle, federal reserve seals and numbers, treasury seals and
numbers, signature blocks and numeric features, in the size and color
similar to genuine currency, finds that a jury would be justified, if
not compelled, to find that these items were in the likeness and
similitude of genuine United States currency.
This court believes that many of the Boggs Bills could be passed as
genuine. Although Boggs prides himself on those characteristics of
his bills that distinguish them from real currency, some of the works
in question are far too similar to authentic currency for this court to
conclude that a jury could not find that a person of average
intelligence and ordinary observation could not readily and
immediately distinguish them from genuine currency, satisfying the
"similitude" standard.5 78
Boggs' challenge to the statute's constitutionality and its
application to his work was thus rejected, and both the declaratory
and injunctive relief he sought were denied.579 His appeal to the D.C.
Circuit was heard by Judges Buckley, Ginsburg, and Tatel, who
affirmed the district court's order in a brief, unsigned per curiam
opinion.
580
2. A Role for Aesthetics?
There are, of course, arguments that can be made about whether
specific items in Boggs' work fall within the statutory prohibitions of
the counterfeiting laws, and further arguments that the relevant
statutory provisions are not, in fact, as narrowly circumscribed as the
First Amendment might be understood to require.581 But there is no
real dispute that some of Boggs' work falls within the statutory
definitions, and the Constitutional questions, while never closed, are
576. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 560.
577. Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 807 (11th Cir. 1983)).
578. Id.
579. Id. at 562.
580. See Boggs, 67 F.2d 972.
581. Id.
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largely settled by the Supreme Court's decision in Regan v. Time,
582
which the district court in Boggs scrupulously followed. To focus
solely on those particular issues would be to miss the larger point
raised by the Boggs case and to pick at details while ignoring the
underlying problem.
The difficult problem presented by the Boggs case is how to
respond once the conventional artillery of the First Amendment is
expended and the restriction on speech has survived, yielding an
undesirable result. In Boggs, the definitional analysis employed by the
courts was unexceptionable: Boggs' bills were considered art, a
recognized genre of artistic expression fully protected by the First
Amendment. 5 3 The utilitarian analysis, too, was properly applied.
The government's interest in protecting its currency was
understandably considered a compelling one, and the most stringent
test of means was applied in testing the constitutionality of the
counterfeiting provisions.
58 4
The choice thus presented by a case such as Boggs, like the choice
presented by the previously discussed 58 5 implications of the Court's
decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,5" 6 for the play "Hair," is
whether the confiscation and loss of much of Boggs' art is simply the
price that must willingly, if grudgingly, be paid for the larger benefits
of First Amendment freedom. Or can the instances of clear mistake,
of which Boggs' might be considered an example, be clearly enough
defined and limited that an ad hoc corrective can be administered
through the exercise of wise judicial discretion?
The device of ad hoc correction, of course, is laden with risk.
First, the discretion would have to be applied under a broad standard
by district court judges or, perhaps, juries. Unevenness is an inevitable
byproduct of such a system into which political or cultural forces and
attitudes will surely creep. Indeed, even in the Boggs case it is likely
that our sympathy with his claim is based on the historical antecedents
to his work, its general acceptability in artistic circles, and the fact that
"established" museums and institutions, such as the Smithsonian and
the Corcoran Gallery, value his "Boggs' Bills." Such open-ended and
broadly channeled discretion has not met with the Supreme Court's
approval even in the obscenity setting, where the costs of error are
582. 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
583. Boggs, 842 F. Supp. at 551.
584. Id. at 551.
585. See supra notes 458-474 and accompanying text.
586. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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reduced because of the low value of sexually explicit speech.58 7 It is
thus hard to imagine the Court tolerating such a risk in the more
sensitive setting of admitted and serious artistic work.
The second risk is that courts would be invited to make
judgments about worth and quality from a purely aesthetic
perspective-on a ground that the Court has taken great pains to
avoid in the past. Aesthetics would necessarily be the criterion, as the
only cases in which ad hoc inquiry would be called for would be those
in which considerations of subject matter, meaning, effectiveness of
communication, and genre and technique had already been judged,
and in which government action had satisfied the ends and means
scrutiny under the First Amendment. Aesthetic judgments, as Holmes
suggested, are not well adapted to those "trained only to the law."
588
Alternatively, the risks of ad hoc decisions and accompanying
error and unevenness would be limited to a narrow band of cases in
which the First Amendment had already been interpreted to permit
restriction and perhaps prohibition of the expression. The risk of
error, therefore, operates in one direction only: erroneous extension
of protection where none is required.
To be sure, there is also the risk of unevenness of treatment of
cases falling within the band of otherwise unprotected speech. This is
a risk of inequality among artists and works of art, for example.589 The
Supreme Court's reception of pure equality arguments under the First
Amendment has been a cool one, however, and the risk may therefore
be tolerable.
590
But the inequality risk also presents a different problem about
which the Court has expressed substantial and recent concern: the risk
of content or point-of-view based inequality stemming even from the
underinclusiveness of a ban on otherwise prohibitable speech.591 This,
of course, is precisely the setting in which Boggs' claim to aesthetic
recognition would be judged, and the concern, as the Supreme Court
587. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
588. See supra text accompanying note 475.
589. Art, of course, would not be the only form of speech entitled to make an aesthetic
claim; the same rule would apply, for example, to satire, humor, political expression,
nonfiction, and so on.
590. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996);
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Vince Blasi, The Checking Value in
First Amendment Theory, 1977 A.B.F. RES. J. 521 (1977); Robert C. Post, Managing
Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654 (1993).
591. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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has expressed it, is that courts may not regulate speech-even by
extending protection beyond that which is constitutionally required to
some speech-"based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the
underlying message expressed."5" While it can be argued that such
content based preferences would occur, if at all, on a localized and
isolated level, not as in the R.A.V. case on a systematic basis,593 the
systematic character of the content discrimination in R.A.V. was of
uncertain significance, and is of doubtful relevance in light of the long
line of cases in which unchanneled discretion vested in public officials
has been stricken under the First Amendment.
594
The question presented by the Boggs case, and by the Indiana
nudity statute's application to "Hair" after the Glen Theatres case, is
whether in the face of these risks a limited opening for judicial
evaluation of aesthetic quality should be permitted. Assuming that the
cases to which such a rule would apply can be tightly limited and
clearly defined; that all claims of value short of the aesthetic have
been fairly judged and answered in the affirmative; and, finally, that
the aesthetic judgment would be reserved for judges alone (unlike
obscenity), perhaps aesthetics should be taken into account. In such
narrowly defined cases the risks of erroneous judgments of quality are
limited, operate only in one direction (unnecessary protection under
the First Amendment), and are unlikely to reflect systematic content
bias, and thus are tolerable. But care needs to be taken to assure that,
once out of the bag, judgments about aesthetic quality do not intrude
into other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence.
VII
Conclusion
The First Amendment's protection has never been absolute, and
it likely never will be. A protection that is limited invites, indeed
compels, boundaries to be set, distinguishing protected speech from
unprotected speech. It is at these boundaries that considerations
bearing on the quality of speech have intruded.
592. Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
593. The content distinction was set out in the very statutory definition-"arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender...."----contained in the St. Paul ordinance. St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance, ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
594. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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The fact that the First Amendment's protection for speech is
qualified does not, however, necessarily imply a regime of protection
grounded on qualitative judgments. If, for example, the First
Amendment required only that the government's justification for
restricting speech be clear and substantial, and that the regulation
serve only that interest, there would be little need to judge questions
of value, technique, and aesthetics; and questions of meaning and
communication, which are interrelated, could be highly circumscribed
and focused, as in a case involving the advocacy of illegal action where
the sole question might be whether the audience would likely be
moved to act.
If the First Amendment were tightly restricted to direct political
speech, the range of circumstances in which qualitative considerations
arise could be tightly limited. Questions of interpretation could be
focused and specialized; questions of genre and technique could be
tightly circumscribed; and there would be only one question of value.
The questions presented by entertainment, art, humor, commerce, and
literature, for example, would simply be cordoned off.
Finally, if the First Amendment could be restricted to the
personal act of speaking or writing to others the perplexing questions
of value and social utility, of meaning and effect of speech in mass
settings, of effective communication and the role of medium and
distribution, and of genre and technique could be greatly simplified.
As Owen Fiss has observed,59 5 the soap box orator in Hyde Park
presents infinitely simpler questions of meaning, communication, and
technique than does CBS, for example, or a cable television operator,
or the activities of an election campaign committee.
The First Amendment, however, has not been so limited, and in
truth it could not be. It would be anachronistic in our highly organized
and complex society to restrict protection for speech to the directly
political, even if that term could be given clear definition in today's
world. Likewise, the act of collective and individual self-expression
could not logically be limited to the personal use of the spoken or
written word. Expression is emotion and motion as well as language; it
is sound and picture and image and texture as well as word. It
transpires through technological and increasingly sophisticated means,
or mediums, like television, which cannot be ignored in First
Amendment thinking lest the most common and influential form of
595. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
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communication be written out of the fundamental social and political
pact, the Constitution.
So speech, as a practical matter, cannot be cabined. But neither
should restraints be fully loosened. All conduct, for example, is not
speech. Emotion and motion are sometimes just that; at other times
they are part of speech, but with transformative consequence, altering
and shaping speech. Money is sometimes speech, or a necessary
component of it; at other times it is just money which, when used to
buy a shirt, has no speech value whatsoever. In some instances
medium and technology may bear little relation to speech; in others
they may bear a close relationship, serving as necessary and effective
means of distributing information and ideas to others; and in yet other
instances their power may threaten social and cultural and political
traditions, undermining common interpretive referents like
authorship, fact and truth, and transforming the content of messages
in anticipated and unanticipated ways.
The serious business of the First Amendment, then, lies in
crafting distinctions, and the distinctions have an inevitable and
necessary definitional dimension. In a complex environment where
some conduct is speech and other conduct is not, a regime of
constitutional rules resting only on the strength of the government's
justification for regulating an activity and the exactness of the means it
has employed simply won't do, for applying such rules requires, first,
that the activity regulated be found to be speech protected by the First
Amendment. Answering the initial question requires the setting and
supervision of boundaries, of distinguishing what is speech from what
is not, of deciding upon its value and impact, of judging its meaning,
and of deciding upon the form, or genre, which it takes.59 6
The point I am making has two parts. The first is that the
complexity and definitional focus of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence is necessary and inevitable. We can quibble about the
details of the elaborate system of rules and doctrine, even simplify it a
bit here and a bit there, but we can not change it in fundamental ways
any more than a Luddite's dreams could be realized today.
The second point is that the elaborate First Amendment
distinctions based on definitional categories, medium-based
distinctions, and graded levels of protection all disguise, but rest upon,
596. In a real sense the First Amendment has become as centered on the management
of expression as on its freedom from regulation, for the phenomenon of expression in the
late 20th century has become too complex to govern with a few simple rules and principles.
See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995); Post, supra note 590, at 654.
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qualitative considerations. It is important that this be understood and
that the analytical distinctions imbedded in the interstices of First
Amendment doctrine be applied in recognition that qualitative
considerations are implicit in them, that judgments about quality in
many forms are both inescapable and valuable, and that quality can be
kept in its proper place under the First Amendment only if its role is
understood systematically and acknowledged openly.
Quality should not be driven axiomatically from the field of First
Amendment doctrine and theory. Only some of its forms and some of
its applications should. Quality has many faces, many component
parts. Recognizing the parts makes it possible to better understand
quality and more effectively to limit its function in judging First
Amendment claims.
I have divided quality into five parts: value of subject matter;
meaning; effectiveness of communication; technique; and aesthetics.
Alternative ways of breaking down quality and thus revealing its parts
surely exist. It is not the particular method of breaking quality down,
but the fact of breaking it down, that matters. For breaking quality
into its parts permits courts clearly to see the ways in which qualitative
judgments play a role in the application of doctrine to cases. More
importantly, it permits courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, to
apply certain criteria of quality when they should be applied and the
way they should be applied, to avoid them when they should be
avoided, and to effectively limit the qualitative inquiry in order to
better protect, in the end, the purely aesthetic dimensions of speech
from the ill-adapted hand of judges, "trained only to the law." 597
597. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (Holmes,
J.).
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